On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Privately

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Presentation transcript:

On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Privately Bhaskar DasGupta Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Chicago dasgupta@cs.uic.edu Joint work with Marco Comi, Michael Schapira and Venkatakumar Srinivasan (UIC) (Princeton) (UIC) Preliminary version appeared in SAGT 2011 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

This is a theoretical investigation We are NOT WARNING !!! This is a theoretical investigation We are NOT building any system doing any simulation work developing any software 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Traditional two-party communication complexity starting with the paper Has a rich history starting with the paper by Andy Yao in 1979 Alice Bob (communication protocol) rounds of alternate communication of small information (e.g., 1 bit, 2 bits) n-bit binary x n-bit binary y both wants to compute f (x,y) given function 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Privacy in two-party communication complexity hypothetical eavesdropper Alice Bob (communication protocol) protocol reveals as little information as possible about private inputs beyond what is necessary for computing f to: both Alice and Bob, as well as to any eavesdropper x y both wants to compute f (x,y) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Conflicting goals in privacy preservation Alice and Bob need to communicate for computing f But, Alice and Bob would prefer not to communicate too much information about their private inputs x and y 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

A Natural Generalization to more than 2 parties party1 x1 function to compute f (x1,x2,x3,x4) round robin party2 party4 common channel x2 x4 party3 x3 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Original Motivation for studying approximate privacy framework (Feigenbaum, Jaggard and Schapira, 2010) Google Advertisers 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

outcome (winner) auction mechanism Traditional goals: maximize revenue design truthful mechanism (no bidder can gain by lying) etc. information about bids outcome (winner) x1 1 2 ⁞ n auction mechanism x2 f (x1,x2,,xn) xn Bidders (e.g. advertisers) Our complementary goal (privacy) bidders want to reveal as little information as necessary to the auctioneer 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Example: 2nd price Vickrey auction via a straightforward protocol 7 $ 1 $ 6 $ 5 $ 5 $ 5 $ 5 $ 4 $ 4 $ 4 $ 7 $ 7 $ 7 $ 6 $ 6 $ 6 $ 3 $ 3 $ 3 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 2 $ 2 $ 2 $ 2 $ winner pays 6 $ Bad privacy: auctioneer knows almost everybody’s bid thus, could set a lower reserve price for a similar item in the future auction item 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Desirable: protocols that preserve privacy perfectly Perfect Privacy Desirable: protocols that preserve privacy perfectly protocols revealing no information about the parties' private inputs beyond that implied by the outcome of the computation can be quantified in several ways (e.g., via information-theoretic measures) e.g., Bar-Yehuda, Chor, Kushilevitz and Orlitsky, 1993 Kushilevitz, 1992 Perfect privacy is often: impossible, or costly to achieve (e.g., requiring impractically extensive communication steps) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Approximate Privacy (topic of our talk) Our talk deals with the approximate privacy framework of Feigenbaum, Jaggard and Schapira, 2010 Quantifies approximate privacy via the privacy approximation ratios (PAR) of protocols 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Transcript of a protocol Some terminologies Protocol a priori fixed set of rules for communication Transcript of a protocol total information (e.g., bits) exchanged during an execution of the protocol Function whatever we need to compute 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Privacy approximation ratios (PAR) Informally, PAR captures this objective observer of protocol cannot distinguish the real inputs of the two communicating parties from as large a set as possible of other inputs To capture this intuition, Feigenbaum et al. makes use of the machinery of communication-complexity theory to provide a geometric and combinatorial interpretation of protocols They formulated worst-case and average-case version of PAR and studied the tradeoff between privacy preservation and communication complexity for several functions 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Some communication complexity definitions f(c,e)= 8 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 a b c d e f g h y a b c d e f g h 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 x 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Encompasses several well-studied functions Tiling functions Encompasses several well-studied functions (e. g., Vickrey's 2nd-price auction) Informally, in a 2-variable tiling function f the output space is a collection of disjoint combinatorial rectangles (where f has the same value) in the 2-dimensional plane 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Tiling function f(x,y) y x 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Example of a non-tiling function f(x,y) 2 1 11 10 01 00 y 00 01 10 11 x 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Dissection protocols A natural class of protocols Each parties' inputs have a natural total ordering, e.g. private input of party is in some range of integers { L, L+1,,M } Protocol allows to ask each party questions of the form “Is your input between the values  and  ?” (under this natural order over possible inputs) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

One Run of Dissection Protocol f(x,y) Alice y = 00 This monochromatic rectangle got partitioned Bob x = 11 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

One Run of Bisection Protocol (special case of dissection protocol) f(x,y) Alice y = 00 Bob x = 11 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

representation of all possible executions Bisection protocol representation of all possible executions Dissection protocol representation of all possible executions 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Why cutting a monochromatic rectangle is bad? f has same output for all x1  x  x2 and y1  y  y2 y2 y’ y1 x1 x2 But, observing the protocol allows one to distinguish between these inputs (extra information revealed) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Worst Case PAR illustration protocol partition 1 cell monochromatic region of 7 cells worst-case PAR = = 7 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

( )   contribution of a cell =  Average Case PAR illustration 6 cells 2 cells 1 3 10 10 Average Case PAR illustration for almost uniform distribution Average Case PAR illustration for uniform distribution 1 3 10 10 y 3 1 10 10 2 2 2 4 probability of each cell =   x (   ) contribution of a cell =  add contributions of all cells 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results We study approximate privacy properties (PAR values) of dissection protocols for computing tiling functions (and, some generalizations) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results 2-party computation Boolean tiling functions: Every Boolean tiling function admits a dissection protocol that is perfectly privacy preserving (PAR=1) Not true otherwise (even if the function output is ternary) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

there is always a “perfect” cut Every Boolean tiling function admits a dissection protocol that is perfectly privacy preserving (PAR=1) Proof idea there is always a “perfect” cut (and, induction) 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results 2-party computation Non-Boolean tiling functions: average PAR Every tiling function admits a dissection protocol that achieves a constant PAR in the average case the parties' private values are drawn from an uniform or almost uniform probability distribution 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

2-party, constant average case PAR Uses some known geometric results Binary space partition (BSP) of rectangles each final region contains one piece Known result: there exists a BSP such that every rectangle is partitioned no more than 4 times 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results 2-party computation Non-Boolean tiling functions: worst-case PAR  tiling functions for which no dissection protocol can achieve a constant PAR in the worst-case 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

not drawn to scale 2 party, large worst-case PAR function 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 First communication 1 large PAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 large PAR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results d-party computation, d > 2 We exhibit a 3-dimensional tiling function for which every dissection protocol exhibits exponential average- and worst-case PAR even when an unlimited number of communication steps is allowed 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

3 party, large PAR 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

3-dimensional tiling function 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Lots of steps are necessary One hypothetical communication step Lots of steps are necessary Why ? Lots of monsters No two can be together Each step cuts lots of rectangles 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results Other results for 2-party computation We explain how our constant average-case PAR result for tiling functions can be extended to a family of “almost” tiling functions. 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

High-level Overview of Our Results Average and worst-case PAR for two specific functions under bisection protocol Set covering set-covering type of functions are useful for studying the differences between deterministic and non-deterministic communication complexities Equality equality function provides a useful test-bed for evaluating privacy preserving protocols 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

Average and worst-case PAR for two specific functions under bisection protocol 9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk

9/22/2018 UIC IGERT Talk