2011 Reconnaissance Summit SBCT Back brief

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Presentation transcript:

2011 Reconnaissance Summit SBCT Back brief UNCLASSIFIED 2011 Reconnaissance Summit SBCT Back brief 8 April 2011 COL Dixon Gunther

WAS/CAM Reconnaissance Emerging Insights SBCT Shift from CAM to WAS (and visa/versa) impacts amount of empowerment that can be delegated, primarily based on the need and ability to mass effects. Both still require clearly stated Task and Purpose. CAM Requires Leader Training for massing of effects SA of UAS for dismounted capability – who gets the UAS feed? Identification of Main and Supporting efforts. Emphasis on weighting efforts The Recce platoon lacks the ability to protect itself against & defeat similarly equipped threat elements WAS How much does each BCT need of the capability to fight for reconnaissance versus surveillance? Inadequate dismounted capability that can fight/interact for information Recce platoon lacks the ability to employ precision fires while protecting populations and infrastructure co-creation of context   A continuous process in which commanders direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes commanders to refine operations based on their improved understanding of the situation. wide area security The application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. combined arms maneuver The application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

Doctrine (1 of 2) Issues: Shift from CAM to WAS and visa/versa impacts amount of empowerment and control afforded a Troop CDR from a Squadron Commander. Clearly stated task & purpose remains critical IPB is a continuous process. Needs to be built and passed on…and updated. We have gotten away from identifying the Decisive (Main) and Shaping (Supporting) efforts. An emphasis on weighted efforts especially in CAM. Recommendation: Articulate what a PLT/Troop is expected to do in WAS and CAM and that transition WAS/CAM means that a Squadron Commander has to provide “left and right limits” to Troop Commanders. Clear task and purpose. This needs to be reinforced/reflected in BCT doctrinal manuals. Task/Purpose for RECON. Decision support tools are critical to assisting Commanders in determining “when to call the boss”.

Doctrine (2 of 2) Issues: The RECON Platoon is supposed to collect information (FM 3.20.98) – does it have the ability in WAS “to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities, deny the enemy positions of advantage”. Recon or Cavalry? (just looking vice ability to ‘fight for information’) A Reconnaissance element still has to be able to fight – at a minimum, for its own survival. Use of the term “targeting” especially WRT non lethal & USAID. All the BCTs cannot do the same mission against the same type of threat. Organizational changes (Stryker Recce versus ARS HBCT Recce). Recommendation: Articulate what a PLT/Troop is expected to do in WAS and CAM and that transition. WAS/CAM means that a Squadron Commander has to provide “left and right limits” to Troop Commanders.

Organization (1 of 1) Issues: Lacks appropriate dismounted reconnaissance capability that can fight/interact for information Needed precision direct/indirect fire to protect the population while not creating collateral damage and provide additional dismounted long range observation capability (reduce RECON signature) Ability to utilize non-lethal Squadron Commander lacks his own organic mortar system to support Troops in contact SA/SU of the situation for dismounted elements - Where does the UAS feed go? Recommendation: Precision small arms (Sniper/SDM) capability needed at PLT level 60mm and 81mm mortars needed at Troop level 120mm mortars needed at Squadron level Voice Intercept capability needed at Troop level. Retain the 39 x 35M in the formation. Ensure the 54 x 19D promised in 2008 are effective in FY 2012. Scouts must retain similar optics and communications capabilities, whether mounted or dismounted (current dismounted capabilities are lacking).

Training (1 of 1) We have gotten away from massing fires (in WAS/CAM) – We must get back to it. Air/Ground integration and airspace deconfliction must be trained at platoon level and below. Issue: To be a truly immersive L/V/C/G environment, the live integration should be going on WHILE the computer game is still going on. As many different simultaneous inputs as possible – continuously. Forcing different decisions and multiple repetitions. Recommendation: Reinforce L/V/C/G at the Institutional level by modeling the training in BOLC/MPCC/ALC/SLC Build VBS2 scenarios that can be pulled “off the shelf” by BCTCs across the Army

Leader Development (1 of 1) Issues: Leader training for massing of effects in CAM/WAS At what level does the institutional force introduce KLEs related to collecting/”fighting for” information? A troop Commander is the key focus for KLEs but other leaders within the troop must be ready to do the same. Negotiation/Conflict Resolution training. The ZOPA – etc. Where does that occur in the institution? Recommendation: BOLC/MCCC/SLC/ALC interactive Avatar training (DRI). Virtual trainer.

Material (1 of 1) Issues: RV as configured today appropriate for the future OE? LRAS capability? (Soldier exposed in order to work the system)? RWS capability? (especially if you lose an exposed Soldier to a PKM) RWS-J capability? Squad Leader Hatch? OSRVT in every truck for video feeds? Lacks ability to collect short range voice intercepts Recommendation: The CDD for the RV is being staffed –today. As written, the emphasis is on protecting the system at the expense of dismounted capability, integrating an RWS with LRAS etc. This is a reflection of the need for the CDD to mirror/become old FCS capable. If the SBCT is suited for Small Scale Contingencies, is there risk to be assumed and make ICVs with RV capability? Does this need to change?