Innovations for Grid Security from Trusted Computing

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Presentation transcript:

Innovations for Grid Security from Trusted Computing 2018/11/9 Innovations for Grid Security from Trusted Computing Wenbo Mao Trusted Systems Lab Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Bristol United Kingdom Joint work with Hai Jin, Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Tech., China Andrew Martin, Oxford University, UK HP template

What’s in this Presentation 2018/11/9 What’s in this Presentation Overview of Trusted Computing TC Working Principle TC for Grid Security 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing in a Nutshell 2018/11/9 Trusted Computing in a Nutshell A temper-resistant hardware based system for a systematic fix of security problems with open platforms, while remaining in open-platform architecture preventing release of critical data into undesired software environments conformed platform/user security policies: even sys-administrator can’t override policies An important requirement: low cost (target: < $5 per platform) 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 From TCPA to TCG Founded in 1999 as Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) by: Compaq HP IBM Intel Microsoft Renamed to Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in 2003 when TCPA reached 190+ member companies https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

TCG: not-for-profit, vendor neutral and industrial & open standards 2018/11/9 TCG: not-for-profit, vendor neutral and industrial & open standards The Board Technical Committee Marketing Committee TPM Conformance PC-specific PDA Mobile ‘phone Servers Infrastructure Peripherals HDD Keyboard Promoted by: AMD, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Sony, Sun 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Platform Architecture 2018/11/9 Trusted Platform Architecture TPM --- Trusted Platform Module --- a tamper-resistant hardware module mounted in a platform App1 App2 App3 .…… App n protected encrypted executables files OS TPM Boot Processes keys & passwords measurement & reporting 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 Deployment Status TPM v1.1b First generation platforms from HP and IBM – available since 2004 This notebook machine has one TPM v1.2 Second generation platforms based on new offerings (eg, measurement, attestation) from AMD, Intel, MS – available 2006 ? TPM (security chip) vendors Atmel, Infineon, National Semiconductor, Sinosun 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 TCG Benefits TCG is designed so that platform identities and Integrity Metrics can be proven reliably to remote parties Secure storage of crypto keys in TPM X.509 to be widely deployed in the vast client environment Secure online discovery of platforms and services: confidence in the information about the software environment and identity of a remote party Protection against hacker scripts, by automatically preventing access to data if unauthorised programs are executed 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

What’s in this Presentation 2018/11/9 What’s in this Presentation Overview of Trusted Computing TC Working Principle TC for Grid Security 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 How it Works…. TCG mechanisms for: Protected Storage and Execution Protect private and secret data Protected environment against malicious code subversion Platform Integrity Measurement and Storage Reliably measure software integrity property Securely store measured platform and s/w integrity Platform Status Attestation Report integrity properties to a remote challenging party Using crypto challenge-response mechanism and digital signature 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 Trusted Platform Module (TPM, Hardware): Protected (tamper-resist) Storage and Execution Hash Processor NV-memory Asymmetric key generation RNG Memory Power detection Digital sign & asymm crypto Clock/Counter Communications I/O MAC PCR 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 TPM Crypto Systems on the Chip: SHA-1 hash, HMAC (hashed msg authentication code) Random number generation (physical) Asymmetric key generation (2048-bit RSA) Asymmetric crypto encryption and signing(RSA PKCS#1v2) Symmetric crypto is performed off-chip (to achieve high performance and avoid exportation control) 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM): Authenticated Boot 2018/11/9 Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM): Authenticated Boot 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 Integrity Measurement and Storage: Platform Configuration Register (PCR) An integrity measurement of an executable is a SHA-1 hash of 160-bit checksum (aka “crypto digest”) The integrity measurement of executables is cumulatively stored in a PCR: PCR  H( executable || PCR ) What can be measured and cumulatively stored (cannot be overwritten until reboot): BIOS, ROMs, MBR (static PCRs: no 0-4) OS loaders (static PCRs: no 5-7) Trusted OS’s (static PCRs: no 8-15) Trusted Applications (dynamic PCRs: no 21-22) 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 Platform Attestation: Reporting System Integrity Status to a Remote Party Stored system integrity status can be reported to a remote party using crypto challenge-response mechanism and digital signature TPM will use a user’s “attestation identity key (AIK)” to sign the system integrity report 1 Alice  TPM-for-Bob: RandomN, “Status quo for PCR3?” 2 TPM-for-Bob  Alice: Sign(PrivateAIK, RandomN, PCR3) 3 Alice verifies signature using Bob’s PublicAIK 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

What’s in this Presentation 2018/11/9 What’s in this Presentation Overview of Trusted Computing TC Working Principle TC for Grid Security 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

TC for Grid Security “Offer I”: Secure Key Storage 2018/11/9 TC for Grid Security “Offer I”: Secure Key Storage Tamper-resistant TPM is a natural place to store crypto keys, no need of using short-lived keys and “proxy certificates” with private key stored in file space TPM of a client can be for multi users, each user can have a user key which can’t even be accessed by sys-admin Secure key storage permits a longer lifetime for a certificate; it can be easier to achieve IPSec for Grid security at the node level, rather than being confined to “identity certificate” at the user level as in the case of the current GSI 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 TC for Grid Security “Offer II”: group-oriented security from distributed FW A conventional firewall is based on network topology: one-side is all trusted, the other side is assumed all enemies; but a Grid VO has no such network topology Distributed firewall (Bellovin et al): With secure means for key storage by each IP node, IPSec can be in place IP packets can be filtered or accepted according to VO policy and IPSec signatures (in IPSec, each packet is signed) With distributed firewall, a Grid VO forms a trust domain and achieves good group-oriented security 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 TC for Grid Security “Offer III”: Attestation of Secure Guest Environment Attestation of secure virtualization: A remote platform (eg, a Grid server) is attested by a guest such that it has the following behaviour of “virtualized OS in curtained memory”: (1) a memory area is allocated to run a virtualized secure OS environment which cannot even be accessed by the platform owner (eg, system administrator); (2) a proprietary code of a guest is encrypted under a public key where the matching private key is in the TPM; the encrypted code is sent to the TPM; (3) TPM decrypts and loads the proprietary code to run in the virtualized OS for the guest … No conventional security mechanism can offer a solution to this typical Grid computing scenario. It is the remote platform attestation that has played the trick. 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

It’s time to work on “TC for Grid Security” 2018/11/9 It’s time to work on “TC for Grid Security” “Offer I” is available now (this machine has a TPM v1.1b) so “Offer I” is readily compatible with GSI (Security Area RG started in GGF13) node level certificate is ready for realizing IPSec user level certificate is ready for property-based credentials “Offers II & III” address exactly fundamental limitations of GSI; the issue here is to augment GSI IPSec deployment will be sped up by TC, hence distributed firewall should start consideration for GSI integrity attestation is with TPM v1.2 and beyond (available in 2006); virtualization work is now underway IDC predicts: 20 million TPM platforms to be delivered by end of 2005, and by 2007, 70% of the platforms world wide will have TPMs Microsft “Longhorn” OS will use TPM, available in 2006 Future: with Grid & TC both in open-platform architecture, they can co-develop without major obstacle 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

Trusted Computing overview 2018/11/9 Work in GGF A GGF new project, TC-RG, has been created: https://forge.gridforum.org/projects/tc-rg Offer I (i.e., augmenting GSI with TPM for crypto key repository) has been planned for completion in one-year timeframe Offers II & III are to be researched further A paper version of this presentation can be downloaded from the above URL 2018年11月9日星期五 Trusted Computing overview HP template

2018/11/9 HP template