Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the Second Nuclear Age Andrew Krepinevich Jacob Cohn

Click to edit Master title style Presentation Roadmap Click to edit Master title style Project Overview Why Scenarios? Five Scenarios Selected Observations and Insights Next Steps

Project Overview

Click to edit Master title style Project Objectives Click to edit Master title style How can scenarios support efforts to craft policies designed to reduce the chances of nuclear use? What would constitute a representative set of scenarios that are characteristic of the Second Nuclear Age, rather than the preceding age? Given these scenarios, what are some of the first-order implications they raise with respect to nuclear policy, strategy, and force posture?

Why Scenarios?

Click to edit Master title style Scenarios Click to edit Master title style Scenarios: A tool for helping us plan in an uncertain world; an antidote to “willful ignorance” A need for effective strategic thinking is most obvious in times of accelerated change While the future is fundamentally unpredictable; it is not wholly uncertain

Click to edit Master title style Why Scenarios? Click to edit Master title style   Do not “predict” the future; rather, they help us to think about the future Help identify what factors will most shape the future Understand how the environment might change Recognize when the environment is changing Know how to respond when change is detected

Click to edit Master title style “Drivers” Click to edit Master title style Geostrategic: Multipolar regional and global competitions Geopolitical: Regime characteristics; external sources of influence Geographic: Proximity and “interspersing” Cultural: The Human Condition; differing perspectives on cost, benefit and risk

Click to edit Master title style “Drivers” Click to edit Master title style Military-Technical: Advanced design nuclear weapons The maturation of the precision-guided weapons regime Advanced air and missile defenses Cyber munitions Military Capabilities: Size and composition of strategic forces Proliferation Dynamics: Static, linear or non-linear? Temporal: Mobilization, early warning, command-and-control

Five Scenarios

Click to edit Master title style Scenarios Click to edit Master title style Iran, Israel and the Crisis Neither Sought An “N-Player” Middle East Confrontation Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” threat North Korea’s “Rational” Option China and the Long-Term Great Power Competition 4 crisis scenarios – 2 in ME, 1 in Eastern Europe, and 1 in East Asia 1 long term competition – US, China, Russia For each scenario – what are the key drivers and what characteristics of the second nuclear age do the scenarios identify

Middle East

Iran and Israel to the Brink Click to edit Master title style Scenario (2016 – 2020) Economic: Joint Agreement unfreezes Iranian assets and ends many economic sanctions Proxies: Tehran’s “slow squeeze” of Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Israel Crisis: Third Lebanon War expands to direct conflict between Israel and Iran; both sides concerned about preemptive nuclear attack Destabilizing Factors Geographic proximity and limits of Early Warning/C2 Predelegation of authority Nuclear doctrine Proxies – assert regional dominance Crisis – instead of continuing to fight increasingly effective proxies; Israel goes for the head of the snake. NOW two undeclared powers facing off Nuclear: July 2020 – estimated stockpile of four to six weapons + two to three additional weapons annually Crisis: November 22, 2020 Hezbollah rocket attack strikes oil refinery at Haifa killing 34 Israelis and wounding nearly 200. Tens of thousands are evacuated due to the intensity of the fires and the presence of toxic fumes. Severe economic damage as the refinery is one of only two in the country. Israeli people demand retaliation – SLCMs & air strikes target Iran’s Abadan oil refinery on December 6, 2020. Israeli retaliation produces far greater destruction and loss of life than Hezbollah attack (oil surges from $71/bbl to $108/bbl). RESULT – nuclear standoff Planning Considerations: Iran concerned about EW/C2 vulnerabilities since Iranian IADS did not attack Israeli strike on Abadan oil refinery in advance Enhanced missile defense capacity (if the U.S. deployed more forces to the region) would reduce the potential of a “Haystack” attack Iran can’t maintain alert status indefinitely, within a week or two at most some forces will have to stand down creating a window of opportunity for Israel CYBERCOM says could launch CAN against EW/C2 systems making it difficult/impossible for Iran to launch with 90% chance of success. Israeli arsenal is sufficiently large that the addition of U.S. nuclear forces would be irrelevant. Also, Israeli nuclear forces are more flexible and closer allowing Israel to execute a prompt attack more effectively than STRATCOM

The “N-Player” Problem Click to edit Master title style Scenario (2016 – 2020) Excursion from previous scenario focusing on the “N-Player” problem Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE expect same nuclear freedom as granted to Iran Saudi Arabia jumpstarts nuclear program with Pakistan’s assistance September 2018, Pakistan deploys nuclear IRBMs to Saudi Arabia Destabilizing Factors Attribution problem Will the U.S. protect its allies equally? Nuclear: Egypt and Turkey undertake modest increases in nuclear enterprise investments UAE purchases several thousand centrifuges as part of significant expansion of nuclear infrastructure Saudi Arabia (with Pakistan’s assistance) constructs a large-scale, distributed, and hardened nuclear infrastructure. Imports thousands of advanced centrifuges and large quantities of uranium ore from Jordan Pakistan supplies technical know how and potentially HEU September 2018, Pakistan deploys 16 IRBMs to deter both Iran and Israel Riyadh insists missiles have dual key control (NATO model); Iran believes missiles are under the sole control of Saudi Arabia Crisis: Potential for conflict to extend to South Asia if Pakistan defends Saudi Arabia. Would a Saudi Arabian nuclear strike (if not under dual key control) be viewed as having occurred with Pakistan’s approval, thus broadening the conflict regardless of Pakistan’s actual support for Saudi actions? Planning Considerations For instance, suppose Iran’s EW/C2 capabilities are interrupted by a CNA as a precursor to a nuclear attack. How would Iran know if Israel or Saudi Arabia was responsible? Will the U.S. limit the interceptors used in defense of Saudi Arabia to guarantee a minimum reserve to defend Israel Missile defense systems are a high demand/low supply asset. Shifting weapons could create vulnerability in another region. Likewise, shifting weapons create incentive to attack now, before redeployment is complete.

Eastern Europe

Sub-Conventional Aggression in Latvia Click to edit Master title style Scenario (2016 – 2018) Economic: Falling oil and gas prices, continued economic sanctions Security: Increasing insecurity as ISIS attributed terror attacks mount Timing: Low domestic approval and weakening internal control near election Crisis: Creeping aggression in Latvia, incorrectly assuming NATO would not intervene, Russia backed into a losing conventional position Destabilizing Factors Alliance management Deterring the “escalate to deescalate” threat Ability of non-nuclear weapons to fill nuclear missions Gaps in the escalation ladder Mobilization race – can Russia consolidate its gains before NATO can deploy sufficient forces to restore Latvia’s territorial integrity

North Korea

Click to edit Master title style North Korea Click to edit Master title style Scenario (2016 – 2021) Economic: Economic reform backfires, by 2019 the situation is desperate Nuclear: Believed to have nuclear capable Taepodong-3s and Nodongs Arms Control: Concessions viewed as a path to regime change Crisis: Nuclear strike on Japan as last ditch effort to stave off regime collapse Destabilizing Factors (Mis)perceptions of leaders Alliance management Vulnerability of missile defenses to Haystack tactic Vulnerability of small arsenals to missile defense Economic: Following weak harvest in 2016 and declining foreign support, Kim Jong-un creates a FEZ west of Pyongyang along the West Korea Bay coast and leverage low labor costs to attract Chinese and South Korean investment and technology Also allows farming for personnel consumption or tax-free sale (quarter hectare per farmer) Successful in 2018 (record harvest and significant Chinese investment), but by late 2019 economic liberalization has failed Corruption and skill mismatch with respect to industry favored by the regime results in failure of the FEZ Agricultural growth from 2018 is squandered as the regime imposes additional regulations, hampering incentives to work, and a drought stunts crop growth China unwilling to expand its subsidies economic growth is ~4% and the drought that effected North Korea is effecting China too Nuclear: Taepodong-3 tested between 2,500 and 3,700 miles, which can threaten U.S. forces in Japan, Guam, and out to Singapore (three successful tests) 20 KT underground test 15 – 25 nuclear weapons total with roughly 10 – 20 mated to ballistic missiles Arms Control: The U.S., South Korea, and Japan recognize Pyongyang’s gambit and insist upon major up-front concessions that must translate into concrete action and be fully implemented prior to the North receiving any assistance Kim Jong-un views the “Iranian model” of nuclear development as preferable, seeing concessions on arms control (like Muammar Qaddafi) as a path towards death and/or regime change. Crisis Target Kitakyushu (Kyushu) with a 54 missile salvo (only five with nuclear warheads) - tens of thousands of casualties from 9 KT blast Offensive against South Korea rule out since the KPA lacks the ability to mount a major combined-arms offensive and the KPA’s limited inventory of ballistic missiles must be reserved for Haystack strikes Demonstration shot is ruled out since Pyongyang’s arsenal is too small to justify “wasting” a warhead like that and also because Kim does not want to give the US time to deploy more BMD assets EMP shot ruled out since North Korea does not have the rocket technology or a sufficiently large warhead to reliably generate an EMP effect (must be at least 30 km above the earth) and to have a widespread effect, it requires a large warhead (at least 1 MT) Planning Considerations Japan and South Korea want different degrees of assurance from the U.S. POTUS believed that trading assistance for real restrictions on nuclear capabilities provides Kim a “win-win” option – complete misunderstanding of Kim’s calculus

Long-Term Competition with China and Russia

Long-Term Multipolar Competition Click to edit Master title style Scenario (2017 – 2020) Economic: Economic slowdown leaves regime reliant on nationalism Geopolitical: Setbacks in South China Sea/East China Sea stress last pillar Military-Technical: U.S. CPGS development and Russian violation of INF treaty raises concerns over vertical escalation vulnerability Nuclear: Fissile material is the principal near-term barrier to growing China’s arsenal; decision made to seek balance with U.S. and Russia Destabilizing Factors What force structure is needed for a multipolar competition? Avoiding an arms race & the role of arms control Effect of geographic proximity – nuclear overflight Four pillars of legitimacy: democracy; ideology; economic growth; nationalism Economic growth threatened by… Slow growth in rest of world (hamper China’s export driven growth) Unfavorable demography with growing dependency ratio Environmental degradation/water shortages Internal corruption Rise of relatively cheap/skilled labor in South and Southeast Asia Geopolitical USN continues FONOPS despite Beijing’s protests In September 2017, Beijing declares ADIZ over SCS. U.S. ignores the ADIZ and USAF and USN elements conduct regular FONOPS Putin concerned over Chinese nationals in Siberia – if we don’t do something soon, the Russian population will be speaking Chinese, Japanese, and Korean – and is strengthening nuclear capabilities along the frontier (deployment of RS-26) Nuclear Estimated PRC nuke inventory of 500 weapons in 2020, growing at a rate of 100 – 150 weapons annually MIRV all ICBMs Equip MRBMs with nuclear warheads Planning Considerations Update the escalation ladder to include CPGS, cyber weapons, and advanced air and missile defenses? Is there a need for a tailorable weapons and a greater variety of delivery systems (e.g., IRBMs)? U.S. vs China conflict would overfly Russia Short flight times and vulnerabilities of EW/C2 could create movement to reconstitute Soviet-style Perimeter system

Selected Insights and Observations

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style The “Nuclear Balance” is now the “Strategic Balance” Wide range of capabilities; many non-nuclear New vertical and horizontal escalation ladders The Bipolar structure is transitioning to a Multipolar structure Global and regional competitions Strategies for deterring one rival may weaken deterrence with another A nuclear “great game” Potential for non-nuclear powers to play

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style The Challenge of Extended Deterrence What is reassuring for one may not be for another Need to review along with revised escalation ladders The Death of “Rational Strategic Man” Single, rational unitary actor model long discredited Crises lead to thinking “fast,” not “slow” Prospect Theory suggests coercion strategies may be a “dead end”

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style The Erosion of Crisis Stability Geographic Proximity, Early Warning, Command-and-Control, Pre-delegation Authority and Human Cognitive Limitations Cyber Munitions and Catalytic War Problems with Prompt Attribution Blurring of Strategic and Non-Strategic Strikes Undeclared Arsenals Multiple Extended Deterrence Commitments Haystack Attacks 1914 Redux: The Mobilization of Missile Defenses

Selected Insights and Observations Click to edit Master title style Arms Control From New START to the Washington Naval Treaty “Multidimensional” Problems “Multipolar” Problems Enforcement and Verification Challenges Implications for the U.S. Strategic Posture Old metrics may no longer apply More options needed Position matters in a mobilization race Potential gap between commitments and capabilities (extended deterrence) Which scenarios are accorded priority? A need to think long term

Next Steps

Click to edit Master title style Selected Next Steps Click to edit Master title style Undertake Strategic Net Assessments on global, regional and functional aspects of the competition Comparative assessment of strategic doctrines Identify strategic planning issues that emerge across scenarios Develop a set of the “missing” scenarios (e.g.; India-Pakistan; nuclear war termination)

Click to edit Master title style Selected Next Steps Click to edit Master title style Develop a revised set of metrics to guide efforts to assess the strategic force balance(s) Update horizontal and vertical escalation ladders Assess prospects for regulating the strategic competition (such as a contemporary version of the Washington Naval Treaty) Examine ongoing efforts among the competitors to enhance their strategic forces, identifying major asymmetries in doctrine, forces and their implications

Questions?