Director, Office of Special Projects Safety and Security at Chemical Plants CBRNe CONVERGENCE 28-30 October 2009 World Forum Centre The Hague Krzysztof Paturej Director, Office of Special Projects Office of Special Projects

Overview of Presentation Status of the CWC implementation OPCW contribution to anti-terrorism efforts Cooperation with the international bodies OPCW’s role in chemical safety and security Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects CWC - Four Pillars Verifiable elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and associated production facilities Non-proliferation Assistance and Protection International co-operation in peaceful application of chemical science and technology Office of Special Projects

Verifiable elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles Total and complete chemical disarmament is a core and urgent objective of the OPCW; The Technical Secretariat verifies the declared stockpiles and then monitors their destruction until the process is completed; About 85% of our inspection effort is dedicated to this segment of the Convention; Status 4 Possessor States ( +3 former possessors Albania, India and A State Party already destroyed its stockpiles) - in total 71,000 tonnes of chemical-warfare agents have been declared. Current Possessor States are: Russia, USA, Libya and Iraq Currently more than 50 % of the declared stockpiles has been verifiably destroyed. Deadline for destruction is 2012. Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects CWC - Universality 188 States Parties 2 Signatory States 5 Non-Signatory Signatory States Israel Myanmar Non-Signatory States Angola Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Egypt Somalia Syrian Arab Republic Office of Special Projects

Chemical Weapons Non-proliferation CW non-proliferation means that when existing chemical arsenals are destroyed, no new chemical weapons should appear in the current or former possessor states or anywhere else; Second OPCW core objective Non-proliferation of chemical weapons, through application of the verification and implementation measures provided for in the CWC also serve to build confidence between States Parties CWC non-proliferation require establishing and maintaining national controls of toxic chemicals (including dual-use materials), without in any way impeding developments in the chemical activities that are not prohibited under the CWC. Over 98% of chemical industry under CWC Over 1500 inspections conducted Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Non-proliferation Activities Developing channels of communication with the Member States and CWC stakeholders to support promotion of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Supporting and conducting events with CWC stakeholders to promote active OPCW non-proliferation policies, and developing cooperation with Member States and CWC stakeholders with a view to comprehensive implementation of the CWC within national non-proliferation policies. Continuing to inform the Director-General about the developments and challenges in the sphere of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Developing contacts and cooperative policies to be maintained with international partners on non-proliferation, including the 1540 Committee. Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Threat of Terrorism with use of chemicals– significant chemical weapons threat since CWC entry into force chemicals and relevant production equipment are readily available multiple chlorine attacks in Iraq, attempts to acquire toxic chemicals for terrorist purposes; use of improvised chemical devices use of chemical weapons by terrorists could have devastating consequences, resulting in thousands of casualties, economic and social disruption Chemical plants world-wide are at risk for receiving a terrorist attack Office of Special Projects

OEWG – Platform for practical co-operation Implementing Art. X – core activity Engaging CWC stakeholders, including chemical industry, and promoting safety and security of chemical plants OPCW as a forum for exchanges and sharing best practices Strengthening the interaction with the relevant international organisations Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Cooperation with the International Bodies The Secretariat has established and maintained channels of communication with a number of regional, sub-regional, and international organisations and agencies in the field of counter-terrorism. The aim of these contacts are to identify ways in which these organisations can assist one another, pursuant to relevant mandates, by exchanging information, knowledge, and expertise as needed, and by coordinating programme activities that relate to action against terrorism. Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/288, dated 8 September 2006 “Encourages the IAEA and the OPCW to continue their efforts, within their respective mandates, to help States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical, or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities, and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials.” Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Safety and Security at Chemical Plants - A new issue arising from the Second Review Conference The Second Review Conference reaffirmed concerns expressed at the First Review Conference that chemical facilities may become subject to attacks or other incidents that could lead to the release or theft of toxic chemicals. The Second Review Conference welcomed the fact that some States Parties had taken measures to minimise such risks and encouraged States Parties to exchange experiences and discuss related issues. It noted the value of Article X in this respect and the role of the OPCW as a forum for consultation and cooperation among the States Parties. The Second Review Conference recognised the need for close cooperation with other relevant international organisations and agencies active in this field. Office of Special Projects

Building the OPCW role in the chemical safety and security With the rapid development of chemical industry production and its spread to new areas of the world the question of security in the area of legitimate production, transportation and use of chemicals is assuming much higher importance. The risk of terrorist attacks using the toxic properties of industrial chemicals adds additional urgency to the problem Enhancing chemical security culture will provide greater assurance that the national chemical security systems will accomplish their functions of preventing, detecting and responding to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer of chemical material and the associated facilities and transport. Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects OPCW as a platform of support for global cooperation in chemical safety and security The Technical Secretariat develops an analysis on “the OPCW role in development of chemical safety and security”. The analysis shall be considered as a process of gathering relevant knowledge, expertise and practical experience to be offered the States Parties and the chemical industry; Main dimension - to develop the role of the OPCW as a platform (venue) of support for global cooperation in reducing the chemical threat by promoting awareness of chemical safety and security best practices by fostering cooperation between chemical professionals (ref. CWC Art. VIII – OPCW as a forum for consultation and cooperation) Office of Special Projects

OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at chemical facilities The OPCW will NOT: - have an independent role; - develop expertise within the Technical Secretariat on Chemical safety and Security issues; - include chemical safety and security issues in inspection and verification activities; - develop regulatory measures; - develop guidance or advise on chemical safety and security issues; ICCA, CEFIC, Member States, national chemical associations, scientific community, and the relevant international organisations will be invited to work, on voluntary basis, to join these efforts Since there are no relevant resources at the Secretariat, the OPCW contribution to enhancing the security of chemical facilities should rely mainly on resources and assistance from and through States Parties. First financial contribution was made by Saudi Arabia to support OPCW as a useful platform of exchanging experiences and support for global cooperation in lessening chemical threat by promoting awareness of chemical security best practices, as an important development in the Art XI implementation Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at chemical facilities – continued Working together with the chemical industry associations and relevant government agencies, OPCW as a platform (venue) will support decreasing the chemical threat by: raising awareness and improving chemical safety and security best practices; exchanging of information and building networks on relevant issues related to chemical safety and security; Keeping States Parties fully abreast of developments in the sphere of chemical safety and security best practices, by seeking and disseminating information and views from the National Authorities and relevant national agencies, chemical industry (for example, via chemical industry associations – Responsible Care), in the academic community (for example, via the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC)); Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at chemical facilities – continued Increase the OPCW role and capacity in the field of emergency response. Increase the importance of Art. X as a forum for cooperation between Member States and chemical industries stakeholders in the field of response to chemical emergencies; Use of expertise available in the chemical industry for provision of technical advice to Member States in the framework of implementation of Art. X and XI; Assist developing countries to participate in the industry programmes related to safety and security of chemical plants Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Conclusions When chemical disarmament is completed, CW non-proliferation will remain a permanent concern; OPCW has built a consensus that national implementation measures are critical to prevent production or transfer of CW or misuse of chemicals - OSP supports practical implementation of this commitment. OPCW develops programs and activities to support Members in their policies and practices against proliferation of chemical weapons and terrorism with use of toxic chemicals There is a growing support from Member States and CWC stakeholders for the OPCW as a platform to advance chemical safety and security with regional dimension and multi-stakeholder participation Office of Special Projects

Office of Special Projects Thank you ! QUESTIONS ? Office of Special Projects