Christos Zamantzas for the BLM team

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Presentation transcript:

Christos Zamantzas for the BLM team LHC Beam Loss Monitoring System LHC Beam Commissioning Workshop 19-20 January 2010 Christos Zamantzas for the BLM team Bernd Dehning, Claudine Chery, Ewald Effinger, Jonathan Emery, Csaba Jr Hajdu, Eva Barbara Holzer, Christoph Kurfuerst, Aurelien Marsili, Annika Nordt, Mariusz Sapinski, Raymond Tissier, Giuseppe Guido Venturini

Contents Acquisition Threshold Values Processing Applications & Databases Reliability

Section 1: Acquisition

Offset Level Relevant for: Minimum detectable signal or Sensitivity of loss measurements False triggers – LHC availability Mean offset values for all IC monitors 1 hours of data – 18/12/2009 Offset [pA] % of total Comments 1-8 6.91% Too low (problem has been identified) 10-20 77.71% Very good 20-30 6.83% Good 30-80 3.28% High (DAC reset needed) >80 5.00% Problematic =0 0.28% no data (faulty cards/connections) 18.12.2009 18.12.2009 - 01.01.2010

Noise Level Several cables have been exchanged some of them 800m long Single channel frequency distribution: Noise on short cable (RS01) Noise in RS01 for all IC monitors 9 hours of data; maximum values – 13/01/2010 Noise [BITS] Monitors % of total Comments 1-30 1083 30.1% very good 30-100 1646 45.7% good 100-200 600 16.7% ok 200-300 201 5.6% candidates for problematic channels > 300 54 1.5% critical noise (channels to be repaired) = 0 18 0.5% no data from 3 cards Several cables have been exchanged some of them 800m long Installation consists of 3 batches from different manufacturers Expected noise reduction Standard cables is factor 2 New cables is > factor 5 (single pair shielded) Mid-term plan use new type of cables Noise on long cable (RS01)

Noise Level Max. noise value frequency distribution: Ionisation Chambers (3602) Noise in RS01 for all IC monitors 9 hours of data; maximum values – 13/01/2010 Noise [BITS] Monitors % of total Comments 1-30 1083 30.1% very good 30-100 1646 45.7% good 100-200 600 16.7% ok 200-300 201 5.6% candidates for problematic channels > 300 54 1.5% critical noise (channels to be repaired) = 0 18 0.5% no data from 3 cards Installation consists of 3 batches from different manufacturers Several cables have been exchanged some of them 800m long Expected noise reduction Standard cables is factor 2 New cables is > factor 5 (single pair shielded) Mid-term plan use new type of cables Secondary Emission Monitors (302)

Ongoing Modifications Some acquisition cards need to be exchanged Cards affected ~ 4% Too low offset current Interconnection boxes Ionisation of the air inside the box measured Adding better isolation to all SEM Global reset of cards not reliable Cards affected ~ 5% Expected to get some improvement with WorldFIP; uncertain on WorldFIP reliability under radiation Currently only point 6 has been connected.

Over-Injection problem BLMQI.03L2.B2I30_MQXA BLMQI.03R8.B1I30_MQXA Problem consists of losses at the LHC TDI and exceeding thresholds at the MQXA Some small difference between injected beams Installation has been verified to be correct.

Over-Injection tests Extensive tests done (with beam 2): Over-injection, TDI open, 2e9 proton Injection on closed TDI (+- 3mm), kicker off Injection on closed TDI (+- 3mm) and TCTV (upper jaw -6 mm, down jaw -12 mm)‏ No significant difference observed Most probably losses come from outside the cryostat

Over-Injection Solutions Spread the signal by hardware means installation of an additional capacitor Add shielding most favourable needs simulations Last year's test with threshold values set over the maximum allowed limit is not a safe solution.

Section 2: Threshold values

Thresholds & Noise Frequency distribution of the maximum noise values over 14 days for each channel (starting from 18-12-2009) All Ionisation Chamber monitors except on collimators (= 3432) Threshold values are MASTER * 0.1 (i.e. default monitor coefficient) No significant problems expected Some channels to be repaired Thresholds can be increased with no safety impact. All Ionisation Chamber monitors on collimators (= 160) Threshold values are MASTER * 1.0 (i.e. maximum monitor coefficient) Significantly lower values Thresholds cannot be increased using the coefficient. Recalculation of values will be done.

Threshold Values No threshold values are missing There are some weak points Some precise simulations are missing Tests for verification and fine tuning of the threshold values. transient losses with special nQPS steady-state losses with temperature sensors More on the Chamonix talk.

Section 3: Processing

System latency Analysed several Beam Dumps in detail. Difference in time between the bunch at the MKI and the break of the beam permit loop (by the BLMS) recorded at the BIC was always between 100 and 130 μs. Time of flight: MKI => monitor = 10 μs monitor => acq. electronics (0.5 km cable) = 3 μs Acq. => processing electronics (1 km fibre) = 3 μs Detection of change in frequency in the daisy-chain = 5 μs Integration in the acquisition electronics = 40 μs. Decision at the BLETC (for fast losses) is taken every 40 μs. Processing of data to decide < 1 μs.

System Self-Monitoring Activation of all the self-monitoring processes: Acquisition operation state monitoring (8 cases) Configuration cross-check (one case) Data transmission between the tunnel and the surface installation (14 cases) Inhibit Beam Dump requests from cards not connected to BIS (2 cases) Failed cases induce a beam dump Example: Continuous checks on the data transmission between the tunnel and the surface installation: Link A Link B ERR A ERR B Ignore CFC CHOISE Comment x   LK_B         all ok (choice based on PCB properties)          1   LK_A        LK_B has errors                                    LK_B        LK_A has errors                                    Dump & LK_B LK_A and LK_B have errors                        LK_B is down                                       Dump & LK_A LK_B is down and LK_A has error                  LK_A is down                                     LK_A is down and LK_B has error                  LK_A and LK_B are both down                        LK_B         Both links down but CFC not present

Section 4: Applications & DB

Storage of Parameters Restructure of all databases: MTF – remove BLMS architecture; keep only ref. measurements and components track history [ongoing] Layout – become the entry point for updating connections or adding new installations [ongoing] LSA – reorganisation of tables to become more relational [done] Internal LSA DB Constrains will be reviewed Internal DB Check for disabled channels [in testing] Based on monitor criticality and adjacent disabled channels Each monitors is being tagged on its criticality Current version only informs on rules violations

Data Concentration Logging data Capture data Reason for losing packets still uncertain – investigation continues Modification of CMW settings and Concentrator have improved the situation (positive side effect: FECs have stopped rebooting) Capture data Temporary solution with “synchronised GET” seems to work Will test more and return to 2048 samples JMS broker – new configuration and tests are foreseen

ALARMS Warnings for the ALARMS consoles to be added:   System Check is ON-GOING concentrated from all checks Timeout from last System Check - TEST MANDATORY MCS online, Connectivity, Beam Permit, ... System Check has failed console should give some details on actions System has requested a Beam Dump.

Data Displays/Applications Most applications ready. Fixed display, Capture display, Monitor factor editor, ... Status application Main parts ready – still several parts missing Need usability update for OP Management application Only GUI, missing code Post-Mortem modules update Adding some more variables (mainly statuses). Adding more functions and better decoding of data. Minor to no changes expected Ongoing Lower priority Ongoing

Section 5: Reliability

Automated checks MCS Online check Connectivity (HV Modulation) check Verify consistency of parameters Connectivity (HV Modulation) check Verify monitor connections Internal Beam Permit check (BLETC -> BLECS) Verify the ability of each card to trigger a dump Will activate in the firmware the enforcing of the agreed periodic run of those checks by the Sequencer. External Beam Permit check (BLMS -> BIS) Verify connection to BIS One minor bug pending Finalising Completed Completed

Connectivity check View on the LHC BLM system for the connectivity check. The high voltage power supply to the monitors is modulated with a 60mHz 30V sinusoidal signal. A current on the monitors is generated by the HV modulation and detected by the normal acquisition system of the BLM. The combiner card uses the running sum (RS_09) from the threshold comparators to determine the amplitude and phase of each monitor (256 per crate). This results are send to the logging and compared to thresholds to permit or block the next injection if a non conformity is detected. The signals of each monitors are stored (in the SRAMs) (see right plots) to be read on demand with the diagnostic application (under development). The thresholds (called internal parameters) are unique for each monitor. They are calculated out of multiple measurements by a script gathering data in the logging. View of the SRAM data containing the original (stairs) and filtered RS09 data of each channel for one crate.

System Verification Tests Automatic extraction from DB + human inspection (repeated daily or weekly) Frequency distribution of channel noise Optical links degradation Automatic verification on the Vertical Slice Test system (before releasing new firmware) Exhaustive Threshold triggering tests (also used in LHC) Reception and Status tests Linearity, impulse, and some predefined patterns of input signals check … In the future will run inside the DB

Summary

Summary BLMS removes correctly the BEAM PERMIT signal if measurements are over threshold. No reliability issues observed. System is well understood since it has been up and running for more than a year. Some availability issues (false dumps) at energies higher than the injection are to be expected if thresholds don’t change in some regions. Continuous monitoring of noise is required. Sequencer initiated tests will be enforced to be run regularly. More tests to verify and adjust the threshold values are needed. Investigation of spurious signals from the SEMs are ongoing and first corrections are being implemented.

Reserved Slides

System overview

New noise reduction algorithm Additional digital filter to reduce “noise” from the ADC circuit. Safe; operates only when losses are very small Verified to be correct; operational in 2009. RS01 RS02 Rad Source Measurements with different firmware OLD NEW RS09 RS06

Variables Update Displays should be driven as much as possible by the electronics. Avoid wrong information on the displays Candidates for inclusion: ChannelMask flag IsCableConnected flag IsConnectedtoBIS flag Provide a bit encoded variable for the reason of the Beam Dump Request. Final details of request is being discussed

Expert Applications Management of parameters (Expert Threshold App) Disabling and masking of channels Configuration of mobile monitors Pass complete login info to DB Connect using LSA DB API Roll-back on history Diagnostics of misbehaving channels (for when checks fail) expert tool initially but later will hand over to OP. Next weeks Next months

Other Known Issues: PM/XPOC data are some times wrongly decoded [Firmware] PM data channels that have been over threshold remain in history [FESA] MCS fails always the first time [CO and FESA] Collimator beam based alignment will not be available for this year [Collimation and BLM]

Beam Permit Lines Check The internal beam permit check verifies the ability of each BLETC to remove the beam permit. A timer ensure that this check is done at least every 24 hours (just before the connectivity check) The external beam permit check verifies that the BIS (CIBUS interface) receives correctly the beam permit signal. These lines are under the responsibility of the interlock system. A BLM interface is available to control these lines. Regular checks are foreseen. Daisy chain from TC1 to BLECS BLM Crate 1 BLETC N°1 U BLETC N°2 U BLETC N°16 U BLECS M M M BLETC N°1 U BLETC N°2 U BLETC N°16 U Last BLECS M M M Daisy chain of BLM crates (up to 4) from BLECS1 to CIBUS BIS network CIBUS Unmaskable CIBUS Maskable