Analytic Versus Continental --C. G. Prado 20th Century Philosophy Analytic Versus Continental --C. G. Prado

History of the Divide 1) 70 or 80 years of divide between Analytical and Continental 1929: Gilbert Ryle dismisses Heidegger’s Being and Time: “Sein und Zeit” in Mind. 2) The gap widened with the rise of the “postmodernist” turn of Continental Philosophy (Jacques Derrida) In last three decades 3) But recently attempts to narrow the gap By focusing on important thinkers in each camp Clarifying how they differ And also how they complement one another

Analytical emphases Early analytical philosophers: Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, logical positivists (Carnap …) Positively described Emphasize logic and language Stress epistemology And philosophy of science  Require high level of technical expertize

Anti-metaphysics Negatively described Reject metaphysical speculation of Continental thinkers: Bradley, Bosanquet, Bergson, Heidegger … This anti-metaphysical approach resonates with followers of John Dewey’s pragmatism in US And British followers of G.E. Moore

The Heart of the Methodological differences: Analysis or Synthesis Solve distinct philosophical problems Reduce them to their parts E.g., Searle: Consciousness consists in Intentionality, Speech acts, Social institutions “Synthesis” Particular philosophical issues are parts of larger unities To properly understand them they must fit in these larger wholes E.g., Foucault: Philosophy from Hegel to Sartre is a “totalizing enterprise.”

Other differences Style Politics Relativism Russell says that Nietzsche “was a literary rather than academic philosopher.” Politics Continental philosophers have experienced two world wars “political baggage” Relativism Nietzschean nihilism

Dismissive attitude Analytic philosophers who say about postmodernists: it’s not worth bothering about For intellectual hygiene, don’t read Foucault (D. M. Armstrong) Searle on attitude of analytic philosophers: “most of this stuff just passes them by. Why should I waste my time attacking it?”

Continental differences among themselves What do Continental philosophers think about analytical ones? Perhaps they are too busy dealing with each other Which kind of Continental philosopher? Existentialists, hermeneutics, phenomenologists, structuralists, post-structuralists, postmoderns, deconstructivists

Common opinion of Continental re Analytical General position of all these trends: Analytical philosophers have ceased to be a “socially engaged interdisciplinary enterprise, becoming instead a highly specialized occupation” (Borradori) Richard Rorty (American Continentalist) replying to Searle’s idea that it’s a waste of time to consider Continental philosophy: The only people who are interested in analytic philosophy are analytic philosophers

Analytic philosophy has become too arcane They have isolated their thought from history and culture In professionalizing philosophy they made their work too arcane for anyone but themselves American philosophy used to be socially relevant John Dewey published in popular journals on issues like education reform, political reform, capital punishment But not Quine, Davidson, Putnam …

New developments Recently, regarding the other side Perhaps not genuine interest But growing curiosity Cause of this development? Excesses of postmodernism: There are no “facts”—these are subjective constructions for ends of power and profit Two opponents both unite in opposing this extreme of Continental thought Continental Habermas’ criticism of Foucault is as strong as analytical Charles Taylor Against postmodernism, analytical philosophers are paying more attention to earlier trends in 20th century Continental thought E.g., Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology

Divergent trends or incommensurable conceptions? There is a difference between two divergent trends in philosophy and incommensurable conceptions of philosophy Philosophy v. pseudo-philosophy where each side denies that the other is really philosophy Instead of arguments on each side, equally matched there is entrenched opposition

Underlying relativism The problem with this is the underlying relativism The idea that there are incompatible conceptions of fundamental philosophical issues And of philosophy itself The “intellectually repugnant” alternative that neither side wants to accept: Say the other side is just wrong and somehow unable to see that they are wrong

Toleration? Or humor? Toleration is not good enough saying that they may be right from their own point of view =Relativism It’s worse to dismiss the other side as confused, perverse, unwilling or incapable of understanding their confusions And so each side instead jokes about the other side

A porous border The time has come to examine more carefully The similarities And differences Re key philosophical issues Then we may see that they are not as different as one had thought that the border between them is porous