Midterm Eval of Teaching Get out piece of paper Do NOT put your name on it What should Prof. Mitchell Start doing? Stop doing Continue doing

Readings Young and Osherenko Koremenos et al.

Young and Osherenko: Institutional Formation Argument about factors that make likely for institution to form Interests: leadership; terms of institution must fit interests Some actors must want an institution enough to create one that fits Power: hegemony; various forms of polarity Forming institution must be in interests of powerful states in system Knowledge: shared; epistemic communities Must have shared view of problem Context: broad shifts, crises Processes: substitutions; interactions

Koremenos et al. Predictions An alternative way to structure the same things that Young and Osherenko are trying to explain

Koremenos et al. Predictions re: Institutional Design Distribution Prediction: distribution problems => HARDER to resolve Enforcement Prediction: enforcement problems => HARDER to resolve Number of actors Prediction: more actors => HARDER to resolve Uncertainty about: Behavior of other actors Preferences of other actors State of world Norms Broader context

Distribution issues Distribution matters because power matters Not all issues pose same distributional issues Harder: territorial disputes, satellite slots, resource access Easier: free trade, human rights Matters most when states in “relative gains” mode Prediction: distribution problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

Enforcement issues How much do states care about enforcement? How readily do violations come to light? If they come to light, will actors stop? How “violation tolerant” are others? Issues pose different enforcement problems Harder: nuclear weapons, free trade Easier: environment, human rights Enforcement matters more for “high politics” issues Prediction: enforcement problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

Number of actors Differs from membership: how many important actors needed to resolve problem Harder (many): human rights, trade Easier (few): river basins, satellite slots Prediction: More actors (usually) make it HARDER to reach agreement Types of actors also matter: is problem due to states, corporations, individuals, society? Relationship of gov’t to actor causing problem.

Uncertainty Behavior of Others Can victim tell what perpetrator is doing? Does technology offer promise or does transparency require their cooperation? Harder: military problems, NTBs, human rights, corruption Easier: tariffs, satellite orbits, radio spectrum, climate change Prediction: behavioral uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

Uncertainty State of World What are consequences of individual or collective actions Scientific knowledge Harder: environmental problems, health problems Easier: trade, arms control Prediction: state of world uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

Uncertainty Preferences of Others Does each side know preferences of other? Are domestic politics obvious to others? Harder: non-democracies, monetary policies, environmental policy, divided domestic politics Easier: health policy, air traffic control Prediction: preferences uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

Norms Is the issue itself normative at all? No: communication, trade VS. Yes: environment, human rights Are states trying to change existing norms or reinforce them? Reinforce: trade (today) VS. Change: environmental protection, new human rights Who/how many support new norm? Prediction: institutions EASIER to create when consistent with existing norms

Broader context Regional variation Time variation Degree of interdependence, shared values, etc. Time variation Cold War, end of Cold War, War on Terror Linkage of issue with other issues Trade as one issue vs. not Sustainable development

My take on Institutional Formation My structure Bring in Young/Osherenko ideas and Koremenos et al. ideas

Review of Variables Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values) Values: what a variable varies between E.g., Variable: color Values: ROYGBIV DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

Review: DVs for the Course Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it DVs for the course Whether institution forms or not What are the features of the institution Behavior of states

Institutional formation Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution? Variable: institutional formation Values: yes or no IVs: features of problem structure

Institutional Formation States do NOT always create solution to problems Four assumptions of institutional design States are rational Future gains are large enough to support cooperation International institutions are costly States are risk averse Two obstacles to formation: distribution / enforcement

When do states create international institutions? Institutions form when powerful actors responsible for a problem become convinced that a situation is suboptimal and that taking action to resolve it is in their interests Conflict that involves deadlock: no institutions Exogenous shocks or crises Shared concern re: problem and need for action Leadership matters Contextual factors also matter

Theoretical predictions Hardest to Easiest, and Why Deadlock: no relevant actors see a problem needing fixing Upstream/downstream: getting upstream state to join Normative: getting states one wants to influence to join Collaboration: distribution AND enforcement problems Positive externalities plagued by incapacity: convincing capable states to contribute Coordination problems: hard distribution problems Epistemic: coordinating and standardizing research

Institutional Design Institutional type Membership Primary rule system Information system Response system

Institutional type Let’s make some predictions

Institutional type Regulatory Procedural Programmatic Generative Coordination, collaboration, and upstream/downstream problems Procedural Epistemic/knowledge problems Programmatic Positive externalities plagued by incapacities Generative Normative problems

Membership Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable Limit membership if enforcement problems and uncertainty about preferences Inclusive membership if distribution problems or symmetric problems

Primary rule system Ambitiousness Basic type of rules Vague/specific Depth of cooperation Basic type of rules Proscriptions/prescriptions Incentive issues Capacity issues Scope: broad/narrow Common vs. differentiated obligations

Information system Strength of information system Strong: collaboration, up/down, normative, and low inherent transparency Weak: coordination, high inherent transparency Type of information system Centralized? Self-reporting / monitoring / verification Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how is info to be used

Response system Response strategies Altering consequences Deterrence: increase expected costs of violation Remuneration: increase expected benefits of compliance Altering opportunities Generative: create new opportunities to comply Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate Altering perceptions Cognitive: provide new information that changes perception of best choice Normative: re-educate regarding values Reciprocity of response: diffuse / specific Strictness of response: violation tolerance Sources of “institutional crises” Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how does response play