Trust and Distrust in International Relations Dr. Vincent Charles Keating Center for War Studies University of Southern Denmark 1 February 2018

Introduction The role of ideas in social science What is “trust”? Common usage of words Social science usage of words What is “trust”? How/Why do we “trust”? How can we tell when others are trusting? How does trust matter for international politics?

What is Trust? Three models of trust in social science Rational model Psychological model Social model

Rational Trust Trust is ‘a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation.’ (Kydd 2005, 3) Is a rational prediction about the nature or characteristics of the other state based on information To trust, we must observing others in the world, calculating: The potential benefits of agreements/cooperation The potential costs of the other state’s defection The probability that the other state will cooperate (not defect)

Rational Trust To put it into a formula, states will trust when 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0 where B = benefit to successful cooperation L = loss to the other side defecting p = the probability of them cooperation and not defecting If result not greater than zero, then no cooperation/ agreement will occur One state will not trust in the other

High Trust With very high trust, you will cooperate even if the benefits are low compared to the costs Will you let your best friend take care of your dog? 𝐵 = 10 𝐿 = 5000 𝑝=0.999 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0? 10(0.999)−5000(0.001)>0? 9.99−5>0? IR example: Should Denmark share military capabilities with Norway?

Low Trust With very low trust, you will not cooperate even if the benefits are high compared to the costs Will you do something minor for the promise of large compensation from a compulsive liar? 𝐵=1000 𝐿=2 𝑝=0.001 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0? 1000(0.001)−2(0.999)>0? 1−1.998>0? No, so you will not cooperate IR Example: Should the North Korea sign a cultural exchange agreement with the United States?

Determining p How do we know what the probability p is? Bayesian method Start with an estimate (𝑝=0.5) Calculate if you want to interact If 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0 , then interact, see if they cooperate or defect If not, then do nothing, and estimate stays the same (𝑝=0.5) Revise that estimate upwards (𝑝=0.7) if they cooperate or downwards (𝑝=0.3) if the defect Repeat the process with new p value

Rational Trust Based on a calculation of Benefits and losses for cooperation Probability that the other will cooperate and not defect Probability of cooperation/defection based on iterative Bayesian method More interaction = better estimate of true p for every state

Implicit Rational Trust Models

Implicit Rational Trust Models

Psychological Trust All leaders of states have general propensity to trust or not – called ‘generalised trust.’ Is ‘moralistic,’ based on the assessment of the general benevolent character of the other Not just an assessment of the others’ interests like in rational trust Two types of people in the world Generalized trusters Generalized distrusters IR Example: Difference between Democrats and Republicans in the Iranian nuclear deal

Social Trust Clusters around a four ideas Social factors are important for developing trusting relationships Trust as a response to preexisting norms of reciprocity Trust in relation to other preexisting norms Trust itself as a type of habitual norm

Rational versus Social Trust Rational trust: a belief that the other side is trustworthy Social trust: a special relationship that cognitively reduces or eliminates risk Trusting relationship allows states to set aside existing risk in favour of assumption that agreement will hold Where possible, trusting relationships become habitual, not calculative Social connections allow actors to ‘overdraw’ on information IR example: Security relationship between Denmark and Sweden

Hedging and Trust How can we tell if a relationship is trusting or not? Trusting relationships can be indicated by the reduction or elimination in hedging strategies Paying a cost in the present that you believe will reduce a future cost (aka buying the tank)

Hedging and Trust Purpose of hedging in international relations Reduces vulnerability Self-insurance against defection We can see the direction of the trusting/distrusting relationship by looking at changes in hedging policies When states are in habitual trusting relationships, they do not perceive the risk, so they do not hedge IR Example: Canada/US security relationship

Research Example 1: Trust and NATO How can NATO help to build trust among member states? Alliances Create basic new relationship of recognition between distrusting states (they are allies) with important responsibilities Keep feuding states together institutionally: exiters have the alliance set against them Trust created by continued engagement in the alliance, particularly during times of crisis

Research Example II: Small State Influence in Alliances Why do big states come to the aid of small states? Expanded domain of trust through over-commitment Danish-US relationship and the 2005 cartoons crisis Denmark had ‘gone beyond the call of duty’ in their military support for US wars Created expanded form of reciprocity outside of strict NATO commitments Allowed Denmark to successfully appeal to US to intervene on its behalf during the crisis

Research Example III: NGOs and Accountability Measures Do accountability measures help to build donor trust in NGOs? Rational model – yes: provides more information Social model – sometimes create distrust NGOs rely on social bond of shared commitment to a cause to create trusting relationships These can be habitual – individual donors might not think about defection Forced accountability measures can disrupt these habitual relationships Examples from experimental psychology literature