OneSwarm: Privacy Preserving P2P Roberto Alberdeston CAP 6135 Spring 2012 Reference: Privacy-preserving P2P data sharing with OneSwarm http://oneswarm.cs.washington.edu 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 http://www.OneSwarm.org 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Terms P2P - a computer network in which each computer in the network can act as a client or server, allowing shared access to resources without central server. Swarm - is the collective behavior of decentralized, self-organized systems. 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Characteristics Privacy Focused P2P Network User Defined Access Control Data is transferred using trusted and untrusted nodes. (transfer dependent) 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Characteristics (cont) Multi Path Packet Transfer Congestion Aware Network Bit Torrent Capable Client 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Issues with Current P2P Systems Bit Torrent Great performance but poor privacy Freenet Anonymous but lacks access control TOR Nodes participate in questionable traffic 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Key Focus Areas User Based Privacy Performance 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Benefits Better Performance/Privacy Runs most file formats natively Bit Torrent Compatible 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Benefits (cont) Multiple Permission Settings Persistent Identities Multi Path Packet Delivery Cost Reduction for Content Distribution (ex: YouTube) 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Data Transfers Mesh of trusted/untrusted nodes Three Types of Transfers Public No Attribution (Anonymous) With Permission (friend-2-friend) 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Data Sharing 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm: Finding Data Public/No Attribution Search Based Private Advertising 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Components Client/Node Trusted Untrusted Replicas Community Servers Key Management + Transfer Groups/Subscriptions 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Node Privacy Each Client/Node ID using public (RSA) key per node List of Nodes List kept in DHT (distributed hash table) DHT has 20 copies (fault tolerance) Data/Files Named with 160-bit SHA-1 hash 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 Growing the Swarm Gtalk User List Import Gtalk Connection Local Area Network Automatically shared keys with LAN Manual Key Exchange (Friends) Most Popular Method 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm: Fairness New Users start with default “contribution” value. If the upload/download ratio > 1, user is given access to more nodes in transfer. Promotes fairness and ensures performance 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Security Protocol Security Components Prevent Timing + Collusion Attacks Components Randomization of Nodes Force Delays User Control Forwarding Probability 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Testing Real World LonePlanet Computers 100k User Provided Statistics Simulation Last.fm Social Graph 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Testing (cont) Data Analysis Session Times Geographic Distribution Usage Patterns Upload Capacity Download Capacity 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Testing (cont) Results of Testing Most permission based relationship were friend-to-friend Transfers over the multipath P2P network FASTER than point-point Temporarily overloaded clients NOT common Transfer Speed >> TOR 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Conclusion P2P Network Privacy Performance User Based Permissions Mesh of Trusted and Untrusted Nodes 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
OneSwarm Conclusion (cont) Three Data Sharing Models Public Anonymous Private Inherent Security Components Best PRIVACY/PERFORMANCE 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012
Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012 OneSwarm Conclusion Questions? 11/14/2018 Alberdeston - CAP6135 Spring 2012