Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife John Nagl

How Armies learn Conservative Organizations Civilian control essential for reform Requires something “really unpleasant” to recognize the need to reform

The Hard Lessons of Insurgency Guerrilla – Small War “The War of the Flea” Clausewitz - “War is just a continuation of politics” Jomini – “Destruction of the enemy’s forces which will decide the outcome of the war”

The Hard Lessons of Insurgency Mao’s “People’s War” Mao’s 3 Stages Gain the support of the people Guerrilla campaign Defeat the Govt. forces in a conventional battle “We are the fish and the People are the sea

The Hard Lessons of Insurgency Direct Coin – Jominian “A War is a war is a war” Indirect Coin – Clauswitzian “Separate the fish from the Sea” WHAM Where is the center of gravity?

Strategic Culture Organizational Culture vs. National Strategic Culture British Strategic Culture vs. American Strategic Culture

The British as a learning institution The Malay Insurgency The British as a learning institution

British Straits Settlements 49% Malay 39% Chinese 10% Tamil Rubber Plantations & Tin Mines

Origins 1930 Malay Communist Party organized proletariat in Rubber plantations & Tin Mines, mostly Chinese. 1936 Banishment Ordinance 1942 British defeated by Japanese on Malay Penninsula 42-45 MPAJA/Loi Tek/Ching Peng MPAJA/Disbanded 1945 w/Weapons buy back MCP/MPLA 45-48 Severe Labor strife Calcutta Communist Youth Conference 1948 Sungai Siput Incident 1948: June 1948 3 British Plantation owners murdered

The British are coming! Sir Edward Ghent Declares Emergency Civilian Casualties 1948 were 1500 “Jungle Bashing” Gurney, Ghent & Briggs Feb 50 Sir Harold Briggs/The Briggs Plan – “New Villages” Oct 51 Sir Henry Gurney assassinated British Coordinating Committee Tactical Innovation - Colonel Walker’s “Ferret Force” Templer’s Plan for political victory

The French in indochina Trung Tran & Trung Nhi revolt agains the Chinese in 40AD The French in Indochina – Michelen Rubber 1908 Uprising in Bien Din 1914 WWI Ho Chi Minh (Bringer of Light) and the VNQED 1930 Nationalist Uprising at Yen Bay – Ho Chi Minh jailed 1940 Japanese Occupation Nguyen Giap & the Vietminh 1945 Japanese Surrender/ Ho declares independence 1950 Coup de Main 1954 Dien Bien Phu & Geneva division at the 17th parrallel

The U.S. In Vietnam – The Advisory years 1954 MAAG 342 Advisors MAAG/MACV Training the ARVN to repel invasion not protect the people TRIM Ngo Dinh Diem 1957 400+ S. Vietnamese officials assassinated JFK and counter insurgency Lt Col. Gregory in the South Delta, “Problem is 15% military and 85% political, it is not just killing VC CIDG & Switchback, Green Berets BRIAM Gen Harkins MACV 1962

The U.S. In Vietnam - the Fighting years “A Strong Temptation to hit someone” MACV Gen William Westmoreland “The VC are excellent at ambushes, but that’s kind of a coward’s way of fighting” Strategic Debate Defensive Enclave Search and Destroy LtCol. Moore & Ia Drang Valley Marine MGEN Lew Walt in I Corps Regional Civil Agency in each sector CAP – Ed Palm CORD TET Offensive

The U.S. In Vietnam - the Fighting years (CAP)

David Kilcullen –Fundamentals of company level counterinsurgency Prepare Know your turf Diagnose the Problem Organize for Intelligence Organize for Inter-Agency Operations Travel Light, but guard CSS Find a Political/Cutlural Adivsor Focus on Squad leaders Rank is nothing, talent is everything Have a game plan

David Kilcullen –Fundamentals of company level counterinsurgency The Golden Hour Be There Don’t act brashly Prepare for the handover on Day 1 Build trusted local networks Start Easy Seek early victories Practice deterrent patrolling Be prepared for setbacks Remember the global audience Engage the women, beware of the children Take stock regularly

David Kilcullen –Fundamentals of company level counterinsurgency Groundhog Day Exploit a Single simple narrative Local forces should mirror the enemy, not U.S. forces Practice armed civil affairs Small is beautiful Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces Build your own solution, attack the enemy only when he gets in your way Getting Short Keep your extraction plan a secret Whatever else you do, keep the initiative

David Galula: CounterInsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice Law #1 – The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent Law #2 – Support is gained through an active minority Law #3 – Support from the population is conditional Law #4 – Intensity of efforts and the vastness of means are essential

Dien bien phu/ khe sanh/ korengal Valley

Dien Bien Phu

Khe Sanh 77 Day Siege, later abandoned

kOrengal Valley “Restrepo” – Sebastian Junger & Tim Heatherington