Sellafield Ltd An Overview

Modern Catastrophes BP Deep Water Horizon 11 employees died in the initial explosion Cost to date £30 Billion and rising Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Arising from Natural event Costs around £30 Billion and rising TEPCO Nationalised by Japanese Government

National Audit Office 2012 “Nuclear operations at Sellafield started in the 1940s, successive operators of the site did not give sufficient thought to decommissioning or retrieving and disposing of radioactive waste. The Authority inherited a legacy of poor planning, neglect and gaps in information” Predicted out turn costs £70 Billion

Safe Secure Stewardship Demonstrable Progress Return on Investment Sellafield Strategy Safe Secure Stewardship Demonstrable Progress Return on Investment

11,000 employees at Sellafield Sellafield Today £1.8bn| annual budget £300m| Local supply chain spend 11,000 employees at Sellafield

Sellafield Context 7 shutdown reactors 2 Reprocessing plants Waste Management High hazard legacy facilities Product Storage Supporting Infrastructure Low temperature, low pressure processes Very large inventory of radioactive material Relatively low rates of change to loss of cooling Aging facilities and infrastructure

Sellafield Ltd COMAH status SL is the largest Nuclear site in Europe One of only two COMAH (Seveso) Nuclear sites in the UK SL uses a number of hazardous substances (COMAH). Examples are as follows, with associated major accident hazards (MAH): Petroleum products Oxygen Sodium Nitrite 38% Hydroxylamine Nitrate 36% NOx Hydrogen COMAH assessment shows SL is currently a lower-tier site PROTECT - COMMERCIAL 15 November 2018

Site History – National Defence Programme The Sellafield site has been operational since the 1940s, when it was used as a Royal Ordinance Factory supporting the war effort. In 1946 the US Congress passed an Atomic Energy Act prohibiting passing classified information to other countries In response to this, Sellafield became the UK’s first atomic energy site and construction of the Windscale Piles to produce military plutonium began in 1947.

Site History – Accelerating the clean up From the 1990s construction began on a number of waste treatment and storage facilities to support reprocessing and decommissioning operations. In 2002 the Waste Vitrification Plant was opened to convert the Highly Active Waste from reprocessing into a solid form for long term storage.

Nuclear Safety Principles: Preventing a Catastrophe Maintaining containment Maintaining cooling Maintaining control of reactivity Maintaining control of chemistry

Scope of Emergency Arrangements Radiological/Nuclear Chemical Fire Transport Loss of Site Services External Events – Weather, Seismic, Malicious Acts/Security Environmental Impacts Severe Accident Considerations

Co-ordination of Emergency Response Emergency Management 15/11/2018 4

Effective Management Control Control of Contractors Security SQEP Nuclear Site Licence COMAH Training Accountability Assurance Regulators Review

Control of contractors Approved contractor status Gated process Demonstrate SQEP Subject to intense scrutiny Performance subject to monthly review Scocio economic commitments Security vetting

Security considerations Driven by specific legislation Classification anyone on site DV SC BC Visitors Info security Breach sanctions

SQEP Demonstrable and auditable experience Must be “Suitable” Formally reviewed at least annually Applies to all site areas Subject to regulatory review

Nuclear Site Licence 36 Licence conditions Each condition approved by the Regulator Covers all aspects of site Subject to formal review

Training Not SQEP Formal Site Induction linked to Security Contract Induction Planned Approved

Accountability At all levels Reviewed as part of work package planning Reviewed at Stakeholder meetings Subject to formal review by the Regulator Runs from SL Board to all areas

Assurance Internal Assurance Group Focussed on: Internal Regulation Tiered audit process Full range of activities Reports directly to the SL Board Works alongside Regulators

Regulators: ONR HSE EA Euratom IAEA WANO INPO

Review Activities reviewed by SL Board through: Safety, Security Assurance Group Project Assurance Group Safety Case Assurance Group RIM (Regulator Interface Meetings) Tier 1 Regulatory interface NMP Safety and Operations Review Group Performance Assurance Group

Conclusions Sellafield Limited and its specialist suppliers have developed an effective and systematic method of assessing resilience. Effective management control cornerstone Focussed on the plants within the greatest potential consequences Provided successful insights into many facilities beyond their Design Basis. Identified a range of considerations and actions which will make a genuine and sustainable improvement in resilience. Close engagement with Regulators and industry colleagues has been important to success Sellafield are committed to enhanced resilience Incorporated this approach into our long-term periodic review of safety cases

Arrangements for resilience