For modeling conflict and cooperation Schwartz/Teneketzis

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Presentation transcript:

For modeling conflict and cooperation Schwartz/Teneketzis Games of Strategy For modeling conflict and cooperation Schwartz/Teneketzis

CPS Infrastructures : Effect of Technological Advancements Conflict and cooperation of CPS providers: an increase in Cooperation (driven by technological complementarities) Competition (driven by availability of numerous substitutes) Complex parties’ incentives  multiple externalities The role of central authority: improving parties’ incentives Higher competition and conflict  importance of resolving conflicts Threats of security failures  Importance of investing in security Central authority’s role: conflict mitigation, coordination, and regulation 11/15/2018

CPS viewed as two-sided market : Models both Conflict and Cooperation Increased role of Central Authority : necessity to harmonize interactions and improve CPS robustness Managers of infrastructure (platform) Producers (suppliers) Consumers (individual users) Central authority (coordinator/regulator) Example: Electric grid Platform Managers: Transmission/Distribution operators Suppliers: Generation plants Users: Customers (large and small) Coordinator: ISO 11/15/2018

Today’s talk: Two game-theoretic models Resource allocation in strategic multi-battlefield conflicts: Our focus is to solve Blotto games with possibility to add extra fields and alliances possibility to form alliances (cooperation) Network design with random faults and strategic attacks Arbitrary (fixed) network structure (a given network topology) Defender faces system failures, and cannot distinguish between Random faults (reliability failures) Strategic attacks (security failures) 11/15/2018

An age-old quest in Game theory: How to allocate scarce resources? Under given assumptions on information order of moves (simultaneous vs sequential) player actions: (discreet vs continuous) player objective: (plurality vs majority ) players: symmetric (homogenous) vs asymmetric (heterogeneous) game: one-shot vs repeated / dynamic Original Colonel Blotto setup: deceptively trivial benchmark 11/15/2018

Colonel Blotto setup 11/15/2018

Applications of Blotto Our research plan: Blotto for CPS infrastructure protection & defense 11/15/2018

Colonel Blotto: Identical players 11/15/2018

Colonel Blotto: Non-identical players 11/15/2018

Who wins the battlefield? 11/15/2018

Payoffs 11/15/2018

Overview of Results 11/15/2018

Results 11/15/2018

Graphical Representation 11/15/2018

Proof Outline 11/15/2018

Marginal distributions at Nash Equilibrium 11/15/2018

Extension I: Coalitional Colonel Blotto 11/15/2018

Extension II: Colonel Blotto with Endogenous Battle fields 11/15/2018

Our focus: Coalitional Colonel Blotto with Endogenous Battle Fields 11/15/2018

Summary of Results on Blotto Games 11/15/2018

Network Design Game for CPS 11/15/2018

Reliability and Security Failures 11/15/2018

Network Design Game 11/15/2018

Application 11/15/2018

Summary of the talk Strategic resource allocation (Blotto games): We characterize equilibria of asymmetric Blotto game with Endogenous number of battlefields Player alliances Network design with security and reliability failures: We find all equilibria for a game with General network topology and values of the nodes Network operator knows only the relative frequencies of random faults and strategic attacks 11/15/2018