Recap Task! Can you identify 3 criticisms of Epiphenomenalism? According to ________________, mental events are caused by __________ events but do not themselves ________ physical events: the interaction is one-way. Mental events are pictured as epiphenomenal by-products that sit “________” physical processes. The main argument for _______________ comes from ________ and is based on the idea that a lot of creatures appear to be able to act based on __________ causes only, there is no reason to suggest minds have any ________ power, nor that humans are any different. Can you identify 3 criticisms of Epiphenomenalism? Evidence of Introspection The Role of Qualia Self-Knowledge Evolution Free Will Other Minds

What major criticisms of dualism as a whole have we covered? Think back to the different areas we’ve covered in the topic.

How could you prove the existence of other minds? Read the task on page 279.

An Issue for Dualism: Solipsism Or - The Problem of Other Minds According to Descartes, we have certain knowledge of our own minds (from the cogito), which we experience directly. The external world on the other hand is experienced indirectly – through our senses. Unfortunately this means we can only know about the minds of other people indirectly. This leads us to the question of how I can judge what state of mind another person is in, or more radically how I can state that they have a mind at all! Any obvious way of responding to this?

What about their behaviour? One response might be to say that I come to such knowledge of other minds on the basis of behaviour. If for example, Ameerah is writhing on the floor screaming, the obvious inference would be that she is in pain. But, this doesn’t actually confirm that she is definitely in pain – she could be faking it, she could be feeling some other emotion, she could have no mental states at all.

Important Distinction Solipsism is often thought of as the belief that my mind is the only one that exists. But if you were the only survivor of a nuclear holocaust, this could be true without you being a solipsist. Real solipsism is the stronger belief that the only kind of mental states possible are your mental states. So ‘pain’ just means ‘my pain’. The true solipsist cannot conceive of the possibility of pain that is not her pain.

The Problem of Other Minds If Descartes is right in claiming that minds and bodies are completely separate, then there is no reason for me to think, when I come across a human body, that there is a mind attached to it. It could be that all other bodies are mindless. If property dualists are right and the mind is a by- product of the brain becoming complex, there is no way of confirming this has also occurred in other brains. Mental states are not publically observable – therefore my own are the only verifiable examples. The idea that other people do have minds and mental states is so important to us that the problem of other minds is often used as an argument that dualism should be rejected. Explain the problem of other minds for your notes.

One Possible Response: Mill’s Analogy Analogous arguments work on the basis that if two things are similar in some respects they are probably similar in other respects. Some philosophers use an argument from analogy as a response to the problem of other minds. Can you think how? < - - - - Me Someone else - - - - >

One Possible Response: Mill’s Analogy “I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by a uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward demeanour. In the case of other human beings I have the evidence of my senses for the first and last links in the series, but not for the intermediate link. I find, however, that the sequence between the first and last is as regular and constant in those other cases as it is in mine. In my own case I know that the first link produces the last through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without. Experience, therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link which must either be the same in others as in myself, or a different one. I must either believe them to be alive, or to be automatons … by supposing the link to be of the same nature … I bring other human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalization which I know by experience to be the true story of my own existence.” What is the argument Mill is making here? (It’s on your handouts) Read through and highlight the key points of the argument.

One Possible Response: Mill’s Analogy I have a mind I know from experience that my behaviour is caused by my mental states Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave in similar ways to me when in similar situations Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour is caused by their mental states Conclusion: Therefore, other people have minds

One Possible Response: Mill’s Analogy I have a mind I know from experience that my behaviour is caused by my mental states Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave in similar ways to me when in similar situations Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour is caused by their mental states Conclusion: Therefore, other people have minds Any criticisms?

What different ways might people react to slipping on ice? Mill’s Analogy Issues One issue with trying to infer minds from analogous behaviour is that behaviour across humanity is not uniform. People simply react differently to situations depending on their personality. This presents a problem because it is hard to infer that they have similar mental states to me if their behaviour is drastically different – the analogy fails. What different ways might people react to slipping on ice? Is it possible to infer using analogy that all these behaviours have the same associated mental state?

Mill’s Analogy Issues A second problem with this argument is that it is a type of weak inductive argument. For inductive arguments to be effective they need to be based on a large body of evidence, many different examples. This argument is only based on one observable example (my mind) and trying to use that to infer the existence of other minds in every other person seems a little far fetched. It is akin to observing that one blackbird has a red beak so assuming every other blackbird must have a red beak.

Recap What is Solipsism? Why is it a problem for Dualism particularly? How does Mill respond to the problem of other minds? Does his argument work? Do you think the problem of other minds can be effectively solved? How?

Mill’s Analogy Issues We could slight improve Mill’s argument by looking at specific instances of behaviour and their associated mental causes: This behaviour has a mental cause That behaviour has a mental cause This other behaviour has a mental cause Etc…. Therefore, whenever I observe behaviour it has a mental cause Other people display the same behaviours observed above Conclusion 1: These behaviours have mental causes Conclusion 2: Other people have minds

Mill’s Analogy Issues This version of the argument gives us a much larger evidence bank to draw from and thus makes it a stronger inductive argument. This behaviour has a mental cause That behaviour has a mental cause This other behaviour has a mental cause Etc…. Therefore, whenever I observe behaviour it has a mental cause Other people display the same behaviours observed above Conclusion 1: These behaviours have mental causes Conclusion 2: Other people have minds

Mill’s Analogy Issues However there remains the issue that these examples of mental states causing behaviour are all observable internally, within myself, whereas other peoples possible mental states remain off limits to us.

A Final Point We might be on stronger grounds if we saw Mill’s argument not as an argument from analogy but as an inference to the best explanation. An inference to the best explanation is abductive rather than inductive: it is a method of reasoning, employed in the sciences, in which the hypothesis selected is that which, if true, would best explain the relevant evidence. For example, the person getting up awkwardly and walking carefully after falling down on the ice. There are lots of possible explanations of this behaviour (For example, he is a robot who is behaving the way he was programmed), but the best inference to make is that he feels some and pain and embarrassment. In other words, the best inference – the hypothesis that provides the most simple, coherent and adequate explanation of his outward demeanour – is that he has a mind.

What have we covered? How might we refine Mill’s argument to make it stronger? Why might some people argue that Mill’s argument is actually stating the best explanation for behaviour rather than as an argument from analogy?

Extension 1: Ascribing Mental States One avenue of attack against the idea of solipsism may come from how we understand mental states: For us to make sense of our own mental states – to know for example that what we are currently feeling is “anger” we need also to learn what it means to say of someone else that they are “angry”. This is due to how we learn information about ourselves; often our parents will point out people having similar emotions in order to help a child recognise these emotions in themselves. It’s why we sometimes find it hard to express particular feelings, we’ve never compared them to others. If this is true then the problem of other minds is not an issue, it is impossible for us to identify our own mental states without presupposing the existence of mental states in other people.

Extension 2: Heidegger – “Being With” A final response to the threat of Solipsism comes from the German philosopher Heidegger. He sees it as a mistake that we must infer the existence of minds from others behaviour. Instead he believes we have an A Priori recognition of their consciousness within our own experiences. He believes this because we exist in an intersubjective world, we do not have a solipsistic starting point for which to start looking for other minds. In other words, it is a mistake to suppose that we were ever conscious only of the self as separate from others, subsequently to have to discover them. Instead our primary mode of experience is “being with others”. Even as babies we are hardwired to imitate and copy expressions and actions – this allows us to develop our consciousness and sense of self within a social context. Without this early connection we would not understand our own minds, let alone others (see feral children as examples).

Revise The Topic Homework Next week you will be completing an essay on the Philosophy of Mind. Your homework for this weekend is very simple: Revise The Topic

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