The EU Competition Law Fining System European Parliament Committee on economic and monetary affairs Working group on competition policy Antoine Winckler.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment
Advertisements

Marker system of jftc’s Leniency Program
2012 ICN Cartel Workshop Panama City, Panama, Thursday, October 4 th, 2012 Lisa M. Phelan Chief of the National Criminal Enforcement Section (NCES) United.
Scott D. Hammond Deputy Assistant Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Detroit, Michigan February 15, 2013.
RESTRICITVE PRACTICES AND LENIENCY Zuzana Šimeková European Union – Opportunities and Challenges June 2009, Dubrovnik.
Leniency related pitfalls and challenges in a criminal enforcement system Marcus Bezzi Executive General Manager, Enforcement and Compliance
Project on Competition Law Enforcement and Governance: Comparative Institutions: SOUTH AFRICA Dennis Davis and Lara Granville.
The Implications of Menarini Marco Bronckers GCLC / 8 December 2011.
The fundamentals of EC competition law
Implementing an Effective Leniency Program March 2013.
John W. McReynolds Assistant Chief, New York Field Office Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice Judicial Training Program Moscow, Russia July.
1 ¿QUÉ ES LA COLUSIÓN EN LICITACIONES? COLOMBIAN LENIENCY PROGRAMME Superintendence of Industry and Commerce
Enforcement pluralism Regulation of market conduct –EU Commission General surveillance of compliance with the Treaty “Trustbuster”: DG Comp –National Competition.
EC Competition law – sanctions & procedure
1 ICN Cartels Working Group Application of leniency to individuals Stephen Blake Cartels and Criminal Enforcement Group UK Office of Fair Trading 27 January.
POWELL, GOLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY LLP ORIGINAL IDEAS. UNCOMMON SOLUTIONS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT Presented by Neil R. Ellis Vienna, Austria.
4 years in the life of the Egyptian Competition Authority.
Course: European Criminal Law SS 2009 Hubert Hinterhofer.
Criminal Antitrust Practice Donald C. Klawiter J. Clayton Everett, Jr. Jennifer M. Driscoll.
Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement WHAT MAKES COMPETITION POLICY WORK? Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law.
58th UIA Congress31 October 2014 Personal liability for infringements of competition law in Denmark Martin André Dittmer | 31 October 2014.
Criminalization of Cartels UHOS Conference 11 th November 2008 – Brno, Czech Republic Carolyn Galbreath Member and Director Cartels Division The Competition.
Enforcement pluralism Regulation of market conduct –EU Commission General surveillance of compliance with the Treaty “Trustbuster”: DG Comp –National Competition.
European Commission, DG Competition Fifth Annual Conference on Competition Enforcement in the CCE Member States 21 February 2014, Bratislava 1 Due Process.
The Portuguese Competition Authority’s Experience with the ICN Recommended Practices and Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual Abel M. Mateus President Autoridade.
Philip Kienapfel, European Commission, DG Competition
Mini Plenary 3: Cartel Enforcement and Leniency in Developing Agencies Leniency Programme in Turkey Gülçin DERE Competition Expert Turkish Competition.
Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law Anna Karamat European Commission DG Environment Unit A.2 ‘Infringements’
Interface between Leniency, Direct Settlement and Criminal Sanctions – A UK perspective European Competition Day, Brno Philip Collins Chairman Office of.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND COMPETITION LAW. Index 1. Why are competition / antitrust issues important? 2. Merger control 3. Distribution systems 4.
Individual liability for competition law infringements Koen Platteau UIA - Firenze 31 October 2014.
To Enforce and Comply Inside the Antitrust Agency - Two Perverse Effects of Leniency Programmes - Martijn Snoep 5 March 2009.
European Cartel Enforcement and Investigations ABA Antitrust 51st Annual Spring Meeting Alec Burnside April 2003.
October 2, 2014 Critical Moments in Cooperation to Maximize Efficiencies for Both Agencies and Companies Tomohiko Kimura Kyowa Sogo Law Offices Osaka,
Mini Plenary 3: Cartel Enforcement and Leniency in Developing Agencies A South African perspective 2013 ICN Cartel Workshop Cape Town, South Africa 16.
Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Relevant changes to the amount of fine. Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating.
Bid Rigging as Provided for under the Fair Competition Act, 2003 and the Proposed Amendments Presenter: Grace Freedom Nicholas Investigation Department.
FEDERAL ANTIMONOPOLY SERVICE International Competition Network 6 th Annual Conference Moscow 2007 Application Experience of International Competition Network.
Settlements Wouter Wils * BIICL, 15 May 2008 * All views expressed are strictly personal.
The Role of the Parliament in Strengthening Road Safety Birutė VĖSAITĖ Chairperson of the Committee on Economics of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania.
Company LOGO Case Study : Price fixing and Market Allocation of Flour Mill Companies in Korea (2006) Hang-Lok, Oh Deputy Director,
Towards a fair and efficient economy for all The Competition Amendment Act, 2009 Presentation to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Economic Development.
Oregon Administrative Sanctions for Violations of Liquor Laws Linda Ignowski Oregon Liquor Control Commission October 2008.
Living in an area of freedom, security and justice European CommissionDirectorate-General Justice and Home affairs.
INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT Presentation by Duncan T. Morotsi 15 th March
LUMSA – International Commercial Law 30 October 2015 Prof. Avv. Roberto Pirozzi
The EU Fight against Environmental Crime – Directive 2008/99 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler DG Justice, Criminal Law.
Cartels and competitor contacts Chris Bryant September 2015.
© Hogan & Hartson LLP. All rights reserved. Cartels Fines, Leniency, Settlement John Pheasant November 28, 2007 Brussels.
The EU Response Developments in EU Cartel Enforcement Howard T. Rosenblatt Howrey LLP Brussels International Cartels Law Seminars International Conference.
ECUADOR FACING THE NEW RULES OF COMPETITION: EXPERIENCE IN COMPLIANCE, CHALLENGES AND GOALS Santiago Reyes Mena Quito.
1 Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine Guidelines on setting fines imposed for violations of the law on protection of economic competition GENERAL APPROACHES.
P ROSECUTION OF CARTELS WITHOUT DIRECT EVIDENCE – SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCE DAVID VOGRINEC Department for Legal Affairs and Investigations Slovenian Competition.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR COUNCIL (NEDLAC)
Competition and Antitrust Compliance Programs for Business
Competition law Class 8-9
Competition Law Enforcement in the E.U. - Dawn Raids -
Mark Krotoski September 15, 2015
Calculated risk between the leniency benefits and class actions in Colombia Gabriel Ibarra Pardo - Ibarra Abogados December 2015.
Caron Beaton-Wells and Julie Clarke
European Commission's fining policy 10 February 2015
Non-Discretionary Administrative Sanctions under the AMA in Japan
Public antitrust enforcement- Procedure and Standards of Judicial Review in EU Competition Law EU Antitrust Law September 2018, Zadar Croatia.
ICN CWG SG1 webinar on ‘”Parental liability”
ICN webinar on parental liability 20 September 2017 Tímea Pálos
Legal Documents Call info day May 21st 2008 C. van Mourik.
Peter Stauber, LL.M. / Berlin, Germany
Using Leniency to Fight Hard-Core Cartels
Dr. Adrian Jung Public Prosecutor
Calculated risk between the leniency benefits and class actions in Colombia Gabriel Ibarra Pardo - Ibarra Abogados December 2015.
Presentation transcript:

The EU Competition Law Fining System European Parliament Committee on economic and monetary affairs Working group on competition policy Antoine Winckler

Outline of Presentation Some Statistical Facts The Agency Issue Parent Liability Standard of Proof A Low Level of Judicial Control?

Statistics Level of Fines: High Level of Discretion; Restitutive v. Dissuasive Nature Unclear; in Most Cases, No Analysis of Economic Effects Gravity + Entry Fees Aggravating Circumstances Mitigating Circumstances Deterrence Discount and Timing Inability to Pay

The Agency Issue Interests of Employee and Company Not Aligned Individual Fines? Alternative Sanctions? Compliance Policy Not Taken into Account Strict Liability of Companies for Employee Misdemeanour ECHR Issue

Parent Company Liability Personal Nature of Antitrust Liability Parental Liability: the AKZO Rule Strict Liability or Rebuttable Presumption? Liability beyond Participation in the Infringement or Negligence

Standard of Proof in Antitrust Investigations The “Complex and Continuous Infringement” Concept Plausibility Test v. Quasi-Criminal Nature of Antitrust Infringements under EU Law

Low Level of Judicial Control Legality Review v. Unlimited Jurisdiction under ECHR Role of Fining Guidelines and Judicial Discretion

Thank You

Annex - Statistics Level of Fines Gravity + Entry Fees Aggravating Circumstances Mitigating Circumstances Deterrence Discount and Timing The statistics provided below are based on information analyzed from the following 10 cases:

Level of Fines

Restitutive v. Dissuasive Nature of Fines Source: The European fines in cartel cases are adequately dissuasive, by Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer and Jean-Pierre Ponssard, October 18, 2011.

Gravity and Entry Fee Multiplier Multiplier Value (% of turnover) Some variation across different cartels Little variation within particular cartels Entry fee multiplier closely correlated with gravity multiplier Gravity Multiplier Entry Fee A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C Car Glass (same in Synthetic Rubber) Candle Wax Chloroprene Rubber Videotapes (same in Flat Glas) Based on a limited sample of 10 cases. Lowest multiplier in Bananas Case (15%), highest multiplier in Marine Hoses Case (25%) – average multiplier of 18.25%

Aggravating Circumstances Company Recidivism * Refusal to cooperate Leader / Instigator Penalty Increase Arkema ENI/Syndial/ Polmeri  (4th fine)  (3rd fine) 90% 60% ENI Group Shell Saint-Gobain Bayer  (2nd fine) 50% Sasol Parker ITR Bridgestone  30% Sony * CFI confirmed in T-38/02 Group Danone that there is no maximum period for repeat offences 13

Mitigating Circumstances Mitigating circumstances have been accepted in recent cases Mitigating Circumstances # of Requests* Times Granted Limited, passive, minor involvement in the infringement 19 Non-implementation of the anti-competitive agreements 10 Effective cooperation outside of the Leniency Notice 11 2 Early termination of infringement 8 Participation in few elements of the infringement 6 3 Competitive nature of the market / Market participant 1 Infringement committed due to negligence Anticompetitive conduct authorized by authorities / forced participation in the infringement 5

Deterrence Note: Smallest company receiving a deterrence Deterrence Multiplier Deterrence multiplier of 1.2 = 20 % increase in fine. Example: Company “A” received a 20% deterrence multiplier. Its VOS in the market of the cartel was about € 20 million, which was about 0.05% of total turnover (global, all products) of around € 40 billion. 0.00 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.08% 0.1% 1.6% Value of Sale (VOS) in relevant market as % of total company turnover (%) Note: Smallest company receiving a deterrence multiplier had a total turnover of about €32 B (Bayer 10%) 15

Discount and Timing Examples Leniency Timing Position Value-add? 1 2 3 4 Value-add?  X Reduction 50% 40% 20% 25% 7% 0% Company A also received partial immunity for submitting evidence enabling the Commission to extend the cartel’s duration by 3 months Car Glas Comp A Comp A Videotapes Comp B 882 Flat Glas Comp A Comp A Candle Wax Comp B Comp C Comp D 854 Comp A 109 Chloroprene Rubber Comp B 237 Comp C 748 200 800 Time between start of investigation and leniency application (days) 16