Moral Sense Theory

“Scottish Enlightenment” 18th-Century philosophers Francis Hutcheson David Hume Adam Smith

Hutcheson In addition to 5 senses we’re familiar with, Hutcheson posits others: Self-perception Sense of beauty Sense of the ridiculous Sense of honor Public sense Moral sense

Hutcheson Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”

Hutcheson Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery” Contrasts with 16th-Century idea of Thomas Hobbes – we only act on self-interest

Hutcheson Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery” Contrasts with 16th-Century idea of Thomas Hobbes – we only act on self-interest Benevolence cannot be reduced to self-interest

Hutcheson Moral sense - natural faculty “by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others”

Hutcheson Moral sense - natural faculty “by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others” Distinction between good and bad discovered by our emotional responses to experience

Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections. Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections. Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason.

Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections. Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections. Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason. Follows Hutcheson: Moral judgments arise from our sentiments.

Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections. Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections. Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason. Follows Hutcheson: Moral judgments arise from our sentiments. “When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”

Hume “Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas

Hume “Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas Nevertheless, moral sense theory shows us how to adopt “rules” which facilitate social living

Hume “Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas Nevertheless, moral sense theory shows us how to adopt “rules” which facilitate social living Justice Property Virtue

Hume Many virtues are artificial, but sympathy and benevolence are natural Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel some propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if everything else be equal.”

Smith Friend of and collaborator with Hume Two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

Smith Like Hume, influenced by Hutcheson; emphasizes role of sentiment

Smith Like Hume, influenced by Hutcheson; emphasizes role of sentiment But: Disagrees with Hutcheson about a specific “moral sense”; stresses sympathy

Smith How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

Smith “Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance

Smith “Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others

Smith “Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others Form moral habits from attempts to secure mutual sympathy

Smith “Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others Form moral habits from attempts to secure mutual sympathy Just as we naturally seek trade, we naturally seek mutual approval and sympathy