Background and Brief History Decentralization and Ethnic Violence in Ethiopia Research Question What are the effects of decentralization, democratization, and ethnic power sharing arrangements on the incidence and intensity of ethnic violence in Ethiopia? Methodology Case Studies: Conflicts in the Oromia and Ogaden regional states and a wide range of smaller incidents. Dependent Variables: An incident is operationalized as ethnic violence if either “(a) it is motivated by animosity towards ethnic others; (b) the victims are chosen by ethnic criteria; or (c) the attack is made in the name of an ethnic group”; or (d) the primary divisions between combatants are along ethnic lines. (10) Independent Variables: Decentralization, democratization, and ethnic power sharing arrangements are analyzed qualitatively to determine (a) the extent and nature of reforms and (b) to assess the presence, absence, exacerbation, or mitigation of ethnic violence directly linked to changes in each variable. Background and Brief History Ethiopia is highly diverse with more than 80 ethnic groups. From 1889 to 1974, imperial governments pursued unitary, centralizing governing policies, forcing assimilation. Under the Derg military regime(1974-1991), highly centralized governance continued. Numerous ethno-nationalist groups rebelled against the Derg, culminating in the ascendance to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the implementation of a new constitution in 1995. (1) Hypotheses Set H1: Decentralization of state authority has decreased the incidence (H1a) and the intensity (H1b) of ethnic violence. Set H2: Ethnic power sharing arrangements have decreased the incidence (H2a) and the intensity (H2b) of ethnic violence. Set H3: Democratization reforms have decreased the incidence (H3a) and the intensity (H3b) of ethnic violence. 1 Ethnic Group Percentage of Population Oromo 34.5% Amhara 26.9% Somali 6.2% Tigray 6.1% Sidama 4% Gurage 2.5% Welaita 2.3% Hadiya 1.7% Afar Gamo 1.5% Gedeo 1.3% Other >1% 11.3% Findings: Decentralization has increased the incidence but decreased the intensity of ethnic violence. Democratization reforms have increased the incidence but decreased the intensity of ethnic violence. Ethnic power sharing arrangements have had an indeterminate effect on the incidence and intensity of ethnic violence. (13) (11) (12) Constitution of 1995 “We, the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia…” (2) Stated Goals: (a) Establish a pluralistic, decentralized democracy, (b) protect ethnic minorities, and (c) ensure state unity. Key Features: (a) Formation of a decentralized federal system with nine ethnically based and politically autonomous regional states comprised of 68 zones that consist of smaller districts. (b) Creation of democratic, parliamentarian governing structure at federal and local levels, including the right to free speech and protections for individuals and ethnic groups. (c) Establishment of right to internal and external secession for state-recognized ethnic groups, either from the country or to form a new regional state, without any requisite for approval from the federal government.(3) Current Realities Ethnic Power Sharing: The EPRDF coalition, comprising three ethnic parties and one multiethnic party, entirely controls the central government. The primary Tigray party, the TPLF, dominates the EPRDF. (4) Democratization: Democratization remains mainly nominal and procedural and the Economist Democracy Index identifies Ethiopia as an authoritarian state. (5) State apparatuses serve as extensions of TPLF and EPRDF control. (6) Opposition gains in 2005 election met with state orchestrated violence. (7) In 2010 the EPRDF and affiliates won 544 of 547 parliamentary seats and 1900 of 1904 state council seats as European Union election observers reported widespread irregularities. (8) Decentralization: Significant political powers have been vested in elected regional state governments, but the EPRDF wields extensive control over regions through coopted affiliate parties, and maintains greater, informal control over some regions. No ethnic group has successfully exercised its constitutional right to internal or external secession. (9) Works Cited: (1) Habtu, Alem. 2004. “Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation.” Dialectical Anthropology 28 (2): 91-123. (2) Ethiopian Constitution. Accessed through University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center on 4/24/2014 at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution.html. (3) Van der Beken, Christophe.2013. “Federalism in a Context of Extreme Ethnic Pluralism: The Case of Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region.” Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 46 (1): 3-17. (4) Habtu, Alem. 2004. (5) Economist Intelligence Unit. 2011. “Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress.” (6) Gebre Mariam, Alemayehu. 2011. “Cartoon Democracy: Ethiopia’s 2010 Election.” International Journal of Ethiopian Studies 5 (2): 27-51. (7) Arriola, Leonard R. 2013. “Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia.” Comparative Politics 45 (2) 147-168. (8) Gebre Mariam, Alemayehu. 2011. (9) Van der Beken, Christophe.2013. (10) Fearon, James D. 2008. “Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence.” The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0047. (11) Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. 2007 data. /library/publications/the-world-factbook (March 17, 2014). (12) Map of Ethiopia. Accessed at http://kweschn.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/url-1.gif (4/24/2014) (13) Ethiopian battle tank disabled after fight with rebels outside Presidential Palace 06/09/1991. U.S. Department of Defense Photo by MSGT Ed Boyce. Access code: DF-ST-92-03615