Final Paper Guidance

Basic structure Introduction – lay out your research question: Review of theory: GENERAL theory review DV: negotiating positions IVs (many): organize what scholars have said about why states take positions they do by VARIABLE, not author! Dependent variable: Positions of countries I will study Provide a table of positions and summarize them Independent variables: go through IVs identified and see if they explain what you observe Conclusion

International Climate Politics

Thinking Theoretically about Climate Change Negotiations What are the characteristics of the problem? Type & strength of actor motivations to address it? Negotiation Theory overview Type of agreement Terms of agreement Three elements of Regulatory System

Type & strength of actor motivations to address it? Unilateral interest-based Interdependent interest-based Normative-based BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)

Negotiation Theory Overview ZOPA (Zone Of Possible Agreement) Finding the existing ZOPA Interests as exogenously “given” Can’t do more than countries involved want to do Creating a new ZOPA Interests as endogenously created Leadership Argument and persuasion Bringing external pressure to bear Engaging NGO community Creating deadlines and expectations Ensuring agreement but also follow through

Type of Agreement Type of obligations Level of ambition/stringency Top-down (imposed commitments) Bottom up (voluntary commitments) Level of ambition/stringency Breadth of membership: Universal or Climate club Legal status: Binding or non-binding

Terms of agreement Substantive topic areas Mitigation Adaptation Loss and Damage

Three elements of Regulatory System Primary rule system Mitigation Obligations Financial Mechanisms Information system Response system

Lead-in to the Paris Climate Negotiations International Climate Governance

Paris Agreement, Where we are, and Where we need to be

How Paris was negotiated: Background mattered “By the opening of the Paris conference, 186 governments had declared national plans covering 94 percent of global emissions (UNFCCC 2015b). These policy pledges laid an important foundation for a global UN agreement” (Dimitrov, 2016). 2014 US/China agreement on climate emission reductions

How Paris was negotiated: Process mattered “Social learning” from previous experience (failures and successes) French leadership of negotiations and use of various tactics to foster agreement Framing issues in certain ways

How Paris was negotiated: Secrecy and few actors All states present at Paris but Paris Agreement reflects “heavy use of secrecy. … [Key issues] were resolved in Paris in secret meetings among a few countries. … The value of secrecy was in reducing the number of actors” (Dimitrov, 2016).

How Paris was negotiated: Paper over differences “‘Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing countries” while “other Parties are encouraged’ to provide such support voluntarily (Art. 9). … After entry into force, Parties shall set a new collective financial goal ‘from a floor of USD 100 billion per year’ (para. 54)” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Legal Status: Why Paris is NON-binding “If we insist on legally binding, the deal will not be global because we will lose the US” (top EU official). In the end, it was the US that weakened mitigation commitments for developed countries in the new agreement. Literally in the last minutes before the final session that adopted the agreement on December 12, the US demanded a single word change: Developed countries “should” rather than “shall” undertake economy-wide quantified emission reductions” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Level of ambition/stringency: Why Paris has weak goals Goal: Most states wanted 1.5°C goal: “It was politically inexpedient to oppose publicly 1.5°C. Hence, industrialized countries engaged in a political exercise of linguistic gymnastics: how to craft ‘creative language’ that mentions 1.5 °C without making it the official operational goal” (Dimitrov, 2016). Commitments: “The weaknesses of the agreement and a lack of political commitment may undermine its environmental effectiveness The aggregate effect of current national pledges is expected to be a global mean temperature rise of 3.7–4.8 degrees this century (UNFCCC 2015b, 8)” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Monitoring and Compliance: Why Paris has weak follow through Global “stocktake” every five years “Compliance mechanisms are weak, with a ‘facilitative’ committee whose work is ‘non-adversarial and non-punitive’ (Art. 15)” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Loss and Damage: Why Paris is not fair … “important to many countries who hold the North historically responsible for negative climate impacts. Island states wanted an institutional process to address permanent loss and irreversible damage. All developed countries closed ranks, strongly united against provisions that could lead to liability and compensation, and blocked the creation of institutional arrangements. In closed consultations, rich countries carefully strategized to formulate text that gives nominal recognition to the issue, while precluding legal obligations” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Ratification and Implementation Ratification process explained Executives sign agreement Then Legislatures ratify them All memberships are voluntary Implementation matters too What happens if states don’t meet their commitments?

But is it meaningless? It may have some instrumental influence AND The power of norms may matter

Where National Negotiating Positions Come From Ecological Vulnerability (benefits of action) Low High Abatement Costs (costs of action) Bystanders Pushers Draggers Intermediates

Where National Negotiating Positions Come From Ecological Vulnerability (benefits of action) Low High Abatement Costs (costs of action) Bystanders Pushers AOSIS, EU Draggers OPEC, US Intermediates