Counter UAV program within NATO Joint Capability Group on Ground Based Air Defence by Fred Klumpers (NLD-MoD) Chairman JCGGBAD NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Content of the briefing Recognition of the emerging UAV threat by NATO Actions taken by NATO up to now Differences and commonalities with Homeland defence Opportunities for cooperation Conclusions

Emerging threat by UAV’s Threat of UAV’s for military operations recognized around 2005 Part of the a-symmetric threat environment Rockets Artillery Mortars (RAM) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Part of the symmetric threat environment UAV itself: can disturb military air operations Airfield, helicopter / own UAV operations UAV load: can disturb all military operations Camera’s, explosives, chemical / Biological agents

Actions taken up to now Since 2007 incorporated in the threat paragraph of the NATO Staff Requirements for Ground Based Air Defence Systems (GBAD) System concept studies, based on the 7 pillar concept to engage the RAM threat: Focus on: Detect Warn Intercept or neutralize Command and Control

Actions taken up to now Invited the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) to perform feasibility studies on the topics detect and engage / neutralize international industries around the world Funded by NATO and industries Sponsored by the JCG GBAD Supported by national military operational / material experts Invited other Subject Matter Expert groups within NATO to study the topics within their area of work Joint Capability Groups on C2, UAS and C-IED Operational experts within NATO Scientific and Technology Organisation within NATO Monitored and reported within NATO by the JCG GBAD

NIAG Studies NIAG SG170: Engagement of Low, Slow and Small Aerial Targets by GBAD (finalized June 2013) 45 experts from 13 NATO and Partner nations and 36 companies Scope: to engage LSS threat today and for the next decade, study: •UAS Characteristics and Missions •Current and evolutionary sensor technology •Current and evolutionary weapons and effectors technology •The evolutionary integrated existing GBAD concepts

NIAG Studies Outcome of the study: Definition in quantifiable terms, the target/threat set, payloads and missions that are likely to be faced by NATO forces. The performance- and technical requirements for a ground based air defence system to counter this target/threat set. Identification of the requirements in technologies for sensor/classification, effector and command, control and communication capable to counter such platforms; Proposal of a GBAD generic system construct capable of countering the current V/SHORAD threat, perform the mission and engage the threats.

NIAG Studies NIAG SG188: GBAD SENSOR MIX OPTIMISATION STUDY FOR EMERGING THREATS (finalized July 2015) 51 experts from 13 NATO and Partner nations and 44 companies Scope: to develop an optimized mix of sensors to detect, track and identify emerging threat for mid and long term: •Update the UAS Characteristics and Missions from the 170 study •Review the evolutionary sensor technology •Review the sensor fusion, required for a sensor mix

NIAG Studies Outcome of the study: Examination in greater detail the GBAD sensor requirements and recommendation of an optimized mix of sensors (including the sensor fusing)   Re-identification, characterization and documentation of potential UAV’s and identification the platform vulnerability to countermeasures.   Identification of a mix of sensors and their processing techniques currently available and those that could be developed and fielded within five years, having the capability to detect, identify, classify and track the LSS threat and at what ranges. Identification of sensor fusion technologies current and available within five years.

NIAG Studies NIAG SG200: Low, Slow and Small (LSS) Threat Effector (started July 2015) Identification of current, new and evolving effectors and effector technology that can be used to neutralize the new low cost and rapidly evolving LSS UAV threat . Unintended collateral damage, especially in urban environments, must be addressed, together with recommendations for mitigation.

NIAG Studies NIAG SG200: Effectors (Started July 2015) The study shall focus on the analysis of conventional effectors (guns, missiles, laser and high power microwave) counter measures (communication/GPS counter measures) spoofing technologies low cost (man portable, more mobile and more improvised) effectors (urban environments)

Differences in requirements Operational differences: Homeland Air threat limited to UAV’s Limited range of environmental conditions Short/long/permanent duration of operations Mostly urban environment Military Air threat : from mini UAV and RAM up to Air Breathing Targets and Ballistic Missiles Very broad range of environmental conditions (temperature, dust, sun, wind, salt, etc) Short/long duration of operations Many scenario’s in respect to land- and see operations, including troops on the move and urban environments.

Differences in requirements Logistical differences: Homeland Limited size and relatively safe area. Maintenance to be performed by civilians An option to outsource the logistics to industry Military Long logistical distances, only partly to be supported by industry Operations not in save areas, maintenance to be performed by military personnel

Commonalities in requirements Same threat Same urban situation Same concept Solution (for both) will be the System of Systems concept Modular and can be optimized for every mission Same requirement for Low Life Cycle cost Use of Commercial of the Shelf modules (militarization by external protection) Smart (common) procurement Smart logistic support (including management and contracts) Common training and exercises

Opportunities Information exchange Optimization of the Life Cycle cost All parties are in the feasibility phase Development of operational (threat) scenario’s Technical feasibility studies Development system concepts To be arranged through the national security authorities Optimization of the Life Cycle cost Smart procurement Smart logistic support Common training and exercises

Conclusions The threat in an urban environment is for Homeland defence the same as for a military mission in an urban environment Systems for a urban environment can have commonality in respect to homeland defence and military missions Both parties are in a feasibility phase and don’t have developed the technical requirement for such systems There are opportunities for cooperation, which can lead to savings in feasibility studies, procurement and life cycle cost

Questions NATO UNCLASSIFIED