https://www. google. com/search https://www.google.com/search?q=security+assistance&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjD_pLatt7ZAhWRt1kKHXQtA2sQ_AUICygC#imgrc=MYsOLDEXOG433M: Will Reno Professor of Political Science Director of the Program of African Studies 14 March 2018 US SECURITY Assistance (and other policies) in Africa: Charades and Realities

The First Dilemma—Collapsing States US policies in Africa increasingly focus on addressing problems of so- called “failed states” Yet officials in many “failed States” lack the political will and capability to produce the cohesive/coherent/capable security forces, no matter how much the US spends on such endeavors. Indeed, many of these officials are involved in behaviors that US policies are meant to address.

Defense Department dominance: DATS in (nearly) all African countries, with brief lapses State Department Incapacity: nearly 25 % of African Countries without appointed US Ambassadors (as of 7 May 2018) CAR, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Somalia absorbed 38 percent of U. S Somalia absorbed 38 percent of U.S. Defense and State Department Africa program expenditures, or about $742 million for 2016, with overall Defense Department assistance to Africa rising 775 percent from 2014 ($161.9 million) to 2016 ($1.4 billion)

The Second Dilemma: State collapse as a distinct social structure: Which is the insurgent? Which is the government?

The Reality of State Collapse

Two Dimensions of Security Assistance The Formal: Western governments try to build professional armies and police forces in weak states Meant to help weak state defeat internal/regional threats Need political reforms too  Broad spectrum COIN The Informal: Weak states are weak precisely because they lack state capacity and/or political willpower “Shadow State” problem – many state/military officials work with ‘bad guys’ Western donors/trainers on the ground, operate in this context, and are unable to solve this problem and generally accept it

Somalia & Mali Somalia collapse (1991) …and multiple follow on governments that collapsed Ethiopia/AMISOM attempt new Somali State (2006-2007 - Present) Mali Coup d’état (2012) …Tuareg rebellion in the north …more unrest Both countries receive substantial security assistance, advising, equipment, aid, and training from the US and Europe https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122869822798786931

Policy & Politics Governments that don’t reform their institutions will not survive without being babysat by the international community Moral Hazard: Assisting “bad” governments just rewards badness Without government commitment to govern the state and society, alternative intervention strategies appear Interveners need a social strategy to insulate CT forces Local Special Forces – sometimes in conflict with regular army too Parallel command structures CONTRACTORS

Harsh Reality…The ad hoc Dimension of Security Policies Personal networks inform how security works in collapsing states US security actors on the ground have to circumnavigate the web of relationships between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys…lots of overlap What does it mean when US security actors ally themselves with local militias and warlords? Implications…short-term & long-term

Moral of the Story… If you are building an army in a failed state, how can you find a way to get that failed state to embrace that army? Fabergé Egg Army: expensive and easy to break A parallel strategy produces good local fighters under contractor and / or foreign Special Ops command (J5, Danab, etc) Production of a global network of security professionals who are not necessarily interested in a liberal model of state-building. Jahara W. Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies,” Defense & Security Analysis 34, no. 3 (2018): forthcoming

Questions?