Attack-Resistant Location Estimation in Sensor Networks

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Chris Karlof and David Wagner
Advertisements

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security1 CSC 774 Advanced Network Security Topic 7.3 Secure and Resilient Location Discovery in Wireless.
Cynthia Kuo, Mark Luk, Rohit Negi, Adrian Perrig Carnegie Mellon University Message-In-a-Bottle: User-Friendly and Secure Cryptographic Key Deployment.
KAIS T Message-In-a-Bottle: User-Friendly and Secure Key Deployment for Sensor Nodes Cynthia Kuo, Mark Luk, Rohit Negi, Adrian Perrig(CMU), Sensys
Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Network Soumyajit Manna Kent State University 5/11/2015Kent State University1.
Edith C. H. Ngai1, Jiangchuan Liu2, and Michael R. Lyu1
A Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du, Jing Deng, Yunghsiang S. Han and Pramod K. Varshney Department.
ITIS 6010/8010 Wireless Network Security Dr. Weichao Wang.
Secure Routing in Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures First IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications 5/11/2003.
SUMP: A Secure Unicast Messaging Protocol for Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networks Jeff Janies, Chin-Tser Huang, Nathan L. Johnson.
1 University of Freiburg Computer Networks and Telematics Prof. Christian Schindelhauer Wireless Sensor Networks 17th Lecture Christian Schindelhauer.
TPS: A Time-Based Positioning Scheme for outdoor Wireless Sensor Networks Authors: Xiuzhen Cheng, Andrew Thaeler, Guoliang Xue, Dechang Chen From IEEE.
LAD: Location Anomaly Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks Wenliang (Kevin) Du (Syracuse Univ.) Lei Fang (Syracuse Univ.) Peng Ning (North Carolina State.
Establishing Pairwise Keys in Distributed Sensor Networks Donggang Liu, Peng Ning Jason Buckingham CSCI 7143: Secure Sensor Networks October 12, 2004.
Computer Science Detecting Malicious Beacon Nodes for Secure Location Discovery in Wireless Sensor Networks Presented by Akshay Lal.
Mitigating DoS Attacks against Broadcast Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks Peng Ning, An Liu North Carolina State University and Wenliang Du Syracuse.
Secure Localization Algorithms for Wireless Sensor Networks proposed by A. Boukerche, H. Oliveira, E. Nakamura, and A. Loureiro (2008) Maria Berenice Carrasco.
MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORK(MANET) SECURITY VAMSI KRISHNA KANURI NAGA SWETHA DASARI RESHMA ARAVAPALLI.
How Does Topology Affect Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks? Ioannis Broustis CS 260 – Seminar on Network Topology.
A Survey of Secure Location Schemes in Wireless Networks /5/21.
ICC 2007 Robust Localization in Wireless Sensor Networks through the Revocation of Malicious Anchors International Conference on Communications 2007 Satyajayant.
Secure routing in wireless sensor network: attacks and countermeasures Presenter: Haiou Xiang Author: Chris Karlof, David Wagner Appeared at the First.
Rushing Attacks and Defense in Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols ► Acts as denial of service by disrupting the flow of data between a source and.
Localization and Secure Localization. The Problem The determination of the geographical locations of sensor nodes Why do we need Localization? –Manual.
A Two-Layer Key Establishment Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Yun Zhou, Student Member, IEEE, Yuguang Fang, Senior Member, IEEE IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON.
Localization and Secure Localization. Learning Objectives Understand why WSNs need localization protocols Understand localization protocols in WSNs Understand.
Cooperative Location- Sensing for Wireless Networks Authors : Haris Fretzagias Maria Papadopouli Presented by cychen IEEE International Conference on Pervasive.
Network/Computer Security Workshop, May 06 The Robustness of Localization Algorithms to Signal Strength Attacks A Comparative Study Yingying Chen, Konstantinos.
Shambhu Upadhyaya 1 Sensor Networks – Hop- by-Hop Authentication Shambhu Upadhyaya Wireless Network Security CSE 566 (Lecture 22)
Ahmad Salam AlRefai.  Introduction  System Features  General Overview (general process)  Details of each component  Simulation Results  Considerations.
1 An Interleaved Hop-by-Hop Authentication Scheme for Filtering of Injected False Data in Sensor Networks Sencun Zhu, Sanjeev Setia, Sushil Jajodia, Peng.
1 Routing security against Threat models CSCI 5931 Wireless & Sensor Networks CSCI 5931 Wireless & Sensor Networks Darshan Chipade.
Jinfang Jiang, Guangjie Han, Lei Shu, Han-Chieh Chao, Shojiro Nishio
Cooperative Location-Sensing for Wireless Networks Charalampos Fretzagias and Maria Papadopouli Department of Computer Science University of North Carolina.
Energy Efficient Detection of Compromised Nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks Haengrae Cho Department of Computer Engineering, Yeungnam University Gyungbuk.
Presented by Edith Ngai MPhil Term 3 Presentation
Authors: Jiang Xie, Ian F. Akyildiz
Introduction Wireless devices offering IP connectivity
Localization for Anisotropic Sensor Networks
A Key Pre-Distribution Scheme Using Deployment Knowledge for Wireless Sensor Networks Zhen Yu & Yong Guan Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering.
MANAGEMENT AND METHODS OF MOBILE IP SECURITY
Under Guidance- Internal Guide- Ms. Shruti T.V
Mobile Networking (I) CS 395T - Mobile Computing and Wireless Networks
Swathi Chandrashekar - Loukas Lazos
Introduction to Wireless Sensor Networks
Dynamic Fine-Grained Localization in Ad-Hoc Networks of Sensors
Presented by: Rohit Rangera
Key Management Techniques in Wireless Sensor Networks
Presenter: Yawen Wei Author: Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran
Security Engineering.
Energy Efficient Detection of Compromised Nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks Haengrae Cho Department of Computer Engineering, Yeungnam University Gyungbuk.
Net 435: Wireless sensor network (WSN)
Quantum Key Distribution
De-anonymizing the Internet Using Unreliable IDs By Yinglian Xie, Fang Yu, and Martín Abadi Presented by Peng Cheng 03/22/2017.
Wireless Mesh Networks
A Novel Latin Square-based Secret Sharing for M2M Communications
July 2014 Project: IEEE P Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) Submission Title: Security Threats in IEEE PAC Date.
Denial-of-Service Jammer Detector Training Course Worldsensing
Resilient Aggregation in Sensor Networks
PAA-2-EP protocol PANA wg - IETF 58 Minneapolis
Protocols.
An Overview of Security Issues in Sensor Network
Chapter 5 SNMP Management
USN Introduction Computer Engineering Sejin Oh.
Chapter 5 SNMP Management
Dong Xuan*, Sriram Chellappan*, Xun Wang* and Shengquan Wang+
Symmetric Key Distribution
Overview: Chapter 2 Localization and Tracking
Protocols.
November 2008 Hybrid MAC for VANET Date: Authors:
Presentation transcript:

Attack-Resistant Location Estimation in Sensor Networks Presented by: Rohit Rangera

Topics Introduction Terms Assumption Method 1. Attack-Resistance Minimum Mean Square Estimation Method 2. Voting Based Location Estimation Limit

Threat Security of location discovery, enhanced by authentication - If authentication is failed, means our beacon nodes have compromised.

Methods 1. Filters out malicious beacon signals on the basis of “consistency” among multiple beacon signals. 2. Tolerate malicious beacon by adopting an iteratively refined voting scheme.

Beacon nodes They know their position and location either GPS or manually. Useful to communicate non-Beacon nodes.

Working Steps 1. Non-beacon nodes receive radio signals called beacon signals from the beacon nodes ( x,y,d). 2. The sensor nodes determine its own location when it have enough number of location references from different beacon nodes.

Assumption and Threat model 1. All beacon nodes are uniquely identified. 2. Each non-beacon node uses at most one location reference derived from the beacon signals sent by each beacon node (for safety). An attacker may change any field in a location reference (x,y,d).

Attack-Resistance Minimum Mean Square Estimation

Voting-based location estimation

Security Analysis To defeat this approach, 1. the attacker has to distribute to a victim node more malicious location references than the benign ones, and control the declared locations and the physical features (like signal strength) of beacon signals so that the malicious location references are considered consistence. 2. The attacker needs similar efforts so that the cell containing the attacker’s choice gets more voted then those containing the sensor’s real location

What attacker can do 1. The attacker may compromise beacon nodes and then generate malicious beacon signals. 2. Attacker may launch wormhole attacks or replay attack to tunnel benign beacon signals from one area to another.

Limit If all the beacon nodes are compromised, their techniques will fails.

Reference 1. Attack-Resistance Location Estimation in Sensor Networks By: D. Liu and P, Ning. W. Du.

Thank You Any question please ?