Route Servers: An AMS-IX Introspective

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Presentation transcript:

Route Servers: An AMS-IX Introspective aris.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net

Basic Route Server Challenges Problem #1 (ca. 2008): Simplify large scale EBGP interconnection (peering) across a Layer 2 network Solution #1: Deploy one (or more) intermediate broker systems, acting similarly to IBGP route reflectors. Call them route servers.* *Now RFC7947

Basic Route Server Challenges Problem #2 (a bit later): Support peer routing policies: Peers want to exchange prefixes with a subset of all route server peers. Diverse Kludges Solutions #2: 1. IRR based policies 2. BGP community parsing 3. Client-Accessible database (we ended up with 1. and 2.)* *Still part of RFC7947

Routing Hygiene Problem #3: Filter out unwanted prefixes Solution #3: Basic Filtering implemented (Bogons, Martians, RFC1918, native AS, next-hop sanity)

Routing Hygiene Problem #4 (ca. 2013): Filter out more unwanted prefixes Solution #4: Filter based on IRR data and RPKI

Route Server politics Problem #5: Introduce solution #4 in a non controversial way. ”Filtering prefixes based on BCPs is OK, but asking other institutions (e.g. RIPE) about prefix validity may attract ire from customers not acknowledging institution authority or value. It might also inadvertently advertise capability to non-community stakeholders”

Route Server politics Solution #5 (2015): Circumvent problem #5 by introducing four choices of filtering (IRR+RPKI, IRR only, RPKI only, no filtering, just tagging) in a second set of route servers. Add all solutions, up to #4 to that new set. Call it Falcon route servers. Make tagging the default filtering option.

Route Server politics Solution #5 (cont’d): Bet internally as to whether customers are interested in the new route servers or not, based on the uptake in a month’s time. There was 

Route Server politics Problem #6: Customers/members informally suggest to backport features to the Legacy route servers. Internal discussion ensues once again. Is it OK to do that?

Route Server politics Solution #6 (2017): Bring the question back to the customer/member base. Get feedback. Customers voicing opinion were all in favor of doing so, and with IRR+RPKI the default filtering mechanism.

Legacy Route Server ”falconization”™ Backporting of features went live on Friday, October 20th, 2017. No traffic loss detected, although advertised prefixes (with IRR+RPKI filtering) went from ~165K to ~68K.

Questions?