RFID Security & Privacy at both Physical and System Levels - Presentation to IoT-GSI 26th August 2011 Robert H. Deng & Yingjiu Li School of Information.

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Presentation transcript:

RFID Security & Privacy at both Physical and System Levels - Presentation to IoT-GSI 26th August 2011 Robert H. Deng & Yingjiu Li School of Information Systems Singapore Management University 2018/11/18

RFID Security & Privacy at Physical Level 2018/11/18

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) Radio signal (contactless) Authenticate / Identify Read / Update Tags (transponders) Attached to objects, “call out” identifying data on a special radio frequency Reader (transceivers) Read data off tags without direct contact Database Match tag IDs to physical objects 2018/11/18

RFID Security Issues Tag Authentication Reader Authentication Only valid tags are accepted by a valid reader Reader Authentication Only valid readers are accepted by valid tags Not always required but mandatory in some applications (e.g., e-tickets) Availability Infeasible to manipulate honest tags such that honest readers do not accept them 2018/11/18

Radio signal (contactless) RFID Privacy Issues Privacy requirements Anonymity: Confidentiality of the tag identity Untraceability: Unlinkability of the tag’s transactions Privacy issues Adversaries identify tags Adversaries track tags Radio signal (contactless) Tags Reader 2018/11/18

RFID Privacy Preserving Authentication Protocol Design Tag T Reader R c r f (optional) Security requirements One way or mutual authentication Privacy requirements Anonymity: Confidentiality of the tag identity Untraceability: Unlinkability of the tag’s transactions 2018/11/18

Cryptographic Protocols for RFID Privacy Numerous lightweight RFID protocols for low-cost tags have been proposed They use simple operations (XOR, bit inner product, CRC, etc) Most of them have been broken (T. van Deursen and S. Radomirovic: Attacks on RFID Protocols, ePrint Archive: Report 2008/310) 2018/11/18

Recent Progress: RFID Privacy Models Ind-privacy: indistinguishability of two tags (Jules & Weis, PerCom 2007) Ideal model, but not easy to work with Unp-privacy: unpredictability of protocol messages (Ha, Moon, Zhou & Ha, ESORICS 2008), (Ma, Li, Deng, Li, CCS09) Only works with symmetric key based protocols ZK-privacy model: Zero knowledge model (Deng, Li, Yung, Zhao, Esorics 2010) Output of real world experiment and output of simulated world experiment are indistinguishable Works with both symmetric key and public key protocols 2018/11/18

RFID Security & Privacy at System Level 2018/11/18

An IoT Architecture for Sharing RFID Information Query/ Answer Discovery service Query/ Answer Internet User Query/ Answer Publish/ Update Publish/ Update Information service Information service RFID readers RFID readers RFID tags RFID tags Enterprise information system Enterprise information system 2018/11/18

Security and Privacy Security: Identification/authentication of involving parties Users, discovery services, information services Privacy: Only authorized parties can access RFID data as needed Query, read, write, update, delete Solution: Access control Policy management, enforcement, implementation 2018/11/18

Access Control Requirements Cross domain RFID data to be shared are managed by different parties (IS and DS) Unknown users Query issuer may not have prior business relationship or be known to data holders Visibility Access to RFID data is based on supply chain information Compatibility Access control can be easily enforced in web services and database systems 2018/11/18

Existing Access Control Models Discretionary access control (DAC) Mandatory access control (MAC) Role based access control (RBAC) Attribute based access control (ABAC) Access Subject Object 2018/11/18

Comparison √ Cross Domain Unknown users Visibility Compatibility DAC Χ MAC RBAC ABAC 2018/11/18

Current Effort Data Discovery Requirements Document (EPCglobal draft, 2009) Description of requirements on RFID discovery services, including data confidentiality, integrity and access control A framework of components for access control in data discovery services (BRIDGE final report, 2009) Focus on networked services for inter-company operation of supply chains Our current work Design secure discovery services and implement the whole system in Singapore 2018/11/18