IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Information Security & Privacy

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Variants of Turing machines
Advertisements

1 1 -Access Control Foundational Results. 2 2 Preliminaries Undecidability The Halting Problem The Turing Machine.
Prof. Busch - LSU1 Decidable Languages. Prof. Busch - LSU2 Recall that: A language is Turing-Acceptable if there is a Turing machine that accepts Also.
P, NP, PS, and NPS By Muhannad Harrim. Class P P is the complexity class containing decision problems which can be solved by a Deterministic Turing machine.
Complexity ©D.Moshkovitz 1 Turing Machines. Complexity ©D.Moshkovitz 2 Motivation Our main goal in this course is to analyze problems and categorize them.
Complexity 5-1 Complexity Andrei Bulatov Complexity of Problems.
November 1, 2004Introduction to Computer Security ©2004 Matt Bishop Slide #3-1 Chapter 3: Foundational Results Overview Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman result –Corollaries.
Fall 2004COMP 3351 Reducibility. Fall 2004COMP 3352 Problem is reduced to problem If we can solve problem then we can solve problem.
CS5371 Theory of Computation Lecture 10: Computability Theory I (Turing Machine)
1 Foundations of Software Design Fall 2002 Marti Hearst Lecture 29: Computability, Turing Machines, Can Computers Think?
Courtesy Costas Busch - RPI1 Reducibility. Courtesy Costas Busch - RPI2 Problem is reduced to problem If we can solve problem then we can solve problem.
Finite State Machines Data Structures and Algorithms for Information Processing 1.
1 Reducibility. 2 Problem is reduced to problem If we can solve problem then we can solve problem.
1 September 14, 2006 Lecture 3 IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security.
Complexity and Computability Theory I Lecture #13 Instructor: Rina Zviel-Girshin Lea Epstein Yael Moses.
The Halting Problem – Undecidable Languages Lecture 31 Section 4.2 Wed, Oct 31, 2007.
1 The Halting Problem and Decidability How powerful is a TM? Any program in a high level language can be simulated by a TM. Any algorithmic procedure carried.
Slide #2-1 Chapter 2: Access Control Matrix Overview Access Control Matrix Model Protection State Transitions –Commands –Conditional Commands.
Slide #3-1 Chapter 3: Foundational Results Overview Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman result –Corollaries.
1 Turing’s Thesis. 2 Turing’s thesis: Any computation carried out by mechanical means can be performed by a Turing Machine (1930)
1Computer Sciences Department. Book: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF COMPUTATION, SECOND EDITION, by: MICHAEL SIPSER Reference 3Computer Sciences Department.
2/1/20161 Computer Security Foundational Results.
Turing Machines Lecture 26 Naveen Z Quazilbash. Overview Introduction Turing Machine Notation Turing Machine Formal Notation Transition Function Instantaneous.
1 IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security James Joshi Associate Professor, SIS Lecture 4 September 18, 2012 Access Control Model Foundational Results.
Overview of the theory of computation Episode 3 0 Turing machines The traditional concepts of computability, decidability and recursive enumerability.
Lecture 24UofH - COSC Dr. Verma 1 COSC 3340: Introduction to Theory of Computation University of Houston Dr. Verma Lecture 24.
1 Turing Machines - Chap 8 Turing Machines Recursive and Recursively Enumerable Languages.
Lecture 16b Turing Machines Topics: Closure Properties of Context Free Languages Cocke-Younger-Kasimi Parsing Algorithm June 23, 2015 CSCE 355 Foundations.
Automata & Formal Languages, Feodor F. Dragan, Kent State University 1 CHAPTER 3 The Church-Turing Thesis Contents Turing Machines definitions, examples,
1 Introduction to Turing Machines
Umans Complexity Theory Lectures Lecture 1b: Turing Machines & Halting Problem.
April 8, 2004ECS 235Slide #1 Overview Safety Question HRU Model Take-Grant Protection Model SPM, ESPM –Multiparent joint creation Expressive power Typed.
Chapter 9 Turing Machines What would happen if we change the stack in Pushdown Automata into some other storage device? Truing Machines, which maintains.
Recursively Enumerable and Recursive Languages. Definition: A language is recursively enumerable if some Turing machine accepts it.
Decidability.
Fall 2013 Lecture 27: Turing machines and decidability CSE 311: Foundations of Computing.
Modeling Arithmetic, Computation, and Languages Mathematical Structures for Computer Science Chapter 8 Copyright © 2006 W.H. Freeman & Co.MSCS SlidesTuring.
CIS Automata and Formal Languages – Pei Wang
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
Busch Complexity Lectures: Turing Machines
Busch Complexity Lectures: Reductions
CSE 311 Foundations of Computing I
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
Reductions Costas Busch - LSU.
Turing Machines.
CS21 Decidability and Tractability
COSC 3340: Introduction to Theory of Computation
LIMITS OF ALGORITHMIC COMPUTATION
Introduction to Computer Security Lecture 2
September 16, 2004 Introduction to Computer Security Lecture 3
Chapter 9 TURING MACHINES.
Busch Complexity Lectures: Undecidable Problems (unsolvable problems)
Jaya Krishna, M.Tech, Assistant Professor
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
Decidable Languages Costas Busch - LSU.
Overview Safety Question HRU Model Take-Grant Protection Model
Formal Languages, Automata and Models of Computation
Computer Security Foundations
Outline Motivation Access Control Matrix Model
Recall last lecture and Nondeterministic TMs
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Information Security & Privacy
Instructor: Aaron Roth
Instructor: Aaron Roth
Decidability continued….
Instructor: Aaron Roth
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
Turing Machines Everything is an Integer
IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Introduction to Security
CIS Automata and Formal Languages – Pei Wang
Presentation transcript:

IS 2150 / TEL 2810 Information Security & Privacy James Joshi Associate Professor, SIS Lecture 4 Jan 30, 2013 Access Control Model Foundational Results

Objective Understand the basic results of the HRU model Saftey issue Turing machine Undecidability

Safety Problem: formally Given Initial state X0 = (S0, O0, A0) Set of primitive commands c r is not in A0[s, o] Can we reach a state Xn where s,o such that An[s,o] includes a right r not in A0[s,o]? If so, the system is not safe But is “safe” secure?

Undecidable Problems Decidable Problem Undecidable Problem A decision problem can be solved by an algorithm that halts on all inputs in a finite number of steps. Undecidable Problem A problem that cannot be solved for all cases by any algorithm whatsoever

Decidability Results (Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman) Theorem: Given a system where each command consists of a single primitive command (mono-operational), there exists an algorithm that will determine if a protection system with initial state X0 is safe with respect to right r.

Decidability Results (Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman) Proof: determine minimum commands k to leak Delete/destroy: Can’t leak Create/enter: new subjects/objects “equal”, so treat all new subjects as one No test for absence of right Tests on A[s1, o1] and A[s2, o2] have same result as the same tests on A[s1, o1] and A[s1, o2] = A[s1, o2] A[s2, o2] If n rights leak possible, must be able to leak k= n(|S0|+1)(|O0|+1)+1 commands Enumerate all possible states to decide

c1 c2 c2 ca cb cb ci ci cj cj cm cn cn cx cy cy Create Statements REMOVE these Delete/destroy c1 c2 c2 ca cb cb ci ci cj cj cm cn cn cx cy cy Create s1; Create s2 …… But the condition of cm needs to be changed Discard these s1 s2 s1 s1 s1 s2 Initial A After execution of cb

c1 c2 c2 ca cb cb ci ci cj cj cm cn cn cx cy cy Create Statements REMOVE these Delete/destroy c1 c2 c2 ca cb cb ci ci cj cj cm cn cn cx cy cy Create s1 If Condition Enter statement o1 o2 s1 o1 o2 s1 s2 r  A[s1, o1] r  A[s1, o1] r  A[s2, o2] r  A[s1, o2] where A[s1, o2] = A[s1, o2] A[s2, o2] s1 X Y s1 X Y  Z s2 Z Initial A After two creates Just use first create

Decidability Results (Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman) Proof: determine minimum commands k to leak Delete/destroy: Can’t leak Create/enter: new subjects/objects “equal”, so treat all new subjects as one No test for absence of right Tests on A[s1, o1] and A[s2, o2] have same result as the same tests on A[s1, o1] and A[s1, o2] = A[s1, o2] A[s2, o2] If n rights leak possible, must be able to leak k= n(|S0|+1)(|O0|+1)+1 commands Enumerate all possible states to decide

Decidability Results (Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman) It is undecidable if a given state of a given protection system is safe for a given generic right For proof – need to know Turing machines and halting problem

Turing Machine & halting problem The halting problem: Given a description of an algorithm and a description of its initial arguments, determine whether the algorithm, when executed with these arguments, ever halts (the alternative is that it runs forever without halting).

Turing Machine & Safety problem Theorem: It is undecidable if a given state of a given protection system is safe for a given generic right Reduce TM to Safety problem If Safety problem is decidable then it implies that TM halts (for all inputs) – showing that the halting problem is decidable (contradiction) TM is an abstract model of computer Alan Turing in 1936

Turing Machine TM consists of A B C … head D A tape divided into cells; infinite in one direction A set of tape symbols M M contains a special blank symbol b A set of states K A head that can read and write symbols An action table that tells the machine how to transition What symbol to write How to move the head (‘L’ for left and ‘R’ for right) What is the next state A B C … head Current state is k Current symbol is C D

Turing Machine Transition function d(k, m) = (k , m , L): In state k, symbol m on tape location is replaced by symbol m , Head moves one cell to the left, and TM enters state k  Halting state is qf TM halts when it enters this state A B C … head Current state is k Current symbol is C D Let d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) where k1 is the next state

Turing Machine A B C … head D A B ? ? … head A B ? ? ? … head ? Let d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) where k1 is the next state 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 A B C … head Current state is k Current symbol is C D A B ? ? … head Let d(k1, D) = (k2, Y, L) where k2 is the next state 1 2 3 4 A B ? ? ? … head ?

TM2Safety Reduction A B C … head D Proof: Reduce TM to safety problem 1 2 4 head Current state is k Current symbol is C D 3 TM2Safety Reduction Proof: Reduce TM to safety problem Symbols, States  rights Tape cell  subject Cell si has A  si has A rights on itself Cell sk  sk has end rights on itself State p, head at si  si has p rights on itself Distinguished Right own: si owns si+1 for 1 ≤ i < k s1 s2 s3 s4 A B C k D end own

Command Mapping (Left move) B C … 1 2 4 head Current state is k Current symbol is C D 3 Command Mapping (Left move) d(k, C) = (k1, X, L) d(k, C) = (k1, X, L) If head is not in leftmost command ck,C(si, si-1) if own in a[si-1, si] and k in a[si, si] and C in a[si, si] then delete k from A[si,si]; delete C from A[si,si]; enter X into A[si,si]; enter k1 into A[si-1, si-1]; End s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 A own s2 B own s3 C k own s4 D end

Command Mapping (Left move) 1 2 3 4 Command Mapping (Left move) 1 2 4 A B X D … Current state is k1 head Current symbol is D d(k, C) = (k1, X, L) d(k, C) = (k1, X, L) If head is not in leftmost command ck,C(si, si-1) if own in a[si-1, si] and k in a[si, si] and C in a[si, si] then delete k from A[si,si]; delete C from A[si,si]; enter X into A[si,si]; enter k1 into A[si-1, si-1]; End s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 A own s2 B k1 own s3 X own s4 D end If head is in leftmost both si and si-1 are s1

Command Mapping (Right move) B C … 1 2 4 head Current state is k Current symbol is C D 3 Command Mapping (Right move) d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) command ck,C(si, si+1) if own in a[si, si+1] and k in a[si, si] and C in a[si, si] then delete k from A[si,si]; delete C from A[si,si]; enter X into A[si,si]; enter k1 into A[si+1, si+1]; end s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 A own s2 B own s3 C k own s4 D end

Command Mapping (Right move) 1 2 3 4 Command Mapping (Right move) 1 2 4 A B C D … Current state is k1 head Current symbol is C d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) d(k, C) = (k1, X, R) command ck,C(si, si+1) if own in a[si, si+1] and k in a[si, si] and C in a[si, si] then delete k from A[si,si]; delete C from A[si,si]; enter X into A[si,si]; enter k1 into A[si+1, si+1]; end s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 A own s2 B own s3 X own s4 D k1 end

Command Mapping (Rightmost move) 1 2 3 4 Command Mapping (Rightmost move) 1 2 4 A B X D … Current state is k1 head Current symbol is C d(k1, C) = (k2, Y, R) d(k1, D) = (k2, Y, R) at end becomes command crightmostk,C(si,si+1) if end in a[si,si] and k1 in a[si,si] and D in a[si,si] then delete end from a[si,si]; create subject si+1; enter own into a[si,si+1]; enter end into a[si+1, si+1]; delete k1 from a[si,si]; delete D from a[si,si]; enter Y into a[si,si]; enter k2 into A[si,si]; end s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 A own s2 B own s3 X own s4 D k1 end

Command Mapping (Rightmost move) 1 2 3 4 Command Mapping (Rightmost move) 1 2 4 A B X D … Current state is k1 head Current symbol is D d(k1, D) = (k2, Y, R) d(k1, D) = (k2, Y, R) at end becomes command crightmostk,C(si,si+1) if end in a[si,si] and k1 in a[si,si] and D in a[si,si] then delete end from a[si,si]; create subject si+1; enter own into a[si,si+1]; enter end into a[si+1, si+1]; delete k1 from a[si,si]; delete D from a[si,si]; enter Y into a[si,si]; enter k2 into A[si,si]; end s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s1 A own s2 B own s3 X own s4 own Y s5 b k2end

Rest of Proof Protection system exactly simulates a TM Exactly 1 end right in ACM Only 1 right corresponds to a state Thus, at most 1 applicable command in each configuration of the TM If TM enters state qf, then right has leaked If safety question decidable, then represent TM as above and determine if qf leaks Leaks halting state  halting state in the matrix  Halting state reached Conclusion: safety question undecidable

Other results For protection system without the create primitives, (i.e., delete create primitive); the safety question is complete in P-SPACE It is undecidable whether a given configuration of a given monotonic protection system is safe for a given generic right Delete destroy, delete primitives; The system becomes monotonic as they only increase in size and complexity The safety question for biconditional monotonic protection systems is undecidable The safety question for monoconditional, monotonic protection systems is decidable The safety question for monoconditional protection systems with create, enter, delete (and no destroy) is decidable.