Anonymity in Structured Peer-to-Peer Networks

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Presentation transcript:

Anonymity in Structured Peer-to-Peer Networks Nikita Borisov and Jason Waddle

Introduction Existing P2P systems offer anonymity or structured routing, but not both We aim to investigate the interaction of network structure and anonymity Analyze Chord and some modifications Techniques generalize to other systems Focus on source-anonymous DHT lookup

Quantifying Anonymity Attacker gets some information about an event wants to learn identity of initiator of that event Crowd a set W of potential initiators Initiator a member of W wants to blend in – not differentiate herself in the eyes of the attacker from the rest of W

Quantifying Anonymity We want to measure the uncertainty of the attacker with respect to the identity of the initiator.

Quantifying Anonymity         A        

Quantifying Anonymity  ?         A 01101...        

Anonymity Sets Anonymity Set S is a random variable the set of initiators that cannot be ruled out as the true initiator based on the information available to the attacker Anonymity can be measured as the expected size of this set E[|S|] Normalized: Anonymity = E[|S|]/|W|

Anonymity Sets A Anonymity = 9/16  Right Half      01101...  

Anonymity Sets Anonymity sets do not generalize to a probability distribution P on initiators implied by information available to attacker e.g., there is an x 2 W, P(x) = .99999 P(W - {x}) uniform (and nonzero) S = W Anonymity = 1

Entropy Entropy H(P) measures the “uncertainty” in a probability distribution H(P) ´ -åx P(x) log2 P(x) Normalized: H(P)/(log2 |W|) Example: P is uniform on S µ W H(P) = - |S| £ (1/|S| log2 1/|S|) = log2 |S| Example: P(x) = 1 H(P) = - log2 1 = 0

Entropy Anonymity can be measured as expected entropy: Anonymity ´ E[H(P)] Normalized: E[H(P)]/(log2 |W|) Anonymity as bits: How many more bits would the attacker need to identify the initiator with certainty?

Chord Network Destination

Routing

Routing to Attackers

Backtrace Attacker

Distribution Average Entropy=0.60

Bad Distribution Average Entropy=0.30

Randomized Routing Chord routing: follow best (longest) finger that makes progress towards the destination Randomized routing: follow random finger that makes progress Guaranteed to eventually arrive at destination Performance bound grows to: O(log2 N) Many more possible paths going through a node

Random Routing

Random Distribution Average Entropy=0.70 Worst-Node Entropy=0.36

Random Distribution (Bad) Average Entropy=0.67 Worst-Node Entropy=0.39

Performance Trade-Off Many possible optimizations to reduce path length E.g. favor larger fingers when picking randomly Such optimizations lower path length But also lower the expected entropy Not all paths are as likely Worst-case entropy suffers even more

Weighted Random Distribution Average Entropy=0.55 Worst-Node Entropy=0.13

Realistic Distribution Average Entropy=0.80 Worst-Node Entropy=0.25

High Indegree

Low Indegree

Summary Some users better off than others High variance in expected entropy In-degree has a powerful effect on both attackers and honest participants In-degree influenced by relatively uncontrollable factors: size of gap to predecessor distance from destination

Intermediaries: Routing by proxy Route first to a random node I, then to the desired destination Really good for nodes in bad situations e.g., low in-degree, attackers for neighbors How to get the routing request to the intermediary?

Intermediaries: Wrong Approach (Mr. I, please route to D) S D

Intermediaries: Wrong Approach SD (I,D) S D

Split Routing Use simple secret sharing to split up the message [D] (“please route to D”) generate R at random split [D] ! M0 = [R] M1 = [R © D] [D] = M0 © M1 neither M0 nor M1 reveal D on their own

Split Routing (D = M0 © M1) Route M0 and M1 along disjoint paths to the intermediary I attackers must intercept both messages except at I, paths have no chance of converging probability of learning S ! D is roughly squared

Bidirectional Routing How to route along disjoint paths? Standard routing is clockwise (CW) fingers increase clockwise ID + ½, ID + ¼, … Extend Chord to allow counterclockwise (CCW) routing as well CCW fingers increase counterclockwise ID – ½, ID - ¼, …

Bidirectional Routing ID(S) + ½ ID(S) + ¼ ID(S) - ¼ CW fingers CCW fingers S

Bidirectional Routing Can use randomized/etc. routing for each share Routing latency increased by ~2x Entropy harder to analyze Must combine information from two attackers Results will be in paper Can use more than 2 paths or more than 1 intermediary Further trade-off performance and anonymity

Conclusion Analyzed anonymity properties of Chord and extensions Identified properties that have the most effect on anonymity Proposed and analyzed anonymity-enhancing modifications Our work can be generalized to other structured P2P systems Indegree variations will be universally relevant Intermediary/split routing can be used with other geometries