IGTF Risk Assessment Team http://tagpma.es.net/wiki/bin/view/IGTF-RAT

Cable Severance Severance of three (out of four) undersea cables in the Mediterranean basin on December 19th, 2008. Affected retrieval of CRLs. http://www.eugridpma.org/newsletter/eugridpma-newsletter-20081220.txt

MD5 MD5 hash collisions in X.509 certificates Risk for new certificates issued using MD5 IGTF should not have any of these… http://www.eugridpma.org/newsletter/eugridpma-newsletter-20090102.txt Also concern about MD5 weakness in general: CA certificates (and subordinates) CNRS subordinate using MD5 will change to SHA1 shortly CRLs Proxy certificates (Globus, VOMS, MyProxy) Globus discussed proxy certificate issue

(EC)DSA EE Keys OpenSSL client vulnerability Unlikely that IGTF CAs have certified (EC)DSA keys http://www.eugridpma.org/newsletter/eugridpma-newsletter-20090108.txt RAT will request CAs to audit

Querying CAs Email Online repositories of issued certificates Privacy issues? Certificates are public? Ex. Public phone number versus publish in phone book Restrict access to RAT members? Decided: Will not require this for now Goal: Gather information to assess the risk Must always tell CAs to modify practice in the future based on new risk/threat

Sanity Checking Requests RSA Exponent < 65537 Hardware tokens (pkcs11-tool) tend to generate exponents 3 & 5 by default Known-weak (Debian OpenSSL) keys MD5 (EC)DSA Transient issue? OpenSSL will be patched. Relying parties should patch in any case!

IGTF RAT Risk assessment is difficult Additional members welcome! Contact: igtf-rat@eugridpma.org