Applications of Blockchains - III

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Presentation transcript:

Applications of Blockchains - III Lecture 15 Applications of Blockchains - III

Fair Multiparty Computation from Public Bulletin Boards Arka Rai Choudhuri - Matthew Green - Abhishek Jain - Gabriel Kaptchuk - Ian Miers ACM CCS’17

Multi-Party Computation

Multi-Party Computation

Multi-Party Computation

Multi-Party Computation Malicious Security without abort Imagine the auction scenario – the is a monetary value to the adversary to aborting early and re-running

Fair Multi-Party Computation

Fair Multi-Party Computation

Attempts to Achieve Fairness General Fairness is impossible without an honest majority [Cleve 86] Gradual Release Mechanisms [BeaGol89, BonNao00, GarJak02] Restricted Class of functions [GHKL08,…] Fairness with Penalties [BenKum14, ADMM14] Δ-T fairness with Trusted Hardware [PST16] Restricted class is the class without XOR

Public Bulletin Boards

Public Bulletin Boards Public: Messages are visible to all parties Available: Messages are permanently available (cannot be modified or deleted) Unforgeable: No adversary can produce a “valid looking” state of the bulletin board which is different from the real state. (Can think of the bulletin board providing an unforgeable signature for every post)

Why Bulletin Boards? Existing technologies can be used as bulletin boards I. Proof-of-Stake based Blockchains II. Google Certificate Transparency Blockchain records are public and available. Proof-of-stake based blockchains satisfy unforgeability [Goyal-Goyal’17] Can be used as an append-only public log Certificates present in the log can be verified by root signature. Add “CT”

x1 x2

x1 x2 How to Decrypt?

Want: Fair Decryption Either both the parties should be able to decrypt, or no one Put differently, either both parties can learn decryption key or no one can Idea: Decryption key: = (a release token RT, and bulletin board’s signature on RT) But standard encryption schemes do not have such special keys! Add “CT”

Want: “Conditional Decryption” Want: Ciphertexts that can only be decrypted if a certain action was implemented Put differently, decryption should only be possible if a statement is true Problem: Regular encryption/decryption keys are random strings (without such structure)

Witness Encryption [Garg-Gentry-Sahai-Waters’13] CITATION [BCP14]

Witness Encryption [Garg-Gentry-Sahai-Waters’13] Security: If x is “false”, then Enc(m,x) is indistinguishable from Enc(m,x’)

Extractable Witness Encryption [Goldwasser-Kalai-Popa-Vaikuntanathan-Zeldovich’13] (Informal) Security: Enc(m,x) is indistinguishable from Enc(m,x’) even for “true” x if no PPT adversary can find a witness for x

(Extractable) Witness Encryption Candidate constructions known [Garg-Gentry-Sahai- Waters’13, Gentry-Lewko-Waters’14] Open problem: Constructing WE from standard crytpographic assumptions Add “CT”

Back to Fair MPC Idea: Let’s use Witness Encryption (WE) to encrypt the output After the initial (unfair) MPC, anyone can post a release token RT to the bulletin board. Then RT, together with signature of the bulletin board can be a “witness” for decryption Let’s suppose that RT is a public value Add “CT”

(RT, sig) x2 x1 x3 RT x4 = WE(y, x := RT was posted on bulletin board)

Problem What if adversary aborts in the initial unfair MPC so that only it learns the WE ciphertext (but not the honest parties) Now, even if adversary posts RT on bulletin board, the honest parties get the witness but not the WE ciphertext! Add “CT”

Solution Use a private release token RT Consider two party case (for simplicity): RT := (RT1, RT2) where RT1 is chosen by P1 and RT2 is chosen by P2 After initial MPC, parties exchange RT1 and RT2 with each other Now, if adversary aborts in the initial MPC, RT exchange phase will not happen, so adversary cannot learn the output If adversary aborts in the RT exchange phase, that’s ok. In order to recover output, it must post RT on bulletin board, which makes it public. Add “CT”

Security Think: Can we base security on Witness Encryption? Problem: Statement is always true (signatures on RT “exist”, just finding them without posting RT on bulletin board is “hard”) Therefore, need Extractable Witness Encryption for security (can be avoided in some special cases) Add “CT”

A more efficient solution Emulate Witness encryption using Trusted Hardware, e.g., Intel SGX In this case, an efficient solution can be obtained if we start from an efficient (unfair) MPC

Trusted Hardware?!? But Gabe, if you are using Trusted Hardware, isn’t all of this trivial? Trusted Hardware solves all security problems!

Trusted Hardware alone cannot guarantee fairness [Pass-Shi-Tramer’17]

Open Questions Can we base security on regular witness encryption? Can we base security on standard assumptions?