Computer-Mediated Communication

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Presentation transcript:

Computer-Mediated Communication Collaborative Editing, Online Collective Action and Game Theory

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Announcements Assignment #2 and Due Dates Thurs Nov 13th (Assn 2) Presentations Dec 2nd and Dec 4th Final Projects Due Tuesday December 16th Next Week No Readings or Reviews In-class activities Office hours moved to 3-4pm today 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Highlighting a few good points and issues: Who is the target audience in a collective action problem? NPR example Incentives and “crowding out” effects Monetary versus other incentives Mycroft: Heinlein vs. Conan Doyle 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore “… [we] note that administrative and coordinating elements seem to be growing at a faster pace than the bulk of articles in the encyclopedia [Wikipedia]” Viégas et al. 2007 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

“Talk” Pages on Wikipedia (Viégas et al. 2007) 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

“Emergent” Order and Coordination 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Designing for Social Psychological Incentives Outcomes for Collective Action Contribution Size Membership Diversity of Contribution Standardization Behaviors Social psychological incentives 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Using Game Theory to Understand Collective Action 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Types of Social Dilemmas Different social dilemma games make different use of the payouts: T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma T>R>S>P Chicken T>P>R>S Deadlock R>T>P>S Stag Hunt B Coop. Defect 3 (R) 5 (T) Reward Temptation Sucker Punishment 3 (R) 0 (S) Ebay example A 0 (S) 1 (P) 5 (T) 1 (P) 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

When are Social Dilemmas Useful in the Study of CMC? Wherever we find mixed-motive situations and collective action… Standards Wars And Intperpersonal Interactions Online Tagging Systems (folksonomies), Collaborative Editing Systems Del.ic.ious 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Forms of Interaction in Social Dilemmas N-person PD 2-person repeated PD Public Good 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore The N-person PD “No one wants to pay taxes because the benefits are so diffuse and the costs are so direct. But everyone may be better off if each person has to pay so that each can share the benefits” cf. Schelling 1973; Axelrod 1984 N-person game is same idea as a standard 2-person, except you now have to account for a new parameter (k) which represents the minimum coalition necessary to produce the optimal outcome. 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Vaccinations, Invisible Hands, Halloween Parties and other Scary Things. Vaccinations: if they are optional, what proportion need to get them to reduce public risk? Invisible Hand: Adam Smith’s idea is essentially about collective behaviors guiding shared outcomes Parties: Showing up on time versus showing up late 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore 2-person repeated PD “…there are many opportunities for mutually rewarding activities by two senators. These mutually rewarding actions have led to the creation of an elaborate set of norms…among the most important of these is the norm of reciprocity [helping out a colleague and getting repaid in kind]” - Axelrod 1984 Same idea as a standard PD, except now you have repeated interactions with same partners over time. This one change accounts for all the interest, because it allows cooperation to emerge even if individuals behave with rational self interest. 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore C C C C C C C C C = 0 versus D D D D D D D D D = 45 C C C C C C C C C = 27 versus B Coop. Defect 3 (R) 5 (T) 3 (R) 0 (S) A 0 (S) 1 (P) 5 (T) 1 (P) 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Strategizing in repeated PD games Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time No mechanisms for enforceable commitments. No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’. No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction. No way to change the other player’s payoffs. What strategy might you use if you had to play this game over and over again with others? Always Cooperate? Always Defect? Something more complicated, perhaps using past behavior? 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore CMC PD tournament 2008! 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore CMC PD tournament 2008! Work in groups to develop PD strategies Use IPDLX open-source PD software Used for tournaments by PD “professionals” Works with Java 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, any platform Tournament will be in class on Tuesday —Actually, TWO tournaments: One where you enter your one best strategy One where you enter any and all strategies 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Tournament format Round-robin: each strategy plays each other strategy and itself once Winner has the most cumulative points Each game will have n turns n is unknown and potentially variable 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

http://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu /i216/f08/ipdlx08.zip Software details… http://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu /i216/f08/ipdlx08.zip 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Software details… public class CMCSample extends Strategy { private final static String _abbrName = "CMCS"; private final static String _name = "CMC Sample Strategy"; private final static String _description = "Not a proper strategy..."; ... 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Software details… public double getMoveDecision() { // Default move double move = COOPERATE; // Do some magic ... // ... end magic. // Return your move for this round return move; } 11/21/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore