Epistemic Vice and Motivation Alessandra Tanesini January 2018

The Plan The motivational account of intellectual virtue and vice Epistemic Malevolence and motivation Some counter-examples: Epistemic Laziness and apparent lack of motivation Arrogance and Dogmatism: Epistemic vice despite good motivations Addressing the counter-examples Two kinds of motivation and the practice of Vice Attribution

The motivational account of intellectual virtue and vice Zagzebski’s motivational account of intellectual virtue (1996, 2003) Motives are necessary components of intellectual virtues Reliability in achieving their ends is also necessary Each intellectual virtue is individuated by a proximate motivation to pursue something which is epistemically good. (e.g., open-mindedness and delight in discovering new truths) Every intellectual virtue shares the same ultimate motive which is love of cognitive contact with reality. The ultimate motive is a motive to pursue for its own sake something which is epistemically good in itself (e.g., truth, knowledge, cognitive contact with reality, understanding). Good- based versus motivation-based accounts

The motivational account of intellectual virtue and vice Motivational accounts of vice claim that bad motivations are necessary for vice. Can be motivation-based or bad-based Intellectual vices have motivational components These include motives to pursue not as mere means things which are epistemically bad in themselves. Qualifications The intellectually vicious person may also be motivated to seek for their own sake things such as power or influence which are not epistemic. There can be many motives for activities so that intellectually vicious persons may have mixed motives: some good and some bad. There is no ultimate motive shared by every intellectual vice

Epistemic Malevolence and Motivation Epistemic malevolence as the opposition to the epistemic good as such (or for its own sake) in all its incarnations or to others’ share in it (Baehr 2010, 192, 204) Ill will toward other people’s intellectual flourishing (e.g., Sophie Auld’s attitude toward Frederick Douglass) Malevolent motive is the motive pursued for its own sake to make the epistemic good one’s own enemy. This is a motive to pursue for its own sake something (being the enemy of the epistemic good) which is epistemically bad in itself. (bad- based) Ill will as both necessary and sufficient for malevolence (motivation-based)

Epistemic Vices and Motivation Three family of views Epistemic vices may require bad motivations (Battaly 2016; 2017). Epistemic vices require the absence of good motivations of the right kind (Zagzebski 1996) Epistemic vices are compatible with good motivations of the right kind (Cassam 2016; Crerar 2017)

Counter-Examples to Motivational Accounts Epistemic Laziness as an example of intellectual vice without a motivational component. Oblomov (Crerar, 2017) Oblomov is epistemically vicious because he is epistemically lazy Oblomov lacks the deep concern for cognitive contact with reality which is shared by all epistemic virtues (cf. Zagzebski 1996) Oblomov also lacks the kind of epistemically bad motivations required by motivational accounts. Oblomov would seem to show that vice is compatible with the absence of bad motives. This would leave open the possibility that epistemic vice requires the absence of the good motives required by virtue.

Counter-Examples to Motivational Accounts Individuals possessing epistemically good motivations but who appear to be vicious (Crerar 2017; Cassam 2016; Montamarquet 1993) Galileo: cares for the truth for its own sake but he is arrogant (Crerar) Oliver: cares for the truth but he is a conspiracy theorist and is dogmatic (Cassam) Gail: cares for the truth but is dogmatic because she overcompensates for her tendencies to gullibility (Montmarquet) These individual are motivated to pursue the truth for its own sake and yet are epistemically vicious.

Answering the Counter-Examples: Oblomov Oblomov regulates his intellectual conduct and has motives His overarching motive - avoid making any effort – is not epistemic Oblomov opposes epistemic labour This is an important motivation of the lazy which explains their indifference to the truth The motivation is to oppose epistemic labour for its own sake Epistemic labour is arguably good in itself (bad- based) “It is better to have tried and failed, then not to have tried at all”

Answering the Counter-Examples: Galileo Galileo is ex hypothesis arrogant. He is also presumed to love the truth for its own sake Galileo is not simply misguided about his intellectual abilities Arrogance presupposes a delight in other people’s epistemic failures Galileo delights in others’ epistemic failures (something which is bad in itself) not simply as a means to further ends (bad based) Galileo is motivated by envy (Motivation based)

Answering the Counter-Examples: Oliver Oliver is conspiracy theorist but is also dogmatic Dogmatism is an unwillingness to engage with views other than one’s own (Battaly MS) Oliver is motivated actively to ignore all relevant evidence that is contrary to his views He pursues this not simply as a means (not exclusively because dogmatism brings further benefits) What he pursues is epistemically bad in itself (bad-based account)

Answering the Counter-Examples: Gail Gail cares for the truth for its own sake, but is aware of a tendency to being gullible. She tries to compensate for it, but overdoes it and becomes dogmatic. Gail may be misguided and thus not dogmatic but only appearing to be such. Alternatively, she does habituate herself into dogmatism. If so, she is not different from Oliver

Vice Attributions and Motivations The attribution of a vice is an explanation of another person’s beliefs or activities that is intended to undermine that belief or action as lacking any rational grounds and to show that it flows from some aspect of the person’s psychological structure. (Cf. Cassam 2015 for a similar view). Vice attributions are psychological explanations of intellectual conduct which undermine their rationality

Explanations of Actions Justifications: An explanation justifies an action or a belief when it adduces considerations (normative reasons) in its favour Rationalisations: A rationalization adduces the (motivating) reasons that the agent takes to support her beliefs or actions Mere explanation: A mere explanation supplies reasons that make the agent’s actions or beliefs intelligible without either justifying or rationalising them. Othello’s killing of Desdemona -no justifying reasons -putative unfaithfulness as motivating reason -jealousy as the motive that makes Othello’s actions intelligible

Vice attributions as mere explanations Mere explanations can invoke motives (but they do not always do so) These motives are not conscious and are not motivating reasons since were one to become conscious of them they would undermine the rationality of the action. Some vice attributions are rationalisations which adduce motivating reasons that are plainly normatively bad (e.g., epistemic malevolence) Usually, vice attributions are psychological explanations that make actions intelligible without rationalising them because they invoke motives of which the agent is not aware. What grounds criticism of vicious people is the badness of their psychological states which are their motivations The practice of vice attribution presupposes that vices include psychological states and that these states are what grounds the legitimacy of criticisms of people for their vices

Vice Attributions and Putative Counter-example The practice of vice attribution appear to undermine the possibility that the arrogant Galileo is arrogant but cares for the truth in the right way Galileo cares that he is the first to discover the truth and not simply that it is discovered. Hence, Galileo does not have virtuous motivations (he is exclusively vicious)

ConclusionS The motivation theory of vice states that motivations are necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) for vice. Among the motivations of vice are motivations to pursue not as mere means things that are epistemically bad in themselves. The badness of their motivations grounds the badness of the vices There is no ultimate motivation common to all vices So-called counter-examples are actually cases in which individuals pursue something epistemically bad in itself (opposing the epistemic good, opposing epistemic labour, delighting in others’ epistemic failures, ignoring evidence) not exclusively as a means to further ends The practice of vice-attribution accords best with the motivational approach than with its alternatives