Tools for the Analysis and Design of Complex Multi-Scale Networks: Dynamics; Security; Uncertainty MURI Annual Review Columbus OH, October 14, 2010 J.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Impact of Interference on Multi-hop Wireless Network Performance Kamal Jain, Jitu Padhye, Venkat Padmanabhan and Lili Qiu Microsoft Research Redmond.
Advertisements

Routing and Congestion Problems in General Networks Presented by Jun Zou CAS 744.
1 Intrusion Monitoring of Malicious Routing Behavior Poornima Balasubramanyam Karl Levitt Computer Security Laboratory Department of Computer Science UCDavis.
MIT and James Orlin © Game Theory 2-person 0-sum (or constant sum) game theory 2-person game theory (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma)
Software Diversity for Information Security Gaurav Kataria Carnegie Mellon University.
1 EL736 Communications Networks II: Design and Algorithms Class8: Networks with Shortest-Path Routing Yong Liu 10/31/2007.
TCP Stability and Resource Allocation: Part II. Issues with TCP Round-trip bias Instability under large bandwidth-delay product Transient performance.
Temporal Action-Graph Games: A New Representation for Dynamic Games Albert Xin Jiang University of British Columbia Kevin Leyton-Brown University of British.
Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks Ron Banner and Ariel Orda Department of Electrical Engineering Technion- Israel Institute of Technology.
A Payment-based Incentive and Service Differentiation Mechanism for P2P Streaming Broadcast Guang Tan and Stephen A. Jarvis Department of Computer Science,
Global Synchronization in Sensornets Jeremy Elson, Richard Karp, Christos Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker.
Bluenet a New Scatternet Formation Scheme * Huseyin Ozgur Tan * Zifang Wang,Robert J.Thomas, Zygmunt Haas ECE Cornell Univ*
1 A Game Theoretic Formulation of the Dynamic Sensor Coverage Problem Jason Marden ( UCLA ) Gürdal Arslan ( University of Hawaii ) Jeff Shamma ( UCLA )
Establishing Pairwise Keys in Distributed Sensor Networks Donggang Liu, Peng Ning Jason Buckingham CSCI 7143: Secure Sensor Networks October 12, 2004.
Game Theory.
Game theoretic modeling, analysis, and mitigation of security risks. Assane Gueye NIST/ITL/CCTG, Gaithersberg NIST ACMD Seminar Tuesday, June 7, 2011.
Budhaditya Pyne BEE-IV Roll No: Jadavpur University.
Learning dynamics,genetic algorithms,and corporate takeovers Thomas H. Noe,Lynn Pi.
Helsinki University of Technology Systems Analysis Laboratory 1 London Business School Management Science and Operations 1 London Business School Management.
Evaluating the Vulnerability of Network Traffic Using Joint Security and Routing Analysis Patrick Tague, David Slater, and Radha Poovendran Network Security.
Network Aware Resource Allocation in Distributed Clouds.
Overcast: Reliable Multicasting with an Overlay Network CS294 Paul Burstein 9/15/2003.
Topology aggregation and Multi-constraint QoS routing Presented by Almas Ansari.
Transit price negotiation: repeated game approach Sogea 23 Mai 2007 Nancy, France D.Barth, J.Cohen, L.Echabbi and C.Hamlaoui
De-Nian Young Ming-Syan Chen IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing Slide content thanks in part to Yu-Hsun Chen, University of Taiwan.
Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d) Presented by Erion Lin.
Inoculation Strategies for Victims of Viruses and the Sum-of-Squares Partition Problem James Apnes, Kevin Change, and Aleksandr Yampolskiy.
Models in I.E. Lectures Introduction to Optimization Models: Shortest Paths.
1 VISA: Virtual Scanning Algorithm for Dynamic Protection of Road Networks IEEE Infocom’09, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Jaehoon Jeong (Paul), Yu Gu, Tian He.
6 December On Selfish Routing in Internet-like Environments paper by Lili Qiu, Yang Richard Yang, Yin Zhang, Scott Shenker presentation by Ed Spitznagel.
1 What is Game Theory About? r Analysis of situations where conflict of interests is present r Goal is to prescribe how conflicts can be resolved 2 2 r.
Vasilis Syrgkanis Cornell University
1 Slides by Yong Liu 1, Deep Medhi 2, and Michał Pióro 3 1 Polytechnic University, New York, USA 2 University of Missouri-Kansas City, USA 3 Warsaw University.
Algorithms For Solving History Sensitive Cascade in Diffusion Networks Research Proposal Georgi Smilyanov, Maksim Tsikhanovich Advisor Dr Yu Zhang Trinity.
Caching Games between Content Providers and Internet Service Providers
Yiting Xia, T. S. Eugene Ng Rice University
Satisfaction Games in Graphical Multi-resource Allocation
Greedy Algorithms General principle of greedy algorithm
COmbining Probable TRAjectories — COPTRA
Suhankar Mishra1, Thang N. Dinh2, My T. Thai1, and Incheol Shin3
Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies
A Study of Group-Tree Matching in Large Scale Group Communications
Abdul Kader Kabbani (Stanford University)
Dynamic Graph Partitioning Algorithm
The countable character of uncountable graphs François Laviolette Barbados 2003.
Impact of Neighbor Selection on Performance and Resilience of Structured P2P Networks Sushma Maramreddy.
Minimum Spanning Tree 8/7/2018 4:26 AM
Center for Complexity in Business, R. Smith School of Business
Aspiration-based Learning
IEEE Student Paper Contest
Structured Models for Multi-Agent Interactions
Towards Next Generation Panel at SAINT 2002
Robustness of wireless ad hoc network topologies
Power Control in WLANs for Optimization of Social Fairness
Robustness of wireless ad hoc network topologies
Throughput-Optimal Broadcast in Dynamic Wireless Networks
CASE − Cognitive Agents for Social Environments
Strayer University at Arlington, VA
Formation of Community-based Multi-hop Wireless Access Networks
Javad Ghaderi, Tianxiong Ji and R. Srikant
Resource Allocation in a Middleware for Streaming Data
A Secure Ad-hoc Routing Approach using Localized Self-healing Communities MobiHoc, 2005 Presented by An Dong-hyeok CNLAB at KAIST.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING IENG314 OPERATIONS RESEARCH II SAMIR SAMEER ABUYOUSSEF
Resource Pooling A system exhibits complete resource pooling if it behaves as if there was a single pooled resource. I propose ‘extent of resource pooling’
MinMax Theorem John von Neumann
Games with Chance Other Search Algorithms
A Study of On-Off Attack Models for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IIS Progress Report 2016/01/18.
Normal Form (Matrix) Games
Presentation transcript:

Tools for the Analysis and Design of Complex Multi-Scale Networks: Dynamics; Security; Uncertainty MURI Annual Review Columbus OH, October 14, 2010 J. Walrand, PI

Contents: Dynamics of Local Protocols Security of Graphs Games with Uncertainty

Dynamics of Local Protocols: Scientific Objectives Approach: An Example General Approach Example 1 Example 2

Scientific Objectives Researchers propose new protocols for networks The protocols are based on local interactions These protocols are difficult to evaluate New methodology for Delays Transients Impact of mobility

Approach: An Example Link 1 Link 2 Link 3

Approach: An Example (continued)

Approach: An Example (continued)

Approach: An Example (continued) How to evaluate delays, mobility, transients? Service rate of queue 1 = P({1}) + P({1, 3}) => Service rate of queues = f(R) = f(q)

Approach: An Example (continued) How to evaluate delays, mobility, transients?

General Approach: Local interactions, randomized protocols Use fluid limit approximation to get ODEs Evaluate ODEs for transient analysis, delays, mobility

Example 1: ODEs vs. Simulations

Example 2: ODEs vs. Simulation

Example 2: ODEs + Simulations with Virtual Arrivals

Security of Graphs: Model Theorem Examples Application Algorithm

Model: Graph Goal of Network Manager: Choose a Spanning Tree T to minimize Probability of Attack Goal of Attacker: Attack a Link L to maximize Probability that L is in T Attacker: + 1 Manager: - 1 One-Shot Zero-Sum Game (Simultaneous Actions)

Theorem: There is a Nash Equilibrium where Attacker attacks only the links of a critical set C, with equal probabilities Manager chooses only trees that have a minimal intersection with C, and have equal likelihood of using each link of C, not larger than that of using any link not in C. [Such a choice is possible.] There is a polynomial algorithm to find C [Cunningham] Critical Set: C if it has a maximal vulnerability ν(C) where

Example 1: Critical Set: C if it has a maximal vulnerability ν(C) where ν(C) = 4/7 Every spanning tree must use at least 4 links of C, i.e., 4 out of 7 links of C. This fraction is maximal for C. Note that the fraction is only ½ for the minimal cut set.

Example 1: ν(C) = 4/7 Nash equilibrium: Attacker attacks each link of C with probability 1/7; Manager chooses spanning trees that use only 4 links of C, in such a way that the probability that a chosen tree uses a particular link of C is 4/7, and this probability is not larger than for any link not in C.]

Example 2: Critical Set: C if it has a maximal vulnerability ν(C) where ν(C) = 1/2 Every spanning tree must use at least 1 link of C, i.e., 1 out of 2 links of C. This fraction is maximal for C. In this case, C is the minimal cut set.

Example 2: ν(C) = 1/2 Nash equilibrium: Attacker attacks each link of C with probability 1/2; Manager chooses spanning trees that use only 1 link of C, in such a way that the probability that a chosen tree uses a particular link of C is ½, which is not larger than the probability of using any link not in C.

Application: Network Design: How to choose a topology with minimal vulnerability? V(G) = 3/4 V(G) = 3/5 V(G) = 2/3 2/3 > 3/5

Games with Uncertainty: Excess of Caution can Hurt Should one be Optimistic?

Excess of Caution can Hurt Relay Network:

Excess of Caution can Hurt Relay Network:

Optimism Best Response: Consistency: Attitude:

Optimism Attitude Game: Example: Consistent Sets: Attitude Game: