Spatio-temporal information in society: evolution of cooperation Gilberto Câmara Licence: Creative Commons ̶̶̶̶ By Attribution ̶̶̶̶ Non Commercial ̶̶̶̶ Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/

Everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Hardin) Tragedy of the Commons? Everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Hardin)

Preconditions for the tragedy of the commons Lack of restraint on pursuits of self-interest Consequences are externalities (I don’t have to pay)

Externalities in the global commons Activity of one person has an impact on the well-being of another. Positive externalities (or external benefits): Benefits realized by those who didn’t pay for them. Negative externalities (or external costs): Costs borne by those who didn’t generate them. Byproducts that harm others. SUVs in USA  Climate Change in Africa

Is the tragedy of the commons inevitable? Experiments show that cooperation emerges if virtuous interactions exist source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

Repeated prisioner´s dillema Four different strategies for repeated prisioner´s dillema source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

Repeated prisioner´s dillema Evolution of prisioner´s dillema comparing different strategies source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)

How can cooperation happen? Nowak MA (2006). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation” Science 314:1560-1563 (most highly cited multidisciplinary paper – ISI, 1st quarter 2010) "I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins“ (J.B.S. Haldane)

Five rules for evolution of cooperation b = benefit for the recepient c= cost for the donor

Common pool resources (Elinor Ostrom)

The ultimate common pool resource

Governing the commons [Ostrom, Science, 2005] 7

Governing the commons: Ostrom´s conditions Clearly defined boundaries Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Collective-choice arrangements: Monitoring and graduated Sanctions. Conflict-resolution mechanisms Minimal recognition of rights to organize. Organized governance activities. 7

Ostrom on governing the commons “The challenge is how best to limit the use of natural resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability.” “Neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.” “Optimal equilibrium with centralized control is based on assumptions concerning accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration.”