Ubiquitous Authentication Using Random Keys

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Presentation transcript:

Ubiquitous Authentication Using Random Keys CAIRN Workshop 13-14 March 1998 David L. Mills University of Delaware mills@udel.edu HTML, PostScript and PowerPoint versions of this presentation are available at http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills 23-Nov-18

Introduction S3 S3 S3 S2 S2 S2 S2 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 * * * * * S4 S3 S3 S2 S2 S2 Workstation Department Servers Campus Servers * to buddy (S2) Network Time Protocol (NTP) synchronizes clocks of hosts and routers in the Internet Provides submillisecond accuracy on LANs, low tens of milliseconds on WANs Unix NTP daemon ported to almost every workstation and server platform available today - from PCs to Crays Well over 100,000 NTP peers deployed in the Internet and its tributaries all over the world 23-Nov-18

Goals Robustness to many and varied kinds of failure, including Byzantine disagreements, malicious attacks and implementation bugs. Our approach is based on diverse network paths, redundant servers and a suite of intricately crafted mitigation algorithms. Autonomous server and client configuration to optimize performance under resource constraints. Our approach is based on Internet multicasting and manycasting, together with engineered drop-add heuristics. Autonomous authentication using a combination of public-key and private-key cryptography. Our approach uses automatically generated and managed random keys with controlled lifetimes and engineered algorithms designed to avoid loss of accuracy due to encryption delays. 23-Nov-18

NTP architecture Peer 1 Filter 1 Intersection and Clustering Algorithms Peer 2 Filiter 2 Combining Algorithm Loop Filter P/F-Lock Loop Peer 3 Filter 3 LCO NTP Messages Timestamps Multiple synchronization peers for redundancy and diversity Clock filters select best from a window of eight clock offset samples Intersection and clustering algorithms pick best subset of peers and discard outlyers Combining algorithm computes weighted average of offsets for best accuracy Loop filter and local clock oscillator (LCO) implement hybrid phase/frequency-lock feedback loop to minimize jitter and wander 23-Nov-18

Clock filter algorithm Server Client T1 T4 Most accurate clock offset q is measured at the lowest delay d (apex of the wedge diagram) Phase dispersion er is weighted average of offset differences over last eight samples - used as error estimator Frequency dispersion ef represents clock reading and frequency tolerance errors - used in distance metric Synchronization distance l = ef + d/2 - used as distance metric and maximum error bound, since correct time q0 must be in the range q - l £ q0 £ q + l 23-Nov-18

Intersection algorithm B m = number of clocks f = number of presumed falsetickers A, B, C are truechimers D is falseticker A D C Correct DTS Time Offset Correct NTP Initially, set falsetickers f and counters c and d to zero Scan from far left endpoint: add one to c for every lower endpoint, subtract one for every upper endpoint, add one to d for every midpoint If c ³ m - f and d ³ m - f, declare success and exit procedure Do the same starting from the far right endpoint If success undeclared, increase f by one and try all over again if f £ m/2, declare failure 23-Nov-18

Delete the survivor smax; reduce n by one Clustering algorithm Sort survivors of intersction algorithm by increasing synchronization distance. Let n be the number of survivors and nmin a lower limit. For each survivor si, compute the select dispersion (weighted sum of clock differences) between si and all others. Let smax be the survivor with maximum select dispersion (relative to all other survivors) and smin the survivor with minimum sample dispersion (clock differences relative to past samples of the same survivor). yes smax £ smin or n £ nmin? no Delete the survivor smax; reduce n by one The resulting survivors are processed by the combining algorithm to produce a weighted average used as the final offset adjustment 23-Nov-18

NTP autonomous configuration - approach Dynamic peer discovery schemes Primary discovery vehicle using NTP multicast and manycast modes Augmented by DNS, web and service location protocols Augmented by subnet search using standard NTP monitoring tools, including ntpq and ntpdc Automatic optimal configuration Distance metric designed to maximize accuracy and reliability Constraints due to fanout limitations and maximum distance Complexity issues require intelligent heuristic Candidate optimization algorithms Multicast mode with or without initial propagation delay calibration Manycast mode with administrative and/or TTL delimited scope Distributed, hierarchical, greedy add/drop heuristic 23-Nov-18

NTP configuration scheme implementation Multicast scheme (moderate accuracy) Servers flood local area with periodic multicast response messages Clients use client/server unicast mode on initial contact to measure propagation delay, then continue in listen-only mode Manycast scheme (highest accuracy) Initially, clients flood local area with a multicast request message Servers respond with multicast response messages Clients continue with servers as if in ordinary configured unicast client/server mode Both schemes require effective implosion/explosion controls Expanding-ring search used with TTL and administrative scope Excess network traffic avoided using multicast responses and rumor diffusion Excess client/server population controlled using NTP clustering algorithm and timeout garbage collection 23-Nov-18

NTP autonomous authentication - approach The circular dilemma: Cryptographic keys must not endure beyond enforced lifetimes Enforced lifetime requires secure timekeeping Secure timekeeping requires cryptographic authentication Authentication and synchronization protocols work independently for each peer, with each allowed to reach a tentative outcome When both authentication and synchronization are complete, the peer is admitted to the population used to synchronize the system clock Complicating this scheme are requirements that the lifetimes of all public keys, including those used to sign certificates, must be enforced as well However, public-key cryptography is too slow for good timekeeping Our approach combines public-key signed credentials, together with pseudo-random key sequences and keyed cryptosums 23-Nov-18

Message propagation time budget Cryptosum and Protocol Processing Cryptosum Output Wait Network Input Wait Time T3b Timestamp T3a Timestamp T3 Timestamp T4 Timestamp T4a Timestamp We want T3 and T4 timestamps for accurate network calibration If output wait is small, T3a is good approximation to T3 T3a can’t be included in message after cryptosum is calculated, but can be sent in next message; use T3b as best approximation to T3 T4 captured by most network drivers at interrupt time; if not, use T4a as best approximation to T4 Largest error is usually output cryptosum Private-key algorithms (MD5, DES-CBC) running times range from 10 ms to 1 ms, depending on architecture, but can be predicted fairly well Public-key algorithms (RSA) running times range up to 100 ms, depending on architecture, but are highly variable and depend on message content 23-Nov-18

MD5 message digest Measured times to construct 128-bit hash of 48-octet NTP header using MD5 algorithm in RSAREF 23-Nov-18

MD5/RSA digital signature Measured times (s) to construct digital signature using RSAREF Message authentication code constructed from 48-octet NTP header hashed with MD5, then encrypted with RSA 512-bit private key 23-Nov-18

NTP autonomous authentication scheme (Autokey) Source Address Dest Address Key ID Session Key Server Key NTP Header Session Key List MD5 Hash MD5 Hash Next Key ID MAC Session keys are generated using IP addresses and key identifiers Initial key identifier is random; each succeeding one is hashed from the previous one Session key list is used in reverse order; clients verify hash of current session key matches most recent session key identifier At intervals, the server generates a pseudo-random session key sequence from a private random seed and a known hash function Session keys are used in reverse order, so clients cannot predict the next one, but can verify the current one is valid using known hash 23-Nov-18

Initial testing and deployment state in NTP Version 4 NTP Version 4 alpha rollout now generally deployed Improved clock discipline accuracy and stability Autonomous configuration and authentication algorithms Revised protocol model to plug security holes Precision time kernels now in Digital Unix 4.x and Solaris 2.6 Testing in local environment Stability problems with certain hardware and software systems remain to be resolved Autonomous configuration greedy add/drop heuristic not yet complete Autokey scheme has problems with Unix socket semantics, especially in multicast configurations Autokey birthday attacks and small key sizes may be a problem 23-Nov-18

Future plans Complete NTP Version 4 protocol testing and validation project Deploy, test and evaluate NTP Version 4 daemon in local network Deploy and test in DARPA testbeds (DARTnet and CAIRN) Deploy and test at friendly sites in the US, Europe and Asia Prosecute standards agendae in IETF, ANSI, ITU, POSIX Revise the NTP formal specification and launch on standards track Participate in deployment strategies with NIST, USNO, others Develop scenarios for other applications such as web caching, DNS servers and other multicast services 23-Nov-18

NTP online resources Internet (Draft) Standard RFC-1305 Version 3 Simple NTP (SNTP) Version 4 specification RFC-2030 Designated SAFEnet standard (Navy) Under consideration in ANSI, ITU, POSIX NTP web page http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp NTP Version 3 release notes and HTML documentation List of public NTP time servers (primary and secondary) NTP newsgroup and FAQ compendium Tutorials, hints and bibliographies NTP Version 3 implementation and documentation for Unix, VMS and Windows Ported to over two dozen architectures and operating systems Utility programs for remote monitoring, control and performance evaluation 23-Nov-18