Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy EUROPOS SÀJUNGA Europos socialinis fondas MYKOLO ROMERIO UNIVERSITETAS   Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

Who is this person? Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004 Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996 What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of Europe

My research Intersection of domestic politics and international relations International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues Connections: The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter? The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik) International regimes & organizations Political markets vs. political contests

Privatizing commercial diplomacy Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors: petition for the initiation of trade disputes consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues attend WTO talks with government officials negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301 US: Private Sector Advisory Committees EU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations

Institutional innovation Nihil nove sub sole? Industry influence on government Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.) Government organizing industry (corporatism) But... Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure International industry groups are being organized by states Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access

Why is this interesting? The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally? Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions Normative issues

Research questions Positive: Normative: What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? Which industries & groups are most active, influential? What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? What are the differences across institutions and polities? Normative: Is “the cart leading the horse”? Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade regime? Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its critics?

Quantitative analysis Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis

Quantitative analysis Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU

Quantitative analysis Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU • Interviews and analysis of documents • Information / opinion from industry, government, and civil-society groups • Emphases: --implementation and politics / process --extent of business-government cooperation --connection to global trade regime --normative questions

Conclusions The petition processes are relatively successful still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry “International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins: institutional causes political/electoral causes hegemony/state-power causes Normative issues: “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory measures Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction