Machine Protection Xu Hongliang.

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Presentation transcript:

Machine Protection Xu Hongliang

Content 1 Machine Interlock 1)Machine Protection and Interlock System 2)Powering Interlock System 3)Beam Interlock System 4) Reliability Issues 2 Beam Dump System 3 Beam Cleaning and Collimation System 4 Detector Protection

1 Machine Interlock System

(1)Machine Protection and Interlock System The machine interlocks are part of the machine protection and include two systems, the powering interlock system and the beam interlock system. The energy stored in the SPPC superconducting magnets and in the circulating beams is unprecedented. An uncontrolled release of energy could lead to serious damage of equipment. Major damage of equipment inside the cryostats will result in long repair times, as the equipment is delicate and difficult to acces. So the functions of the machine protection is : (1)Protect the beam: The system should not generate beam dumps if this is not strictly necessary. Faulty trigger signals that lead to a beam dump should be avoided. (2)Provide the evidence: In case of beam dump or failure in the powering systems, correct diagnostic messages should get to the operator. In case of multiple alarms when one initial failure. (3) Assist the operation of the machine: The diagnostics for failures should be easy to understand. The status of the system must be presented clearly to the operator in the control room and should be transparent.

(2)Powering Interlock System Powering Interlock System ensure: 1)The Powering interlock systems permits powering of magnets if several conditions are met. In the case of a failure, the powering interlock system must ensure a safe stop of powering (“ power abort”) and a discharge of the magnet energy and request a beam dump if necessary. 2) Protection during magnet powering prevents damage to the elements in the electrical circuits, such as magnets, normal conducting and superconducting cables, current leads and power converters. Magnets can be powered independently of beam operation, for example during commissioning and for tests. The full functionality of the protection systems is required for the start of commissioning the magnet powering system. 3)Protection requires dedicated equipment such as the quench protection system, energy extraction system and so on.

Conditions for powering Cryogenics: correct conditions 1.9K, 4.5K, other conditions Safety systems ready (AUG – arret urgence general, UPS – uninterruptible power supplies, …) Power converter ready Magnet protection system ready Power converters Energy extraction Operator / Controls: must give permission to start powering Powering Interlock Controller (PIC) Beam Interlocks Quench in a magnet inside the electrical circuit Warming up of the magnet due to quench in an adjacent magnet Warming up of the magnet due to failure in the cryogenic system AUG or UPS fault Power converter failure

(三)Beam interlock system The beam interlock system permits beam operation. (1)It permits injection into the SPPC when all system are ready for beam. (2)With the circulating beam, the beam interlock system transmits any beam dump request from other systems to the beam dumping system. The system that are essential for protection during beam dumping, collimators and beam dilutors and beam monitors and all of these have an interface to the beam interlock system. Other systems with interface to the beam interlocks are the powering interlocks, RF, injection kickers, vacuum system, access safety system, controls system and the LHC experiments.

LHC Machine Interlocks Devices Movable Detectors Beam Loss Monitors BCM Experimental Magnets Collimator Positions Environmental parameters Safe Beam Parameter Distribution LHC Devices LHC Devices Safe LHC Parameter Software Interlocks Sequencer Operator Buttons CCC LHC Experiments Transverse Feedback Beam Aperture Kickers Collimation System SpecialBLMs Beam Dumping System Beam Interlock System Safe Beam Flag Injection Interlock Powering Interlocks sc magnets Powering Interlocks nc magnets Magnet Current Monitor RF System Beam loss monitors BLM Beam LifetimeFBCM Access System Vacuum System Screens / Mirrors BTV Timing System (Post Mortem Trigger) Magnets Power Converters Monitors aperture limits (some 100) Monitors in arcs (several 1000) MPS (several 1000) Power Converters ~800 AUG UPS Cryo OK Doors EIS Vacuum valves Access Safety Blocks RF Stoppers

(3)Beam Loss and Strategy for Dumping Beam The most probable causes for beam losses are failures in the magnet powering system, with about 1000 magnets powered in thousands of electrical circuits with thousands of power converters. However, there could be many other types of failures. There could be also aperture restriction, with two beams circulating through 53km of beam vacuum pipe containing the beam screen, helium feed-throughs, interconnects, RF shielding etc, many vacuum valves and more than 100 collimators jaws could obstruct the beam passage.

The Categories of Beam Losses The time after a failure at which particle losses become unacceptable was evaluated for many types of failures. This time depends on the failure and several other parameters such as energy, optics and collimator settings and falls into four categories: 1)One turn failures are ultra-fast losses due to a failure during injection or beam dump. 2)Very fast losses in less than 5 ms. 3)Fast losses in more than 5 ms. 4)Steady losses are continuous losses, the lifetime is one second or more.

Reasons and solutions of beam loss (1)One turn failures could happen during injection and extraction. Protection relies on collimators and dilutors which must be correctly positioned with respect to the beam. The beam interlock system ensures that no beam can be injected if the collimators and dilutors are not correctly positioned. (2)Very fast losses: The failure of a D1 normal conducting bending magnet in IR1 and IR5 has been indentified as the fastest mechanism for multi-turn failures. The beam moves and could touch a collimator after a few turn. Another very fast beam loss is expected after a quench of a superconducting dipole magnet. In this case the beam is expected to touch collimator jaws after several 10’s of turns. For failures causing very fast beam movements or emittance blow-up, the beam loss close to aperture limitation (collimators, low-beta quadrupoles, etc.) are detected by beam loss monitors. The loss monitors request a beam dump if the beam loss exceeds a pre-defined threshold. It is also planned to detector rapid beam position changes. If beam orbit movement exceed a predefined value of say, ~0.2mm/ms, the beam are dumped. (3)Fast loss: Beam loss monitors around the machine and signals from equipment in case of hardware failure will be used to generate beam dump request and complement fast beam loss and beam position monitors. (4)Steady losses: The beam losses and heat load at collimators will be monitored. A beam dump in case of unacceptable lifetime is also being considered.

(4)Reliability Issues The correct functioning of powering and beam interlock system is essential to avoid damage of machine equipment. As such they have to be designed as highly reliable and fail safe systems.

2 Beam Dumping System The beam dumping system: The function of the beam dumping system will be to fast-extract the beam in a loss-free way from each ring of the collider and to transport it to an external absorber, positioned sufficiently far away to allow for appropriate beam dilution in order nor to overheat the absorber material.

LHC IR6 Beam dumping system layout

LHC beam dumping line

3 Beam Cleaning and Collimation System

4 Detector Protection

The collaboration work in the future (1) Physics Design of the Beam Dumping System. (2)Physics Design of Beam Dumping Line. (3) The Investigation of Related Physical Topic.

Thank you!

Main dipoles: quench of a magnet Quench in one magnet: Resistance and voltage drop across quenched zone Quench is detected: Voltage across magnet exceeds 100 mV for >10 ms DFB DFB Magnet 2 Magnet 4 Magnet 152 Magnet 154 Magnet 1 Magnet 3 Magnet 5 Magnet 153 Energy Extraction: switch closed Energy Extraction: switch closed Quench Detector Power Converter

Main dipoles: magnet protection Quench heaters warm up the entire magnet coil: energy stored in magnet dissipated inside the magnet (time constant of 200 ms) Diode in parallel becomes conducting: current of other magnets through diode Resistance is switched into the circuit: energy of 153 magnets is dissipated into the resistance (time constant of 100 s for main dipole magnets) DFB DFB Magnet 2 Magnet 4 Magnet 152 Magnet 154 Magnet 1 Magnet 3 Magnet 5 Magnet 153 Energy Extraction: switch open Energy Extraction: switch open Quench Detector Quench Heater PS Power Converter

Magnet and busbar quench detection To detect a quench: U = R  I (about 1 V need to be detected) But one needs to substract from U1: a) U2 = Rwarm  I b) During energy ramp: U = dI/dt  L  154 = 77  (U3 + U4) DFB DFB Magnet 2 Magnet 4 Magnet 152 Magnet 154 Magnet 1 Magnet 3 Magnet 5 Magnet 153 U2 U3 U4 U1 Power Converter World FIP - deterministic Fieldbus