Still Want to Leave the EU? Voters’ Perceptions of Brexit Two Years On John Curtice, Senior Research Fellow, NatCen Social Research Senior Fellow, ‘The UK in a Changing Europe’ whatukthinks.org/eu @whatukthinks

Five NatCen Brexit Surveys September 2016 (1,391) February 2017 (2,322) July 2017 (2,184) October 2017 (2,168) 7 June – 8 July 2018 2,048 members of NatCen’s mixed mode random probability panel = 56% response. Data weighted to known demographic characteristics and pattern of response to original BSA interview.

Two Key Questions Have voters’ expectations and evaluations changed at all during the Brexit process? What impact are these expectations and evaluations having on people’s support for Leave or Remain?

Attitudes towards Free Trade with the EU Base: All respondents

Attitudes towards Treating EU Migrants like non-EU Migrants Base: All respondents

The Possible Trade-Off It has been argued that when Britain leaves the EU, British firms will only be allowed to continue to sell goods and services freely to people in the EU if people from the EU are still free to come here to live and work.  Do you think Britain should or should not allow people from the EU to freely come here to live and work in return for allowing British firms to sell goods and services freely in the EU.  Definitely should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work Probably should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work Probably should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work Definitely should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

How Attitudes towards the Trade-Off Have Changed Base: All respondents

Anticipated Consequences of Brexit for Immigration Base: All respondents

Anticipated Consequences of Brexit for The Economy Base: All respondents

Will the UK Get a Good or a Bad Deal? Base: All respondents

The Turnover of ‘Votes’ Vote Now/Vote 2016 Remain (%) Leave Did Not Vote 90 12 49 6 81 23 Would Not Vote 4 27

How Perceptions of the Economic Consequences Matter Base: All respondents

Including For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016 Base: All respondents

The Distribution of Economic Perceptions Base: All respondents

Views on ‘Soft’ vs. ‘Hard’ Brexit Matter Rather Less Base: All respondents

And Again For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016 Base: All respondents

How Opinion Divides on ‘Soft’ vs. ‘Hard’ Brexit Base: All respondents

Perceptions Of The Likely Deal Are Relatively Unimportant Base: All respondents

Including For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016 Base: All respondents

How Opinions Divide On The Likely Deal Base: All respondents

Laying The Blame Base: All respondents

Conclusion Voters’ expectations and evaluations have changed somewhat during the last two years Less concerned about control of EU migration Less likely to think we will get a good deal More critical of how Brexit is being handled But turnover of support since 2016 related above all to perceptions of the economics of Brexit. The pessimism of Remain voters about those economics outweighs the optimism of Leave voters. Helps explain why the Leave vote is seemingly a little softer – and why 2016 abstainers are inclined towards Remain.

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