Ugandan Military Efforts 1990 - Operation North Self – defense militia (arrow boys and rhino group) 2002 – Operation Iron Fist 2008 – Operation Lightening Thunder 1990 – Operation North: supposed to cut off the local support for the LRA in the north and to arm civilians with bows and arrows (this is the Arrow Group). The operation failed because of the more advanced weapons the LRA had. Operation North resulted in more attacks from the LRA, but it succeed in driving them out of Northern Uganda – at this time the LRA moved to different parts of the region including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan. 2002 – Iron Fist: in 2002 Uganda entered Southern Sudan with about 10,000 troops and succeeded in destroying multiple LRA camps, including the groups main base. This operation, although successful in destroying property, did not capture or harm any LRA leaders. This operation unintentionally pushed the LRA more deeply into Northern Uganda. This lead to thousands more kidnappings and displaced persons. 2008 – Operation Lightening Thunder: Incorporated the governments of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Southern Sudan. This operation was only expected to last one month, but with environmental, logistical, and lack of infrastructure it lasted more than two years. Even with regional cooperation there was still little progress on augmenting a strike against the LRA and there was not much cooperation on ensuring civilian protection. Ever since this operation, civilian protection has been one of the main factors in combating the LRA; this is how they operate and persist – the members of the LRA are regular civilians that had been kidnapped and forced into this organization.

Ugandan non – military efforts 2007 – Forgiveness Tour 2007 – Forgiveness Tour: purpose was to gain support for a program of traditional justice ceremonies designed to bring a permanent end to the LRA. The ‘forgiveness’ was going to come about in amnesties and traditional justice, this justice would include retribution, rehabilitation, reconciliation, compensation, and restoration. The Uganda Government denied intervention of the International Criminal Court because their main concern was not punishment of the LRA but to restore stability to the Ugandan society.

United Nations/ African Union 2012 – African – led Regional Cooperation Initiative Civilian Protection AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (2012) 2012 – African – led regional cooperation initiative: endorsed by the Security Council and was a result of a collaborative approach that included UN – and African Union assessment missions. The counter – LRA regional task force would consist of a coalition of the affected nations that would benefit from donations primarily by the US and UN peacekeeping operations within the countries. Civilian Protection: Since the LRA preys on vulnerable communities, the USAID is helping to make communities less vulnerable by creating “protection communities”, they will identify security threats and assess how to fix the issues. High – frequency radios will also be provided to send out warning signals. Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA: launched in March 2012. Active cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in tackling security issues which pose challenges in Africa. Designed to have three components: the Joint Coordination Mechanism, the Regional Task Force (composed of 5,000 soldiers), and the Joint Operations Centre (component of the Regional Task force and staffed by 30 officers). The task force was tasked with protecting the local civilians who are the most vulnerable to attack and to track and combat LRA elements. When necessary, they are also tasked with asssiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected populations.

U.S. Assistance 2010 – Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2012 – Defense Secretary Leon Panetta proposition 2012 – assistance in Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA 2010 – lord’s resistance army disarmament and northern Uganda recovery act: U.S. policy was now to work with regional governments to remove Kony and his top lieutenants and to protect civilians, demobilize and reintegrate the remaining members of the LRA, and continue humanitarian relief to the areas affected. 2012 – Defense Secretary proposition: Defense secretary Leon Panetta proposed to congress that the United States give $22.5 million to Uganda to fight the LRA. The Department of Defense would pay for logistic support; including transportation services and supplies. The U.S. would not engaged in warfare or lead the task of tracking down Kony because it was believed that the African countries involved had better knowledge of the vast areas in which the LRA operated. 2012 assistance: US government has provided support to the regional task force through the secondment of 100 special forces that will assist with the hunt for Kony and the LRA. The U.S. has headquarters in Uganda with bases in South Sudan, Central African Republic and limited presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. U.S. officials are not allowed to engage in any military confrontation until for self defense. Since U.S. forces have arrived they have assisted in logistical and intelligence support to Uganda’s military. Advisors have helped establish operations and intelligence fusion centers in operating bases. The U.S. State Department field staff have been dedicated to countering LRA efforts that includes cross – boarder information sharing on LRA activates to both military and civilians. Strengthening civilians protection is the main effort.

Conclusions Failure to defeat LRA Recent success that contributes to the defeat Failure: The LRA operates in small groups across vast areas that are heavily forested, making it hard to be found. They move to new territories where they are able to maintain its organizational structure, acquire needed resources, and reproduce patterns of violence until the space is unusable. Recent success: the use of civilian protection and equipping them with proper supplies to better defend themselves has weakened the LRA and their ability to recruit and kidnap. The LRA is still able to persist because there has yet to be any apprehension of Joseph Kony or any of his high – ranking affiliates, which is a leading factor in stopping the LRA once and for all.