What DNSSEC Provides Cryptographic signatures in the DNS

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Presentation transcript:

What DNSSEC Provides Cryptographic signatures in the DNS Integrates with existing server infrastructure and user clients Assures integrity of results returned from DNS queries: Users can validate source authenticity and data integrity Checks chain of signatures up to root Protects against tampering in caches, during transmission Not provided: message encryption, security for denial-of-service attacks

Trust Anchors installed on client resolvers. DNSSEC Chain of Trust “.” – DNS root. Trust Anchors installed on client resolvers. KSK ZSK KSK KSK se. gov. KSK KSK KSK ZSK ZSK ZSK KSKs KSKs KSK KSK opm.gov. nist.gov. KSK’s often serve as the “anchor” of authentication chain. The higher up in the tree, the more useful the trust anchor KSK KSK ZSK ZSK Data Data

Deployment in .gov Policy Drivers: OMB Memo, FISMA Docs and tools: NIST SP 800-81(r1), NIST SP 800-57 Part 3, SNIP Testbed. Two big deadlines OMB Memo: External authoritative zones by Dec 2009 FISMA: 12 months after publication of Controls document (SP 800-53), August/Sept 2010 – all Federal systems. Progress so far: ~70 signed delegations, another 20-30 signed but not chained.

Lessons Learned from Early Deployments Deployment is really a content management exercise, not just a security exercise FISMA, other drivers lead to centralization of many network operations How is the data handled will help how best to deploy Signing is easy, key management is hard HSM’s vs. offline storage key rollover/resigning Communication more important than strong crypto Knowing who to contact (parent zone and subzones) important.

More Lessons Learned Upgrade vs. new purchases Majority of agencies may not need investment in new equipment – upgrades may be enough, but it depends on current plans May choose to for other reasons, but DNSSEC may not be the driver Invest the same importance in the keys as you do the data There is such a thing as overkill Consider information leakage as well Do not need to wait on anybody to deploy first Majority of work is internal operations, interface to parent zone will be in a standard form Practice makes perfect - SNIP