Lecture 45 Discrimination IX Discrimination on Economic Status and Immigration Status

This Lecture Pages 694-706 Discrimination based on Economic Status and Immigration Status San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) Plyler v. Doe (1982)

Economic Status Discrimination The country once had debtors prisons However, attitudes started to change The War on Poverty more programs to assist the poor Providing counsel to the indigent But what standard to apply? Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) Court strikes down one year state residency requirement for welfare benefits They seems to apply strict scrutiny but it also implied the right to interstate travel too This was a fundamental right, but what if a fundamental right not implicated?

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) Background Challenge to the Texas educational funding system It is based on property taxes in the district, so poor areas get less money The state and federal government would add small additional funding The disparity was very great between districts, often correlated with race A lower court said this was discrimination based on economic status They said children were a suspect class and education was a fundamental right

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez- II Arguments For San Antonio School District and the State of Texas Spending per pupil is not a proper measure to use Education is not a fundamental right as recognized by the Constitution or the Court Economic status is not a suspect class The school funding system is rational in it lets local districts to use more of their resources For Rodriguez and other plaintiffs The state draws school district boundaries Education is very important and is a fundamental right The poor are a suspect class The proper standard is strict scrutiny

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez- III Powell, J. for a 5-4 Court He rules that the poor are not a suspect class and there is no strict scrutiny The right to be educated is not found in the Constitution either implicitly or explicitly No Equal Protection requirement for equal per pupil spending The poor are not a suspect class This law does not discriminate against all poor people in Texas The proper standard is therefore rational basis Court finds this formula is rationally related to an legitimate state objective

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez- IV Marshall, J. dissenting Dissents also by Brennan and White, JJ. He thinks everyone has the right to an equal start in life And this means education Therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny There is discriminatory treatment from this policy Note: Many have challenged state funding formulas successfully under state constitutional provisions, but not at the federal level after this case

Discrimination based on Alienage Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) Resident aliens entitled to Equal Protection Graham v. Richardson (1971) Non-citizens are a suspect class Nyquist v. Mauclet (1977) Resident aliens cannot be denied state higher education financial aid Foley v. Connelie (1978) Not a violation to have a policy to deny aliens a job in law enforcement

Plyler v. Doe (1982) Background Texas passes a law to deny education to the children of those not in the country legally by denying the districts state funds for them They can also deny enrollment to undocumented children Lawsuit filed in Tyler against school that denied children admission who could not prove their citizenship status

Plyler v. Doe- II Arguments For Texas For Doe Education is not a fundamental right, thus law subject to rational basis This is a resource issue for Texas taxpayers Texas has an interest in discouraging illegal immigration For Doe Equal Protection Clause applies to undocumented children San Antonio involved discriminatory education resources, this a complete denial This is not a good means to stop illegal immigration

Plyler v. Doe- III Brennan, J. for a 5-4 Court Powell, J. joins in this opinion unlike San Antonio Marshall concurs to echo his dissent in San Antonio Undocumented children are people “in any ordinary sense of the term” Texas justification for the law is insufficient They see the opposite effect This was directed against children in a discriminatory manner This is a total denial of education This law furthers no substantial state interest This seems to be its own intermediate scrutiny standard But for undocumented immigrants, this standard applies only to children

Plyler v. Doe- IV Burger, C.J. joined by White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ. dissenting They would leave this to the political process Court is seeking to do Congress job here They don’t agree with the policy per se but think it should be left to the legislatures

Next Lecture Pages 706-716 State Action Requirement Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972)