COEVOLUTION of COOPERATION and SELECTIVE INTERACTION －AN EXPERIMENT－

Slides:

Advertisements

Similar presentations

Concepts of Game Theory II. 2 The prisioners reasoning… Put yourself in the place of prisoner i (or j)… Reason as follows: –Suppose I cooperate… If j.

Advertisements

© 2007 Levente Buttyán and Jean-Pierre Hubaux Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks Chapter 10: Selfishness in packet.

Infinitely Repeated Games

Lecture V: Game Theory Zhixin Liu Complex Systems Research Center,

Part 8 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly

Game Theory “Доверяй, Но Проверяй” (“Trust, but Verify”) - Russian Proverb (Ronald Reagan) Topic 5 Repeated Games.

Evolution of Cooperation The importance of being suspicious.

Infinitely Repeated Games. In an infinitely repeated game, the application of subgame perfection is different - after any possible history, the continuation.

The basics of Game Theory Understanding strategic behaviour.

AP Economics Mr. Bernstein Module 65: Game Theory December 10, 2014.

Game Theory. Games Oligopolist Play ▫Each oligopolist realizes both that its profit depends on what its competitor does and that its competitor’s profit.

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism. The Prisoners’ Dilemma Player 2 Player 1.

Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore June 19, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Human Social Dilemmas Cooperation Between Non-Relatives Complex Evolutionary Problem Repeated Interaction, Conditional Cooperation Human Cooperation Often.

PRISONER’S DILEMMA By Ajul Shah, Hiten Morar, Pooja Hindocha, Amish Parekh & Daniel Castellino.

Introduction to Game Theory and Behavior Networked Life CIS 112 Spring 2009 Prof. Michael Kearns.

Game-Theoretic Models for Effects of Social Embeddedness on Trust and Cooperation Werner Raub Workshop on Social Theory, Trust, Social Networks, and Social.

On Bounded Rationality and Computational Complexity Christos Papadimitriou and Mihallis Yannakakis.

Anonymizing Web Services Through a Club Mechanism With Economic Incentives Mamata Jenamani Leszek Lilien Bharat Bhargava Department of Computer Sciences.

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Behavior. Chapter Outline ©2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma: An Introduction.

Agenda, Day 2  Questions about syllabus? About myths?  Prisoner’s dilemma  Prisoner’s dilemma vs negotiation  Play a single round  Play multiple rounds.

Example Department of Computer Science University of Bologna Italy ( Decentralised, Evolving, Large-scale Information Systems (DELIS)

Rationality meets the tribe: Some models of cultural group selection David Hales, The Open University Hales, D., (2010) Rationality.

Presenter: Chih-Yuan Chou GA-BASED ALGORITHMS FOR FINDING EQUILIBRIUM 1.

McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright  2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. GAME THEORY, STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS.

Evolving cooperation in one-time interactions with strangers Tags produce cooperation in the single round prisoner’s dilemma and it’s.

KRUGMAN'S MICROECONOMICS for AP* Game Theory Margaret Ray and David Anderson Micro: Econ: Module.

© 2007 Worth Publishers Essentials of Economics Krugman Wells Olney Prepared by: Fernando & Yvonn Quijano.

Mixed Strategies and Repeated Games

FREE-RIDING and INTERGROUP MOBLITILY Jun Kobayashi (Chicago) Hideki Fujiyama (Dokkyo) Yuhsuke Koyama (Tokyo Tech) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo) August 16, 2004.

Game Theory by James Crissey Luis Mendez James Reid.

1 Social Dilemmas. 2 The Anatomy of Cooperation How does cooperation develop and how is it sustained in an environment where individuals are rewarded.

The evolution of cooperation. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor.

Introduction to Game Theory Presented by 蘇柏穎 2004/12/9 2004/12/9.

Exit for Cooperation --A Simulation Study-- Yuhsuke Koyama (Tokyo Tech) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo) Jun Kobayashi (Chicago) August 15, 2004 ASA, San Francisco.

Games People Play. 10: Evolutionary Games Games People Play. Evolutionary Games What if individuals aren’t as smart and calculating as we have assumed.

Evolving Strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Jennifer Golbeck University of Maryland, College Park Department of Computer Science July 23, 2002.

Game Theory.  The analysis of situations in which players are interdependent.  Or…from the book….  a method of modelling the strategic interaction.

RISE and FALL of COOPERATION Jun Kobayashi (Seikei U) Yuhsuke Koyama (Tokyo I of Tech) Hideki Fujiyama (Dokkyo U) Hirokuni Oura (Teikyo U) August 15, 2005.

KRUGMAN'S MICROECONOMICS for AP* Game Theory Margaret Ray and David Anderson Micro: Econ: Module.

ECONOMICS Paul Krugman | Robin Wells with Margaret Ray and David Anderson SECOND EDITION in MODULES.

FREE-RIDERS and TURNOVER Jun Kobayashi (Chicago) Naoko Taniguchi (Teikyo, Michigan) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo) August 18, 2004 ASA Mini Conference, SF.

OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE THROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD CHOICE ~AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY~ Maastricht University Arno Riedl Ingrid M.T. Rohde Martin Strobel.

Game theory Chapter 28 and 29

Game theory basics A Game describes situations of strategic interaction, where the payoff for one agent depends on its own actions as well as on the actions.

Game Theory and Cooperation

Module 32 Game Theory.

Project BEST Game Theory.

Chapter 12 - Imperfect Competition: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Game theory Chapter 28 and 29

이 장에서는 불완전 경쟁시장에 대해서 학습한다.

Managerial Economics Kyle Anderson

Imperfect Competition

Game Theory Module KRUGMAN'S MICROECONOMICS for AP* Micro: Econ:

Prisoner’s Dilemma with N-Participants and Optional Cooperation

Computer-Mediated Communication

COOPERATION Tit-for-Tat and reciprocal altruism By-product mutualism

Networks and Cooperation

LECTURE 6: MULTIAGENT INTERACTIONS

Managerial Economics Kyle Anderson

ESCAPE from FREERIDERS

Game Theory Fall Mike Shor Topic 5.

Chapter 14 & 15 Repeated Games.

Evolving cooperation in one-time interactions with strangers

Game Theory Lesson 15 Section 65.

When fairness bends rationality: Ernst Fehr meets John Nash

Introduction to RePast and Tutorial I

Collaboration in Repeated Games

Phase transitions to cooperation in the prisoner‘s dilemma

Game Theory Spring Mike Shor Topic 5.

Presentation transcript:

COEVOLUTION of COOPERATION and SELECTIVE INTERACTION －AN EXPERIMENT－ Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ Today is the FIRST day in Europe. (in each slide) Title → SUMMARY → read out → MOVE. Jun Kobayashi (U of Chicago) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U) Hideki Ishihara (Waseda U) February 16, 2003 Cancun, SUNBELT

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ PLAN QUESTION THEORY HYPOTHESES METHOD BUSINESS GAME RESULT CONCLUSION

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ QUESTION MODERN SOCIETIES… Can CHANGE PARTNERS. Divorce, Move, Change Job, Multinational Firms, Immigrate. COOPERATION in Dilemmas… when CHANGE PARTNERS? My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ PRISONERS' DILEMMA Rational to DEFECT, Worse than ALL COOPERATE. Payoff My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. Defection Cooperation # Cooperators

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ LITERATURE COGNITIVE Solution… COMMON VALUE (Sen). STRUCTURAL Solution… SANCTIONS (Olson). STRATEGIC Solution… TIT-FOR-TAT (Axelrod)  LEAST Assumption. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ THEORY SELECTIVE INTERACTION (Dawes), EXITING (Hayashi). EXIT Cooperators' NETWORK. BUT, NONTRIVIAL… b/c Defectors FOLLOW. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. C C D D C D D C

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ HYPOTHESES "EXITING TIT-for-TAT'… TIT-for-TAT in a Group, EXIT when DEFECTED, Cooperate in NEW Group. H1 SOME play "EXITING TFT." H2 Earn MORE than DEFECTORS. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ METHOD Web-based EXPERIMENT. Repeat PD Game in a GROUP, MOVE to ANOTHER Group, ANONYMOUS. 15-20 Subjects (students). 30-40 PD Games; 3-6 Moves. 6 Sessions, 111 Subjects. 2 Universities in Japan. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ BUSINESS GAME Work at one of 4 FIRMS. If D (Work LAZILY), PAYOFF… # Cooperators 4 . # Workers in Firm If C (Work HARD), PAYOFF… D's Payoff － 2. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. Defection Payoff Cooperation # Cooperators

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ EACH MONTH Your CHOICE, PAYOFF Each FIRM's PAYOFF #Workers My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. HOW to WORK?

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ EVERY 6 MONTHS History of Each FIRM's PAYOFF, #Workers Each FIRM's AVERAGE PAYOFF My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. WHERE to WORK?

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ RESULT Mean SD C .40 .24 Move .54 Payoff .80 .38 6 Sessions 111 Subjects My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ DISTRIBUTION move behav. EXIT FIXED RANDOM total TFT 30 10 8 48 All C 1 4 6 All D 7 3 2 12 5 27 Other 18 58 35 111 X2=8.89, p=0.36. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ TEST HYPOTHESIS 1 SOME play "EXITING TFT"? SUPPORTED! INDEPENDENCE b/w BEHAVIOR / MOVE Strategies. 27% (30 in 111) My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ PAYOFF move behav. EXIT FIXED RANDOM total TFT 0.77 0.90 0.80 All C 0.09 0.66 1.01 0.62 All D 0.91 0.87 1.39 0.98 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.79 Other 0.74 0.25 0.84 My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ TEST HYPOTHESIS 2 Exiting TFT BETTER than D? DENIED!! (p=0.06, one-side test). B/c Defectors INVADE. payoff 1 My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. 0.9 ALL D 0.8 EXITING TFT 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 1 2 0.76 0.98

Jun Kobayashi (jun.kobayashi@uchicago.edu) http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/koba/ CONCLUSION Possibility of COEVOLUTION, BUT Needs MORE. To Exclude Defectors, DISTINGUISH Individuals. EMERGENCE of Networks? My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.