Assignment #7 – Solutions

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Assignment #7 – Solutions

Problem 1a Migrating secrets between platform configurations on a single machine. TPM command to seal 𝑆: 𝐶=𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙( 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐴 ,𝑆,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 2 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 3 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 4 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 ) TPM command to unseal 𝐶 and retrieve 𝑆: 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑙( 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉,𝐴 ,𝐶,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 2 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 3 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 4 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 ) 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography

Problem 1b Patching part of the measured OS Before applying the patch, the OS needs to seal 𝑆 to the set of new PCR values that match the patched OS and save this sealed value away Then, after patching, the PCR values of the patched OS will update and allow this sealed value to be unsealed. 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙( 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐴 ,𝑆,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 2 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 3 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅′ 4 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅′ 5 ) 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography

Problem 2 Migrating secrets between machines with TPMs Basic idea: use 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙 (without any PCR values) to encrypt 𝑆 to 𝐵’s TPM. 𝐴 needs a copy of 𝐵’s public encryption key for 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙, so 𝐴 queries the PKI (or perhaps B itself) for a copy of the PKI’scertificate issued to 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 . 𝐴 verifies that the cert chains properly to the PKI’s trusted root, then extracts 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 from the certificate With 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 , 𝐴 computes 𝐶=𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙( 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 ,𝑆) 𝐴 then sends 𝐶 to 𝐵 B computes 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐾 𝐾𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉,𝐵 ,𝐶 =𝑆. 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography

Problem 3 Migrating secrets between machines with TPMs with assurance of equivalent software stacks Before sending 𝑆 to 𝐵 (in any form), 𝐴 should receive from 𝐵 some proof that 𝐵 ′ 𝑠 OS boot sequence (measured by PCRs 0-5) is the same as 𝐴 ′ 𝑠. When 𝑆 is transmitted to 𝐵, 𝐴 should ensure that 𝑆 will only be accessible on 𝐵 if the same software stack is running on 𝐵 as on 𝐴 at the time the migration begins. 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography

Problem 3a “Before sending 𝑆 to 𝐵 (in any form), 𝐴 should receive from 𝐵 some proof that 𝐵 ′ 𝑠 OS boot sequence (measured by PCRs 0-5) is the same as 𝐴 ′ 𝑠.” 𝐴 can request an attestation from 𝐵 to something that includes PCRs 0-5. To make sure the attestation is “fresh”, 𝐴 should send a random challenge value to 𝐵 and ask 𝐵 to 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒 that. 𝐴  𝐵: random value 𝑅 (say 128 bits of random) 𝐵  𝐴: 𝑄=𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒( 𝐾 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐺,𝐵 ,𝑅, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 ,…, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 ) 𝐴 verifies the signature on 𝑄, checks 𝑅 hasn’t changed, checks 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,…, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 . 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography

Problem 3b 𝐴 uses 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙 to encrypt 𝑆 to 𝐵 and the values of PCRs 0-5 “When 𝑆 is transmitted to 𝐵, 𝐴 should ensure that 𝑆 will only be accessible on 𝐵 if the same software stack is running on 𝐵 as on 𝐴 at the time the migration begins.” 𝐴 uses 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙 to encrypt 𝑆 to 𝐵 and the values of PCRs 0-5 We assume 𝐴 has a copy of 𝐵 ′ 𝑠 public encryption key 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 Using 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 , 𝐴 computes 𝐶=𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑙( 𝐾 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝐵,𝐵 ,𝑆, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 ,𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 ,…, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 ) 𝐴 then sends 𝐶 to 𝐵 B computes 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐾 𝐾𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉,𝐵 ,𝐶, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 0 , 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 1 , …, 𝑃𝐶 𝑅 5 =𝑆. 11/27/2018 Practical Aspects of Modern Cryptography