Computer-Mediated Communication

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Presentation transcript:

Computer-Mediated Communication Tournament Debrief

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Why Game Theory for mediated communication? 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Game Theory “Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on what several agents choose to do and where their choices depend on what others choose to do.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/ 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Game Theory and Core Concepts Analytical vs. Behavioral Game Theory Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games Zero and Non-Zero Sum Games One-Shot vs. Repeated Equilibria (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) (example for cooperative game) 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Why the Prisoner’s Dilemma? … demonstrates how communication between individuals can significantly alter “the best strategy” for solving a problem where self interest might otherwise lead to a deficient outcome. 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

The Evolution of Cooperation Axelrod’s famous (1984) tournament allowed individuals to submit any strategy. All strategies played each other in the tournament. The winner was one of the shortest submissions, about 4 lines of code. 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

The Simple Effectiveness of the Tit-for-Tat Strategy Tit-for-Tat: begin with ‘cooperate’ and then do whatever the opponent did on the last turn. 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Lessons from Tit-for-Tat Be nice It starts by cooperating. Most top-scoring strategies do this. Be forgiving It quickly and happily returns to cooperation without holding a grudge. Be able to retaliate It never allows defection to go unpunished. Be clear It is predictable and easy to understand. It pays to be predictable in non-zero sum games. 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Considering the “Shadow of the Future” 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Is Tit-for-Tat Always the Answer? 2-person repeated PD N-person PD Public Good 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Some common complaints… “Hey, isnt this rational choice?” “This stuff explains the problem, not the solution!” “A theoretical tool cannot explain real life, right?” (Picture courtesy vismod.media.mit.edu) 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Revisiting our earlier question…Where does this apply to CMC? Wherever we find mixed-motive situations and collective action… Del.ic.ious 11/28/2018 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore