General trends in collective bargaining in south/south-west Europe since the crisis Contribution to the IndustriALL Europe workshop By Sotiria Theodoropoulou, Senior Researcher-ETUI stheodoropoulou@etui.org Rome, 31st January 2018 Although more expertise on labour market policies, I will focus more on collective bargaining today to be in line with the aims of the workshop. I do not have as much familiarity with all countries to the same extent, so additions to what will be presented are welcome. Material drawn by my work and that of colleagues at the ETUI. We work on collective bargaining, on employment policies and on the impact of austerity in all of them.
Outline Southern Europe: Crisis and responses Developments in collective bargaining by country Some outcomes: coverage, compensation per employee, employment, working hours Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Southern Europe and the crisis Introduce countries by colour codes Unemployment rose substantiall in Greece (orange), Spain (Grey) and Portugal (Green). Relatively more modest increases in Italy (brightblue) and France (yellow) Public debt rose in GR, PT (blue and bright blue), Spain. Debt was high in Italy even though it did not increase substianally during the crisis Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Southern Europe and responses to the crisis GR, PT: Bail-outs in exchange for economic adjustment programmes (internal devaluation, austeritylabour market reforms) IT: benefitted from ECB interventions in the bond markets; ECB exerted pressure for labour market reforms to ‘stimulate output and productivity growth’ ES: high increase in unemployment; received bail-out for its banks; centre-right government (mostly) imposed labour market reforms FR: no crisis but high unemployment and high (by EU criteria) public debt Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Common trends in reforms Underlying guiding principle: emphasis on aligning labour cost developments to productivity growth and turnover developments at the firm level Decentralisation of collective bargaining Some weakening of administrative extension procedures Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Greece: Deregulation and de-coupling of different collective bargaining levels Law 4024 (Oct 2011), Law 4046 and Ministerial Council Act No 6 (Feb 2012) Main aims: restrict the role of sectoral collective bargaining and further decentralising the system to company level Suspension of the process of extension of sectoral and occupational CBAs, at expense of favourability principle ‘Associations of persons’ can sign company CBAs Max duration of CBAs = 3 years; extension of validity period reduced (63 months); reduction of ‘after-effect’ in the absence of new agreements (only basic wage and 4 allowances (seniority, child, education and heavy work)) Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Greece Abolition (since 2012) of unilateral recourse to arbitration and restriction of the subject matter of arbitration to the determination of the basic wage only Suspension (since Feb 2012) of all automatic increases provided by law or CBA until the employment rate <10% The national collective wage agreement no longer sets the minimum wage (now statutorily set) Increase in the quorum needed by first-grade organisations to call a strike to 50% of staff. Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Portugal Changes in 2012, 2014 Allowing the employment contract to regulate in peius issues that previously could only be regulated by collective agreement; declaring null and void or suspending collective agreement clauses that established a more favourable regime for employees than the new reformed law which; reducing the threshold company size, above which non-union workers’ representatives could conclude collective agreements (by delegation of unions), favouring decentralisation (Law 23/2012); reducing all periods concerning the expiry and ‘after-effect’ of collective agreements: the first period was reduced from 5 to 3 years, the survival period was reduced from 18 to 12 months (Law 55/2014); Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Portugal: decentralisation Law 55/2014 also established the possibility of suspending temporarily collective agreements with companies in crisis; severely limiting the administrative extension of collective agreements Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Italy: Proximity agreements allowing for opt-outs Reform passed in September 2011 allowing possibility to derogate by company agreement (proximity agreements) from conventional and statutory provisions, including those governing layoffs Possibility to diverge not only from national/sectoral agreements but also from national law and the Workers’ Statute Company agreements could involve all aspects of labour organisation and production, e.g. recruitment modalities, the regulation of the employment relationship and consequences of termination (excl. for discriminatory layoffs) Reforms focused mostly on employment contracts and unemployment benefits. Some measures also to improve work-life balance. Above reforms did not give employers unilateral right to decide changing working conditions at the company level without trade union reps. Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Spain: decentralisation and opt-outs Reforms of collective wage bargaining in 2012 in 3 important aspects Company-level agreements get priority over sectoral collective agreements (salaries, hours, working ours, shift hours). Significant increase in company level CBAs Company may opt out of applicable CBA as long as it reaches an agreement with the employee representatives. Otherwise, compulsory arbitration automatic extension of collective agreements beyond their expiry date – also known as "ultraactividad" – is restricted to only one year, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
France: Continued decentralisation Reforms in 2013, 2016 (El Khomri law) and 2017 (Macron) Since 2013, companies allowed to conclude ‘job preservation agreements’. Employees refusing new working conditions can be dismissed El Khomri law granted a much more important role to company-level agreements for the regulation of working time. The draft law represents the first stage in the reform of the Labour Code scheduled for completion in 2018. The bill provides also for a ‘company referendum’ that would enable collective agreements to be directly endorsed by the workforce; in addition, it contains new features affecting the rules on employer representativeness, redundancy measures and occupational medicine. Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
France: Continued decentralisation Macron reforms take the El Khomri law further Social dialogue in firms employing <20 workers will not require a trade union representative Expansion of the topics that can now be negotiated at the company level and which would previously be set by law or sectoral agreements (e.g. bonus, 13th month salary) A means for a collectively-agreed breaking of contract Creation of a social and economic committee within firms which will be allowed to negotiate without the presence of a trade union Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Outcomes: Bargaining coverage in decline GR PT IT ES FR 2009 2013 2014 Adjusted bargaining coverage 83 42 82.7 72.9 80 81.4 77.6 98 98 (2012) Bargaining coverage in private sector 69.5 Unadjusted bargaining coverage 57 29 68.1 60.5 81.9 51.1 73.3 69.8 93 93 (2012) Adjusted bargaining coverage=% of all wage earners with right to bargaining; Bargaining coverage in private sector=% of all wage earners with right to bargaining in private sector; unadjusted bargaining coverage=% of all wage earners covered by bargaining Source: Visser J., ICTWSS Database, v.5.1 September 2016 Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Outcomes: Nominal and real compensation per employee Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Outcomes: Employment (numbers of jobs) has yet to recover Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Outcomes: Total annual hours worked have yet to recover Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe
Summary South European countries have faced particular challenges during the crisis: financing of public debt, high unemployment rates, low growth Responses have in several cases been dictated from outside but often also decided by national governments There has been a drive for shifting bargaining to the company level Expansion of issues to be negotiated between company and employees Trend towards excluding trade unions from company level dialogue; questioning of representativeness of trade unions Sotiria Theodoropoulou © etui (2018) IndustriALLworkshop-Collective bargaining in South Europe