Lebanon’s Consociationalism: A Fragile Political Model The basic argument for consociationalism, as opposed to a simple majority rule, is that it prevents the outbreak of open conflict in socially heterogeneous societies Lebanon independence in 1943, its population was divided roughly equally between the Christian and Muslim communities, which can be further broken down to 17 recognized religious sects with three principal religious communities: Maronite Christians, Sunni, and Shi’a Muslims. The three principal religious communities gained the most in terms of political power with clear advantages being initially accorded to the Maronites. This was to assure them that the political supremacy they enjoyed under the French mandate would not diminish after independence.

Article 95 of Lebanon’s 1943 constitution stated that for a temporary but unspecified period, religious sects would be equitably represented in public employment and cabinet posts. The principle of equitable representation was not defined but that the president would be a Maronite, the speaker of the house a Shia, and the prime minister a Sunni. The president appointed the prime minister and cabinet members and could, with the approval of the council of ministers, dissolve the parliament. Under the national accord, Christians enjoyed a 5 to 4 majority in parliament.

In practice, a sectarian formula has been assiduously applied to cabinet posts until today among the six largest religious communities, along with representation of the Armenian community. An overall balance between Christian and Muslims in the cabinet has been maintained throughout.

The fact that a sectarian balance had to be maintained implied that no single political or religious group, or the army, could impose its hegemony or ideology on the society. With the exception of the civil war period, this helped foster civil rights and a level of democratic practices including periodic parliamentary elections. Lebanon’s democracy suffered from a number of shortcomings related to sectarianism, external interventions and discriminatory practices among others

The preamble of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution declares the country as a parliamentary democratic republic. The independence from the French Mandate was gained in 1943 under the same constitution and a “National Pact” that lasted until 1975.

The “National Pact” put in place the Consociational democracy, and it lasted for over thirty years. This form of democracy occurs where “the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population” (Lijphart, 1977: 1). According to Lijphart:

“Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four characteristics. 1- government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society. This can take several different forms, such as a grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, a grand council or committee with important advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top office holders in a presidential system. 2- the mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests, 3- proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, 4- a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs.”

Consociational democracy in belgium Four measures of power-sharing were introduced on national institutions: the government was to consist of an equal number of Dutch and French-speaking ministers, making decisions by consensus; members of the national government were subdivided into separate Dutch and French language groups; language policy legislation and certain constitutional laws were subject to special voting requirements (a majority of each language group, a majority within each, and an overall two thirds majority of yes-votes); and an “alarm bell procedure” which gives 75% of a language group to judge a legislative proposal harmful to relations between the Flemish and French communities, the measure would be postponed and referred to the national government. This procedure designed further to protect French-speakers and also used in the bilingual region of Brussels where it protects the Flemish minority.

CONSOCIATIONALISM IN cyprus (1960) The 1960 Cyprus constitution embodied all the principles of consociational democracy. The president, a Greek-Cypriot, and the vice-president, a Turkish-Cypriot, were to be elected by their respective communities and were to share prerogatives and executive power. A 50- member house of representatives was composed of 35 Greek- and 15 Turkish-Cypriots elected by their respective communities. Either the president or the vice-president could veto legislation passed by the house of representatives in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, but not legislation passed in the communal chambers. The principles of grand coalition and proportionality were further strengthened by the provisions that the council of ministers, the legislature and the public service were all to be apportioned in a ratio of 70% Greek-Cypriot and 30% Turkish-Cypriot, while the army was to have a 60:40 ratio. Measures for autonomy included separately elected communal chambers as well as provisions for separate municipalities in the five main towns, reflecting the separation of the ethnic populations in urban areas