Combinatorial Auctions (Bidding and Allocation)

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Presentation transcript:

Combinatorial Auctions (Bidding and Allocation) Adapted from Noam Nisan

The Setting Set of Products: Each customer can bid: $700 for { AND } $1200 for { } OR $8 for { } $6 for { } XOR $30 for { } $3 for {ANY 3}

Examples “Classic”: E-commerce: (take-off right) AND (landing right) (frequency A) XOR (frequency B) E-commerce: chair AND sofa -- of matching colors (machine A for 2 hours) AND (machine B for 1 hour) XOR XOR

Model We assume: Each bidder c has a valuation function c(S), for any set of products S, describing precisely the price c is willing to pay for S No externalities: c depends solely on S c satisfies: Free disposal: S  T  c (S)  c (T) May satisfy additionally: Complementarity: c (ST)  c (S)+ c (T) Substitutability: c (ST)  c (S)+ c (T)

Issues Consider only Sealed Bid Auctions Bidding languages and their expressiveness Allocation algorithms (maximizing total efficiency) Not deal with payment rules and bidders’ strategies

How Does c Communicates c c sends his valuation c to auctioneer as: a vector of numbers Problem: Exponential size a computer program (applet) Problem: requires exponential number of accesses by any auctioneer algorithm Using an Expressive, Efficient Bidding language

Bidding Language: Requirements Expressiveness Must be expressive enough to represent every possible valuation. Representation should not be too long Simplicity Easy for humans to understand Easy for auctioneer algorithms to handle

AND, OR, and XOR bids {left-sock, right-sock}:10 {blue-shirt}:8 XOR {red-shirt}:7 {stamp-A}:6 OR {stamp-B}:8

General OR bids and XOR bids {a,b}:7 OR {d,e}:8 OR {a,c}:4 {a}=0, {a, b}=7, {a, c}=4, {a, b, c}=7, {a, b, d, e}=15 Can only express valuations with no substitutabilities. {a,b}:7 XOR {d,e}:8 XOR {a,c}:4 {a}=0, {a, b}=7, {a, c}=4, {a, b, c}=7, {a, b, d, e}=8 Can express any valuation Requires exponential size to represent {a}:1 OR {b}:1 OR … OR {z}:1

OR of XORs example {couch}:7 XOR {chair}:5 OR {TV, VCR}:8 XOR {Book}:3

OR-of-XORs example 2 Downward sloping symmetric valuation: Any first item is valued at 9, the second at 7, and the third at 5. {a}:9 XOR {b}:9 XOR {c}:9 XOR {d}:9 OR {a}:7 XOR {b}:7 XOR {c}:7 XOR {d}:7 {a}:5 XOR {b}:5 XOR {c}:5 XOR {d}:5

XOR of ORs example The Monochromatic valuation: Even numbered items are red, and odd ones blue. Bidder wants to stick to one color, and values each item of that color at 1. {a}:1 OR {c}:1 OR {e}:1 OR {g}:1 XOR {b}:1 OR {d}:1 OR {f}:1 OR {h}:1

Bidding Language: Limitations Theorem: The downward sloping symmetric valuation with n items requires exponential size XOR-of-OR bids. Theorem: The monochromatic valuation with n items requires exponential size OR-of-XOR bids.

OR* Bidding Language (Fujishima et al) Allow each bidder to introduce phantom items, and incorporate them in an OR bid. Example: {a,z}:7 OR {b,z}:8 (z phantom) equivalent to (7 for a) XOR (8 for b) Lemma: OR* can simulate OR-of-XORs Lemma: OR* can simulate XOR-of-ORs

Allocation A computational problem: Input: bids Outputs: allocation of items to bidders Difficult computational problem (NP-complete) Existing approaches: Very restricted bidding languages (Rothkopf et al) Search over allocation space (Fujishima etal, Sandholm) Fast heuristics (Fujishima etal, Lehman et al)

Integer-Programming Formalization Relaxation: produces “fractional” allocations: xj specifies fraction of bid j obtained If we’re lucky, the solution is 0,1 Integer-Programming Formalization n items: m atomic bids: Goal: Maximize social efficiency subject to constraints 0

The Dual Linear Problem n items: m atomic bids: Goal: Minimize Implicit Prices subject to constraints

The meaning of the dual Intuition: yi is the implicit price for item i Definition: Allocation {xj} is supported by prices {yi} if Theorem: There exists an allocation that is supported by prices iff the LP solution is 0,1

When do we get 0,1 solutions? Theorem: in each one of the cases below, the LP will produce optimal 0,1 results: Hierarchical valuations 1-dimensional valuations Downward sloping symmetric valuation OR of XORs of singletons “independent” problems with 0,1 solutions problem with 0,1 solution + low bids