Frank Joop Global Business Development

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Presentation transcript:

Design Safety into Your Plant Mary Kay O’Conner Process Safety Symposium Frank Joop Global Business Development Intergraph Process, Power & Marine

Be Pro-active – “SAFETY FIRST”

Safety is at the Forefront

Was this your plant…………….

Contributors to an accident The Basics Risk Reduction Instrument are a well accepted risk reduction system Safety for personnel, facility and environment Contributors to an accident Course Process deviation What is released to the atmosphere

Risk Reduction Necessary Risk Reduction Actual Risk Reduction (ALARP) Residual Risk Tolerable Risk Process Risk Increasing Risk Necessary Risk Reduction Actual Risk Reduction (ALARP) SIS Relief Alarms BPCS Design Process ALARP stands for As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Tolerable Risk

The Standards ISA S84.01 and IEC 61508 Framework for the design Key steps are: Process design HAZOP and Risk analysis Determine protection layers Define Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Define SIS Specification of SIS Design Operating procedures Commissioning Modification coupled back to the process design

Risk Assessment What if Checklist What if/ Checklist HAZOP FMECA FTA Method Smaller system For repeatable systems For proven designs For larger and more complex systems For any type or size system Plus Fast and simple Standardized approach Good and fast method Very thorough Very thorough, with diagrams Minus Not very thorough No new analysis components Need experienced personnel Very time consuming More for individuals rather then a group approach which means less input from experience FMECA=Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis FTA= Fault Tree Analysis

HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? Hazard Identification Likelihood vs. Severity Risk reduction The best, most rigorous method for hazard assessment Team of 5 – 8 experienced engineers, operators Usually after the design / change is complete Impacts time TO market and time IN market

Process Safety Information Systems Design Control Finance Maintenance Safety

Process Safety is Mission Critical Law License to operate Cost Injury, plant damage Abnormal upsets Image Staff Community Marketplace

HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? HAZOP = Hazard and Operability Studies Study of the possibility of deviation from the design intent HAZOP Fundamentals: Deviation Course Key words are: Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Level, Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge), Composition, React Mix, Reduce (grind, crush, etc.), Absorb, Corrode Erode Operational words Isolate, Drain, Vent, Purge, Inspect, Maintain, Start-up, Shutdown Secondary Key Words No, Less, More, Reverse, Also, Other, Fluctuation, Early, Late DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION     

HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? Verifying each system DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION   No, Flow Strainer Blockage Pump cavitations Wrong mixing Pressure measurement At pump Inspection of filter Add instr.

HAZOP’s late in the schedule Process Design Instrument design Piping layout Material ordering HAZOP Found error Design change ($$) Change order for material/equipment ($$$$$)

HAZOP’s late in the schedule Impact / Follow on Effect: DCS Configuration DCS HMI (Graphics) Alarm Management Asset Management Instrumentation Design Procurement Changes Vendor Communications Piping Changes Material Changes Construction Planning Commissioning Spare Parts Loading Documentation Etc... DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION   No, Flow Strainer Blockage Pump cavitations Wrong mixing Pressure measurement At pump Inspection of filter Add instr. Multiple by thousands of potential “Safe-guards”

HAZOP’s – Earlier in the schedule Process Design Make HAZOP part of design process early on Instrument design Piping layout Material ordering HAZOP (final) No errors No Design change No Change order for material/equipment Reduced design and CAPEX risks

The Solution SmartPlant Process Safety enables to design safety into your plant and reduces the operational risks. Design = EPC Operational = OO

SPPS Process Safety information Hazop study Knowledge base Knowledge from experts, captured once only P&IDs Lessons learned Full, auditable record Comprehensive Consistent - Up to 50% time & cost reduction Structured database

Plant safety information today Hazop study Plant safety knowledge Lack of safety data impacts Plant Modification Operation Maintenance

The Solution Equipment Models in SmartPlant Process Safety Knowledge about the behaviour of process equipment is essential for hazard identification. Each equipment type in SPPS has a “Model”. Describes behaviour, failure modes and hazards. Connects to other equipment through ports. Models collected into a “Unit Model Library”. “Instances” of these equipment models are used in the P&IDs which SPPS analyses.

The Solution Flow Modelling… Centrifugal pump: etc… Pin Pout Qout Qin Tout Tin + etc… – noQout noQin Consequence: dry running

The Solution Plant Modelling…

The Solution Equipment Models 270 + Models pre-built !!

The Solution Fault-consequence Lists…

The Solution Fault-consequence detail

The Solution Fault-Consequence Assessment

MoC workflow Existing plant Proposed modification /new batch sheet P&IDs Plant Safety database from SPPS and Hazop study Proposed modification /new batch sheet Run SPPS to find hazards Compare and Hazop new cause-consequences Modify P&IDs Engineering approval Safety approval Final approval Permit to work

The Solution Comparing before and after Hazops

Any more F/C in this Node & deviation? The Solution Brainstorming Any more F/C in this Node & deviation?

HAZOP’s w/ SP Process Safety Traditional HAZOP Study SP Process Safety HAZOP Study Manually divide P&ID’s / Plant into “nodes” to study and mark-up P&ID’s Manually prepare “node” work- sheet Focus on individual node and deviation at a time Manually work to identify fault- Consequence both inside and outside the node Manually identify and document safe- guards / instrumentation Assign actions and manually communicate them to respective disciplines Manually document study for future reference / audits Automatically create “nodes” using intelligent data / rules from SmartPlant P&ID Semi-Automatic preparation of “node” worksheet, interactive navigation and selection from P&ID database Interactive visual aid to P&ID for brain storming activities Automatic recommendations of Safe-Guards Electronic and collaborative assignment of actions for respective disciplines Automatic email-notification of actions, including action management functions Automatically generate HAZOP reports / results History management / comparison reports

Process Safety Integration Vision... TEF TEF TEF CALCULATIONS SP- PID TEF TEF HAZOPS ACCIDENT DATA Data & Document Management Load, Exchange, Share, Collaboration & Integration Technologies CORPORATE SAFETY MEMORY ‘eEngineering Integration Hub’ TEF TEF SPI HUMAN FACTORS TEF TEF MoC BROWSER SPEL SP3D SECURITY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Business Results Achieved Early Hazard Elimination Hazard Identification Automation Risk Assessment Action Management Data Handover Check designs Using CSM Unified record 50% time & cost reduction Project schedule reduction Faster re-hazops Better MoC Lessons learned Safety of acquisitions Better design Make changes before limited, costly Shorter Hazop studies Consistent, thorough, Auditable Re-usable, comparable Visual aid to improve brainstorming Build corporate safety memory (CSM) Capture knowledge of experts once and re-use always Action validation Better action management

Summary Full, auditable, consistent Hazops record Reduced time, cost and tedium Early design checking enables change before becomes costly, limited Knowledge capture and use Company’s experts’ experience lessons learned Hazop study results - living data Supporting MoC Accessible information

Integrating the Engineering Enterprise…