Improving reliability of IRR database

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Presentation transcript:

Improving reliability of IRR database The University of Tokyo Kengo Nagahashi (kenken@elab.ic.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp) Nara Institute of Science and Technology Masasi Eto (masash-e@is.aist-nara.ac.jp) JPNIC IRR Planning Team 2018/11/29

Research Activity of JPIRR Nagahashi Prefix Validation using IRR Database Eto Improvement of consistency among AS policies on IRR database Our goal is Improving reliability of IRR database More widespread use of IRR JPIRR Planning Team investigates 2 research activities One is checking invalid origin AS using IRR Database By Kengo Nagahashi. And the other is Improvement of consistency among AS Policies on IRR database. Our goal is to improve reliability of IRR database and Though its activities, we aim to more wide spread use of IRR 2018/11/29

Prefix Validation using IRR Database The University of Tokyo Kengo Nagahashi (kenken@elab.ic.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp) 2018/11/29

Background One of severe problems in Inter-domain routing; Why happen? Hijacking prefix (black hole) Why happen? One AS propagates invalid origin prefix AS2 AS3 There are several important issues in BGP. And one of severe problems is hijacking prefix also Said black hole problem. The reason why its problem happens is that One AS propagates invalid origin prefix. For example, in this figure, AS5 should announce 133.11/16 but AS4 announces its prefix and AS3,AS2 and AS1 goes AS4 and unreachable problem is happened AS1 AS5 originates 133.11/16 133.11/16=AS5->AS3->AS2 133.27/16=AS4-AS3->AS2 ⇒UNREACH!! AS4 133.11/16 2018/11/29

Counter major Approach Authenticate prefix in BGP update BGP Routers exchange Certificate Candidates: sBGP, soBGP Problem Take long time solution Heavy protocol: To verify certificate per one prefix BGP holds over 120,000 prefixes… There are several counter major approach for Detecting hijacking prefix. One of valid solution Is to authenticate prefix in BGP update To authenticate prefix, BGP routers exchange Certificate. The protocol to exchange Certificate is sBGP and soBGP. But problem is to take long time to deploy and Protocol is heavy . There needs to verify vertificate Per one prefix and current BGP holds One hundred and twenty thousands of prefixes , So it can say it is overhead 2018/11/29

Motivation To check a correct prefix by lightweight and simple What to “check” ? To identify invalid origin prefix To use certificate is too heavy (same as sBGP, soBGP) How to verify? Using IRR Database So our motivation is to check a correct prefix by Light weight and simple method. So what we check? The answer is to Identify invalid origin prefix. As we said previously, To use certificate is too heavy. And next, how to verify prefix? To verify it we use IRR database 2018/11/29

Approach Using IRR as Database router router DB (1)Download request for DB (once a day) router router DB Prefix announcement (2)Response prefix/origin-as pairs (3)Comparison with (1) and (2) Example: #show invalid route Network origin origin in DB 199.31.20.0/24 2400 568 Our approach is consists of 3 flows. One is router issues download request for Database one a day And second, Database response prefix/origin-as pairs to routers Finally, router can compare prefix in BGP update and prefix in Database. As database we us IRR 2018/11/29

simple protocol Download Response Router requests Download to DB Frequency is once a day Response DB responses to router Response prefix/origin-as pairs which stores in DB There needs simple protocol to communicate Router and Database. One is Download message . Router requests Download to Database one a day. Next is Response message , Database responses to router With prefix/origin-as pairs 2018/11/29

Problems to be solved Future Work Router Overhead Utilization of IRR To hold 120,000 prefix/origin-as pairs is overhead? Utilization of IRR All entries are registered in IRR database? Duration of update Is Once a day too long ? There are several issues to be solved. One is router overhead , this means Router hold one hundred twenty thousands of prefix/origin-as pairs The other is utilization of IRR. All Entries are no registered in IRR database. 2018/11/29

Consistency Check among AS policies Nara Institute of Science and Technology Masasi Eto (masash-e@is.aist-nara.ac.jp) 2018/11/29

auto-configuration with IRR Generate router configuration from routing policy registered in IRR with “RtConfig” Policy IRR RtConfig Config AS 1 AS 2 2018/11/29

Consistency among AS policies Inconsistencies Inconsistency of import in routing information Inconsistency of export in routing information As a result When we generate the router configurations from IRR database, the connectivity between peering ASes will be lost. IRR inspects only policy’s syntax. → Need to inspect policy’s semantics 2018/11/29

Inconsistency of import AS 3 import AS 2 AS 3 AS 4 AS 5 export AS 2 AS 3 AS 4 ------- IX 3 AS 1 AS 2 AS 4 AS 5 2018/11/29

Inconsistency of export AS 3 import AS 2 AS 3 AS 4 ------- export AS 2 AS 3 AS 4 AS 5 IX 3 AS 1 AS 2 AS 4 AS 5 2018/11/29

Classification of Inconsistencies Inconsistencies of import Peer AS-SET doesn’t exist on IRR database Peer AS doesn’t exist on IRR database Peer AS doesn’t export any route to the AS Peer AS doesn’t export route which the AS imports Inconsistencies of export Peer AS doesn’t import any route from the AS Peer AS doesn’t import route which the AS exports 2018/11/29

Policy Check Server Policy Checker Database Checker Inspects if the policy is consistent with peer ASes’ policies Database Checker Inspects how many inconsistencies exist on unified IRR database. 2018/11/29

Example - query 2018/11/29

Example - result 2018/11/29

Analysis of Inspection Result Registered Ases: 11696 -> 55.8% of AS has at least one inconsistency 2018/11/29

Detail of Inconsistencies Classification Number Rate Peer AS-SET doesn’t exist on IRR database 482 0.2 % Peer AS doesn’t exist on IRR database 7,971 4.0 % Peer AS doesn’t exist export any routes to the AS 36,333 18.6 % Peer AS doesn’t import any routes from the AS 34,710 17.8 % Peer AS doesn’t export route which the AS imports 11,436 5.8 % Peer AS doesn’t import route which the AS exports 17,753 9.1 % Total 108,685 55.8 % Rate of each inconsistency in all 194,820 import and export sentences 2018/11/29

Future Work Deploy Policy Checker on JPIRR. Implement a function to notify result of investigation to JPIRR users periodically. 2018/11/29