THE ROLE AND STANDARDS OF OIE - AVIAN INFLUENZA (AI) International Avian Influenza Congress 2-5 September 2007 Antalya, Turkey Comments (with copyright) / Commentaires (soumis au Copyright) : Dr Keith Hamilton OIE Scientific and Technical Department

Update on global AI situation Overview of OIE Role and standards of OIE Terrestrial Code, Diagnostic Manual Zoning and compartmentalisation Diagnostics, vaccination Some OIE initiatives Plan

AVIAN INFLUENZA EVENTS 2003- 2004: South East Asia 2005: spread to Central Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe 2006: First cases African Continent (Nigeria) and Middle East Spread to western Europe (mainly in wild birds) 2007: Entrenched in some countries, re-occurrences in others 2003/2004 confined to SE Asia hope that it would remain contained and wouldn’t spread further. 2005 Spread to Turkey and Eastern Europe 2006 first inf. In Africa W.Europe – involvement of wild birds – exact role still unclear and significance of wild birds is still debated. EU surveillance for AI was extended to make it obligatory to carry out surveillance in wild birds in October 2005. 2007 most countries have been able to deal with outbreaks, there have been reoccurrences following elimination in some countries and infection does appear entrenched in others

HPAI SITUATION FROM JAN-DEC 2006: ONGOING AND RESOLVED (INCLUDING NON H5N1) INFORMATION from OIE World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) – collation of reports from members – maps for all lısetd dıseaes on the OIE website. There are many dots on the map, cause for optimism, most are blue. The blue dots indicate resolved outbreaks and red indicate ongoing. Red dots usually go blue 3 months after last outbreak. Although many countries still affected and there have been some reoccurrences, MOST have been able to deal with disease. Also should note that it’s not just H5N1 that causes HPAI, but here in South Africa H5N2 in Ostriches. No surveillance is 100% so there will be a degree of underreporting especially in wild birds.

HPAI SITUATION JAN - AUG 2007 Can see that there have been reoccurrences and it seems to be entrenched in some areas – Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia Risk of disease becoming entrenched in areas with HIGH POULTRY DENSITY and WEAK VETERINARY SERVICES One of the focusses of OIE work is to improve the capacity of vet services.

WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE CURRENT GLOBAL SITUATION ? Behavior of the current H5N1 “Asian strain” Rapid spread through 3 continents Human health component Role of poultry movements and migratory wild birds? Difficulties in detection and control entrenched in Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt Acknowledged economic and social consequences of the current crisis AI is NOT A NEW DISEASE, AI viruses have been around for years Behaviour of HPAI H%N! Asian Lineage is unusual: Rapid spread over 3 continents through Movements of poultry and poultry products – illegal and legal For the first time (for HPAI vs classical theory) there has been suspicion that wild birds may have been involved in introducing HPAI H5N1 to poultry in some cases – although there is ongoing debate. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO CONTROL DISEASE IN WILD BIRDS – such as destroying habitat etc – not effective, not proportionate, may exacerbate problem. HUMAN HEALTH aspect over XXX people dead (CASE FATALITY rate is high) ECONOMIC and SOCIAL consequences of animal diseases have been acknowledged- a step towards addressing them. World bank paper by Dr Francois Legall

WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH OIE An intergovernmental organisation 172 Members Founded in 1924 Headquarters in Paris Regional offices and sub offices Mandate : “to improve Animal Health worldwide” Intergovernmental 1924 predates UN 20+ members. The OIE was set up following an outbreak of Rinderpest in Belgium caused by some Zebu cattle in transit from India to Brazil. Now (2007)- there are 169 member countries + territories of the OIE 5 regional offıces: Asia/Pacific (Tokyo), Americas (Panama, Buenos Aires; central america- Panama), Africa (Bamako), Eastern Europe (Sofia), Middle East (Beirut) Subregıonal offıces: Brussels, Gabarone Broad mandate – can be summarised in the objectives

OIE OBJECTIVES Transparency of global disease situation Provide expertise, encourage international solidarity Collect, analyse, disseminate scientific info. Standards for safe global trade in animals and animal products Promotion of Veterinary Services Food safety (farm level) and animal welfare The lists A+B COMBINED to 1 LIST 100+ diseases affecting mammals, fish, molluscs, bees. Listed diseases – a serious threat to animal health or production or human health. Members report occurrences of these diseases to the OIE, once reported the info is then disseminated to Members. Allows countries to take preventative action reduce the likelihood of further spread. Thru network of ref labs, collaborating centres and codes/guidelines, OIE provides expertise to help countries control disease. Important for developing countries. OIE is looking to extend this capacity and expertise to areas where it is needed through twinning. Constantly review scientific info about disease control – made available to help members to imp. Control. Info disseminated in science and tech reviews Int. standards and guidelines for the control of major animal diseases are developed and set by the OIE on the basis of scientific principles. Supports the requirement of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the WTO that ‘sanitary measures should be scientifically justifiable’. OIE standards are recognised as the reference. measures that countries can use to protect themselves against import of disease through trade. The ability to control disease depends on the strength of national veterinary services. This is a global concern and we want to eliminate disease at source. OIE is assisting countries in improving their veterinary services. One initiative the Performance Vision strategy programme aims to identify gaps – this is the first step. Imp. Synergy with codex alimentarius. OIE deals with risk at farm level BEFORE it is a product e.e salmonella- poultry. Codex Al deals with it once a product

OIE STANDARDS (avaılable on oıe websıte) Terrestrial Animal Health Code Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals Aquatic Animal Health Code Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals safeguard world trade without unjustified barriers i.e. based on scientific principles WTO recognises OIE standards, guidelines and recommendations as the international standards for animal health and zoonoses. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the WTO that ‘sanitary measures should be scientifically justifiable’. CODE Lays down standards, guidelines and recommendations that should be followed to ensure safe international trade in animals and animal products One for terrestrial animals and one for aquatic animals MANUAL The OIE standards for laboratory testing and vaccination are laid out in the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Again, one for terrestrial animals and one for aquatic animals. Code and Standards adopted each year at gen. session by consensus of IC. Any proposed changes are debated before adoption

WHY STANDARDS ARE NECCESSARY International public good Safety of international trade Harmonisation of national legislation and control measures Fairer trade Unregulated trade in animals/animal products - rapid global spread of many animal diseases - potentıal significant impact on livelihoods, economies, human health, animal welfare. If follow guidelines - international trade should ıs safer. Speed and ease of global travel today makes regulations more relevant than ever. Outbreak of TAD in any one country is a risk for the whole international community. Rapid spread and wide occurrence of major TADs including HPAI H5N1 has highlighted the need for a global approach to control – control of widely disseminated disease can only be achieved through HARMONISED global approach. In support of WTO SPS agreement the regulations - based on science and should not result in unjustified trade barriers. i.e. in case of AI allow for trade in products that are processed to be safe, findings in wild birds – do not change country status

STRATEGY FROM OUTSET: MINIMIZE THE THREAT AT SOURCE AVIAN INFLUENZA STRATEGY FROM OUTSET: MINIMIZE THE THREAT AT SOURCE Early detection and early warning Rapid investigation and confirmation of suspects Rapid and transparent notification Rapid response Improvement of governance and legislation MOVE ONTO AVIAN INFLUENZA This current crisis the AIM has always been to eliminate at the POULTRY source (WHO offer the same message) (although be prepared (contingency plans, vaccine production etc in case of pandemic). NOT WILD BIRDS Early detection and reporting provides early warning – neighbouring countries can take precautions and decrease risk of further spread (containment whilst deal with outbreak). Suspect cases should be investigated immediately to confirm or rule out disease- this requires a good reporting network and awareness of what disease may look like. Confirmation requires access to good reliable laboratory. Clinical diagnosis of any avian disease (infectious or other) is problematic, especially in areas where people are used to large numbers of deaths from ND etc. THEREFORE LABORATORY diagnosis is essential. Delays getting samples to the lab can be a real probe. Rapid response is of course important so that measures can be implemented when disease is most amenable to control and reduce direct losses. A medium to long term strategy to improve response of individual country to disease outbreaks. Investing in global control is a universal benefit.

THE OIE STANDARDS FOR AI Terrestrial Code Chapter 2.7.12: Avian Influenza Terrestrial Code Appendix 3.8.9: Guidelines for the surveillance of Avian Influenza Manual : Chapter 2.1.14 Development of guidelines on the implementation of vaccination and for compartmentalisation for AI and Newcastle disease In the CODE and MANUAL specific sections on AI, this is where to find them. Terrestrial code – defines NAI and differentiates HPNAI/LPNAI. Defines poultry. Describes the measures for preventing spread of NAI through trade so member states can protect themselves Appendix on surveillance – specific guidelines on surveillance to detect disease early, declare oneself free, to retain free status and to regain freedom. Provides guidance on surveillance in face of vaccination which is vital if a vaccination programme is adopted.

OIE TERRESTRIAL CODE AI CHAPTER AI Chapter updates sınce 2004 Differentiate between HPAI and LPAI Encourage transparent reporting Appropriate measures Defıne occurrence ın poultry OIE recomends agaınst trade measures ıf fındıngs ın bırds other than poultry Specific risk-based trade recommendations for commodities (egg products, meat products etc) Allowances for vaccınatıon (ıf suffıcıent surveıllance) Specific science based guidelines on what territories can reasonably do to prevent introduction/spread of NAI Over 100 diseases are OIE listed so not every chapter is updated each year. Chapter UPDATE ın 2004 AND SINCE THEN MAIN CHANGES LNPAI and HPNAI were defined LPNAI differentiated from HPNAI - outbreak of LPNAI not have the same consequences for trade as an outbreak of HPNAI. Encouraged reporting of LPNAI Disease occurence on virus isolation or RNA ID (in past sero positive, RNA and virus) FINDINGS IN BIRDS BIRDS OTHER THAN POULTRY – OIE recomends such fındıngs of LPAI or HPAI SHOULD NOT CHANGE STATUS of country – unlike with FMD. safety of certain commodities for trade– science based i.e. egg products, poultry semen etc i.e. material that would not contain virus or that has been treated sufficiently to kill virus -accounts for vaccination i.e. allows trade if sufficient monitoring to provide evidence of disease freedom based on approved surveıllance

NOTIFIABLE AVIAN INFLUENZA (NAI) ‘an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of H5 or H7 subtypes or by any AI virus categorized as HPAI’ HPAI= Any AI virus with IVPI > 1.2 (6wk old chickens) or at least 75% mortality (4-8 wk old chickens) or H5 or H7 subtype with multiple basic amino acids at cleavage site Code defines NAI, HPNAI and LPNAI To date all HPAI viruses have been of subtype H5 or H7 and LPAI of subtypes H5 and H7 have potential to mutate to HPAI. THEREFORE LPAI H5/H7 IN POULTRY notifiable. HPNAI –IVPI (6 wk old chickens greater than 1.2 or mortality over 75% or H5 OR H7 with multiple basic AAs at HAO cleavage site- where enzymes act). New chapter will say REGARDLESS OF PATHOGENICITY IN CHICKENS IF SUBTYPE H5 OR H7 AND HAO CLEAVAGE SITE AA SEQUENCE IS SIMILAR TO ANY OF THOSE OBSERVED IN VIRULENT VIRUSES.. WILL BE CONSIDERED HPNAI. Occurrence of infection is defined as isolation of virus or RNA specific to NAI. POSITIVE SEROLOGY to H5/H7 alone is not occurrence of infection it may indicate prior exposure. All cases of pos serology should be followed up by virological investigation. All occurrences of H5/H7 and HPAIs in poultry should be reported to OIE, only occurrence of HPAI in wild birds need to be reported. OIE RECOMENDS AGAINST TRADE RESTRICTIONS WHEN HPAI FOUND IN ANY OTHER BIRDS THAN POULTRY. For purposes of code- incubation period is 21 days.

POULTRY Birds reared or kept in captivity for the production of meat or eggs for consumption for the production of other commercial products for restocking supplies of game for breeding these categories of birds including backyard poultry, fighting cocks Does not include racing pigeons, birds kept for show, display or as pets DEFINITION IS SPECIFICALLY FOR AI CHAPTER OF CODE Other captive birds or wild birds are not poultry Should be no trade implications if NAI is found in wild birds

GUIDELINES FOR SURVEILLANCE (APP. 3.8.9) Early detection essential for effective control For self declaration of NAI or HPNAI free (from ‘poultry’) status in country, zone or compartment To maintain free status or following an outbreak Can be applied to a country, zone or compartment Even with vaccination Chapter provides guidance on putting together a surveillance programme that aims to detect an outbreak of NAI early so that control can be implemented when disease situation is more amenable to control. Also to provide early warning for other countries Guidance on providing evidence of freedom in poultry for self declaration of freedom from country, zone or compartment. Scientifically impossible to demonstrate the absence of disease in absolute terms, no survey is 100% sensitive or specific. Would need to test every bird every day. Sufficient confidence can be achieved through a combination of approaches and should be adapted to situation Guidelines define how to go about building evidence base for freedom following an outbreak or maintaining freedom. A REQUIREMENT THAT NAI ıs NOTIFIABLE- AWARENESS OF SIGNS IMP

SURVEILLANCE MUST BE adapted to situation (area, risk, epidemiology, resource) A combination of…. Clinical Serological Virological and approaches…. Targeted Random Random targeted Sx should be adapted to the situation based on risk and resources. Different methods should be combined in overall programme. Knowing where flocks are and their characteristics is a great help, some countries have poultry register. Clinical: notifiable status is A REQUIREMENT, awareness of signs, FORMAL reporting networks, HPAI v LPAI (HPAI easier), complications with concurrent disease (ND) or ducks/geese. If the notification system is working properly there should be regular negative investigations. Serological is good for random surveys. Seropositives may result from active infection, prior exposure, maternal abs, vaccinated birds, specificity of test. Therefore not all are the result of active infection and SHOULD EXPECT false +ves. Have a strategy in place for dealing with them. ALL SERO +ve need further inv. Virological – PCR/virus isolation – indicates active infection – cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs should be taken form live birds, pooled tissue samples from dead birds. Strategies – Targeting- can target to higher risk types of production (free range, multi age flocks, multi species flocks, older birds), trade patterns (live markets), use of surface water, poor biosecurity Random surveys- random selection of premises need to do some statistics (knowing national flock size etc) to work out sample size. Random targeted survey i.e. random selection of higher risk flocks, select sample sizes etc

AI STATUS Self declared NAI free establishment NAI free country, zone or compartment HPNAI free country, zone or compartment NAI status can be applied to a country, a zone, compartment or establishment and to HPNAI or NAI (both HPNAI and LPNAI). These are for self declaration of freedom. OIE officially recognises disease freedom for 4 diseases CBPP, BSE, FMD and Rinderpest, not avian influenza. Difficulties with AI certified freedom – wild birds, extensive small farmers, ducks, LPAI, hard to guarantee. OIE publish self declared freedom on WAHID

COUNTRY, ZONE OR COMPARTMENT FREEDOM a country, zone or compartment may be considered free from NAI when it has been shown that neither HPNAI nor LPNAI infection has been present in the country, zone or compartment for the past 12 months Based on surveillance in accordance with Appendix 3.8.9 freedom may be regained after 3 months based on surveillance in accordance with Appendix 3.8.9 and stamping out in the case of HPNAI ‘NAI free’ – evidence that neither LPNAI or HPAI are present based on approved surveillance. When regaining status must stamp out in case of HPNAI but also must carry out surveillance in accordance with guidelines Surveillance inc. clinical surveillance (notifiable status, awareness of signs, susceptible spp., concurrent disease, good veterinary services, targeted- markets etc), serological, virological

CODE DEFINITION OF FREEDOM ‘a country, zone or compartment may be considered free from HPNAI when it has been shown that HPNAI infection has not been present in the past 12 months’ based on surveillance…it does not meet the criteria for NAI freedom its LPNAI status may be unknown but any NAI virus detected is not HPNAI freedom may be regained 3 months after stamping out, based on surveillance Self cert. of freedom from HPNAI. Free from HPNAI but LPNAI status may be uncertain or present (during surveillance LPNAI is isolated). Clinical surveillance for LPAI may be problematic – may require laboratory surveillance.

ZONING AND COMPARTMENTALISATION (CH 1.3.5) Establish/maintain a subpopulation with a different health status within the national borders. Depends on epidemiology, environment, biosecurity, health status of adjacent areas, surveillance…… Zoning: separation by natural or artificial geographical barriers Compartmentalisation: separation via a biosecurity management system NOT ALL DISEASES ARE AMENABLE TO COMP/ZONING (i.e BT) – CSF and AI are good examples Concept can be applied where there are (clearly defined subpopulations with a different health status Zone or comp IDEALLY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE A DISEASE OUTBREAK. Aim is to allow safe trade in certain commodities from that subpopulation when free demonstrated by approved surveillance. Need to provide assurances that it is in fact a separate sub population – guidelines on doing this (the leaflet). Should be considered in advance. The concept follows the principle of ‘basing regulations on science’. Zoning – natural (mountains, rivers etc) or artificial (roads) or legal (country boundaries, protection zones etc) Compartmentalisation – subpopulation defined by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity. Spatial factors and management are imp in both. Implementation depends on epi factors, environmental factors, bio security measures, health status of animals in adjacent areas. To maintain either must invest in biosecurity and surveillance. Valid animal IDENTIFICATION system is a prerequisite as is a TRACEABILITY system

COMPARTMENT Equipment BREEDING FLOCK FEED SUPPLY Feed Equipment Birds Feed Feed Equipment GROWING FLOCK Equipment Birds Birds Equipment Avian flu spread mainly by contact and poultry industry well integrated with distinct units so a good example for compartmentalisation. Within a compartment there are subcompartments – if an outbreak in a subcompartment may introduce a biosecurity barrier to isolate that subcompartment. Birds SLAUGHTER HOUSE GROWING FLOCK Equipment

BENEFITS OF ZONING AND COMPARTMENTALISATION allow safe trade in certain commodities even when country not free incentive for good biosecurity predefined epidemiological groups and lınks wıthın compartment – assist with tracıng contacts In principle a country could separate industrial compartment from backyard flocks if assurances can be given that they are separate subpopulations – OIE checklist can assist i.e. continue trading certain products from industrial sector Incentive/encouragement for good biosecurity – industry can see benefits of investing in biosecurity. Concept can works both ways i.e. disease within or outside compartment. If there is an outbreak in the compartment/zone because the epi groups have been predefined – will help with tracing disease/contacts. National boundaries take precedent (i.e. zone or comp WITHIN national boundary).

Checklist published by OIE practical implementation of compartmentalisation to quickly implement Not part of the code provides practical guidance on what a compartment is and how to establish one quickly.

OIE MANUAL OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND VACCINES FOR TERRESTRIAL ANIMALS A companion volume of the Code To facilitate international trade in animals and animal products by describing internationally agreed upon laboratory methods for diagnosis and requirements for the production and control of vaccines. The OIE standards for laboratory testing and vaccination are laid out in the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. For most listed diseases including avian influenza (AI), clinical diagnosis alone is not sufficient to confirm infection in livestock. Clinical detection of Notifiable Avian Influenza (NAI) may be problematic especially for Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza viruses (LPAI) or for HPAI in areas also affected by other virulent poultry diseases such as Newcastle disease (the two diseases can be difficult to distinguish from one another). Reliable laboratory diagnostics are therefore essential for disease control and safe trade. Assurances about the quality and validity of laboratory results can be provided when laboratories comply with OIE standards. These standards also ensure international harmonisation of laboratory diagnostic techniques. OIE reference laboratories uphold these standards and function as centres of expertise. Early detection is essential for effective control. Problems with clinical dx of many diseases i.e. LPAI or HPAI in areas with concurrent disease (i.e. ND) therefore rely on laboratory diagnosis. Suspicion of listed diseases NEEDS laboratory CONFIRMATION. Need confidence in lab results- Confirmation of disease, or declaring freedom following laboratory surveillance or from individual animals tested (pre/post import) for international trade. Harmonised approach to testing and control for confidence in global trade and for global response to TADs.

DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES Identification of the Agent Assessment of pathogenicity Serological tests Developing techniques The diagnostic manual provides guidance on the following.. First ID that it is influenza A virus then what subtype Then assessment of pathogenicity – in vivo tests (live chickens –IVPI/or 75% mortality), molecular- mutliple basic aas at cleavage sit Developing techniques are not officially recognised so are research tools. All recognised tests start somewhere as research tools.

VACCINATION An important tool, so long as: Meets OIE Standards Post-vaccination monitoring (DIVA, sentınels) guidance on meeting OIE standards for manufacture and potency testing i.e. if HPNAI is used in challenge studies or vx production the facility must meet OIE requirements for Containment Group 4 pathogens. Currently mainly INACTIVATED vaccines are used, there is some use of RECOMBINANT VECTOR (fowl pox, infectious laryngotracheitis) vaccines pros and cons good vaccine plan adapted to the situation, structure of industry, species of bird etc. THIS MUST INCLUDE POST VACCINAL MONITORING, MAINTENANCE OF COLD CHAIN and PLAN FOR ADMINISTERING Vx. Must have an exit strategy – vaccination campaign expensive to sustain i.e. when to stop.

IF A VACCINATION STRATEGY IS USED All vaccinated flocks – virological/serological surveıllance to ensure no virus circulation Test all flocks at least every 6 months (mınımum) Surveillance DIVA – Detection of Infection in Vaccinated flocks And vaccinated birds Serology (different NA) i.e. H5N1 outbreak, H5N2 vaccine Sentinels Vırologıcal Surveillance INCREDIBLY important during a vaccination campaign and must be addressed in the Vaccination plan. Vx protects against disease but not infection therefore CLINICAL disease harder to detect so CLINICAL surveillance in vaccinated birds may be less sensitive. Vx birds can shed virus variably depending on spp (Vx usually reduces viral shedding) – danger of silent spread. All vaccinated flocks should be tested every 6 months or more often. To check: INFECTION NOT PRESENT IN VACCINATED BIRDS Vaccıne ıs ımmunısıng bırds Vaccıne straıns match fıeld straıns DIVA Detection of Infection in Vaccinated flocks And vaccinated birds does just that. Possible approaches Serology- used in Italy, use Vx with different NA to circulating viruses i.e. H5N2 (for H5N1) and serological testing for NA. Sentinels – susceptible non vaccinated birds in contact with vaccinated birds- must be clearly IDENTIFIED for regular serological or virological testing. Virological testing to assess if birds are shedding virus.

CONTROL METHODS THAT VACCINATION COMPLEMENTS Culling (methods, capacity, transportation) Destruction and disinfection Enforceability of movement restrictions Alternative slaughter and marketing procedures Vaccination is a tool to complement other classical techniques – stamping out and good biosecurity. IF vaccination is used without classic control measures – risk of ENDEMICITY. Long term circulation of virus in vaccinated birds may lead to genetic drift away from vx strain. It should not be used alone. Movement restrictions are enforced to prevent spread on contaminated objects/ products or undetected infection in live animals Need a legal backing and to be able to enforce this Alternative marketing procedures instead of live markets etc

GLOBAL OIE EMERGENCY VACCINE BANK Started as vaccine bank for Africa in collaboration with AU/IBAR/PACE and EC Provides free (strategic) stocks of vaccines to countries OIE manages the vaccine fund Delivery of more than 20 million doses of vaccine worldwide OIE- virtual vaccine bank –rolling stock Pharmaceutical co. guarantees to keep vx available and have it within country in 3 days Recipient must guarantee can keep cold chain (if sits on runway in 40C for 48 hours- useless) OIE stock is H5N2 Should have a vaccination plan and an exit strategy

OTHER OIE INTIATIVES OFFLU – joint FAO/OIE network Laboratory Twinning projects A summary of some other interesting OIE initiatives

OIE/FAO NETWORK FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA

OFFLU : OBJECTIVES Offer veterinary expertise to assist in the control of AI Exchange sequence data and virus strains within the network and to share this with the wider scientific community Early detection of new virus strains and sharing of these strains with the WHO reference labs to support early preparation of human vaccines Collaborate with the WHO Influenza Network on all issues on the animal-human interface Identify gaps and develop research on avian influenza (AI) JOINT OIE/FAO NETWORK of expertise Objectives are….. Sequence sharing is important for development of vaccines (both human and animal) and for vaccine matching with field strains, for investigating markers of pathogenicity, for molecular epidemiology (i.e. origin of an outbreak), to track mutations (human health implications, pathogenicity) Other proposed activities- generate timetable of training – avoid duplication, rational approach to

OIE LABORATORY TWINNING Members need to be scientifically competent and capacity to: Debate the scientific justification for standards on an equal footing with other Members Readily apply the guidelines and standards of OIE Objectives Extend network of laboratory capacity and expertise to developing and transition countries where it is currently deficient More even geographical distribution Some may become OIE reference laboratories in their own right TADs global problem – need a global response. Need even global distribution of laboratory capacity and expertise– so all have equal access Current bias of laboratory capacity and expertise to developed countries in northern hemisphere Twinning is a concept that aims to extend expertise and capacity to developing and transition countries by developing and supporting links between parent laboratories (OIE reference labs) and candidate labs in developing countries. Achieved through Twinning project which last 1-3 years. Some but not all candidate labs may get OIE Ref Status As a concept has been used before on a large scale by the EU to assist accession countries with meeting and maintaining standards required for entry into EU

Thank you for listening

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