Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “unethical experimentation” argument 1. The history of cloning nonhuman animals includes a high incidence of major disabilities, deformities, and deaths. 2. To engage in an experimental process that puts individuals at risk of serious disabilities, etc., is morally wrong (unless there is some compelling reason to do so.) 3. The sorts of reasons people do or would have for cloning do not constitute sufficiently good reason to override the reasons against cloning that concern possible disabilities, etc. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “unethical experimentation” argument (cont'd) Thus: 4. Reproductive cloning is morally wrong. The “identity” argument 1. Cloned individuals would inevitably (or very likely) experience certain psychic and social identity “problems” peculiar to being a clone (e.g., being “scrutinized” in relation to older version; being a curiosity). And such “problems” will likely be a source of psychological suffering or stress for the cloned individual. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “identity” argument (cont'd) 2. The fact that some practice would likely cause such suffering is a good moral reason for being morally opposed to it. Thus: 3. There is good moral reason for being opposed to human cloning. The “manufacturing” argument 1. Reproductive cloning involves genetic selection and reproductive technology in bringing about children. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “manufacturing” argument (cont'd) 2. The result of technology is an artifact, or at least something that will likely be treated as one. Add to this the “commodification” of cloning and… 3. As a result, the cloned individual will “not stand on the same plane” as the parents and scientists who were responsible for cloning that individual. 4. Having such a status (not being on the same plane) is dehumanizing. 5. Actions that constitute or are involved in bringing about a dehumanizing existence are morally wrong. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “manufacturing” argument (cont'd) Thus: 6. Reproductive cloning is morally wrong. The “despotism” argument 1. Reproductive cloning “seeks to make one’s children after one’s own image… and their future according to one’s own will.” 2. To impose one’s will on someone else for such purposes is despotic. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Leon Kass, “Preventing Brave New World” The “despotism” argument (cont'd) 3. Despotism is a clear case of treating someone as a mere means. 4. It is wrong to treat someone as a mere means. Thus: 5. Reproductive cloning is morally wrong. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Gregory E. Pence, “Will Cloning Harm People?” A rebuttal of consequentialist arguments against reproductive cloning “Originating humans by SCNT will never be common” because of how expensive it must be. Embryos will not be harmed because they “are not sentient and...thus [are] not the kind of subjects that can be harmed.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Gregory E. Pence, “Will Cloning Harm People?” Regarding harm to SCNT children: 1. Parents need not have bad motives. 2. Genes do not fully determine a child's future. 3. Social prejudices change. 4. Confusion with social, genetic, and kinship ties would not be any worse than that found with twins. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Gregory E. Pence, “Will Cloning Harm People?” “Originating a child by SCNT is not a breakthrough in kind but a matter of degree along a continuum involving twins and a special kind of reproductive choice” Pence presents six cases along a continuum to illustrate this point: Case 1: Natural twins Case 2: Deliberate twinning Case 3: Rebecca Case 4: Susan Case 5: Suzette Case 6: SCNT © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Michael J. Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection” “The deepest moral objection to enhancement lies less in the perfection it seeks than in the human disposition it expresses and promotes.” From a religious perspective: “To believe that our talents and powers are wholly our own doing is to misunderstand our place in creation, to confuse our role with God's.” From a secular perspective: “If bioengineering made the myth of the 'self-made man' come true, it would be difficult to view our talents as gifts for which we are indebted, rather than as achievements for which we are responsible.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Michael J. Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection” This can be thought of as a virtue ethics approach. The proper attitude towards talents regards them as gifts, not mere consequences of effort. The “ethics of effort” is an expression of a kind of arrogance. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Frances M. Kamm, “Is there a Problem with Enhancement?” Michael Sandel's objections to human enhancement, relating to: A designer's desire for mastery Treatment vs. enhancement Parent-child relationships Social justice © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Frances M. Kamm, “Is there a Problem with Enhancement?” Response to “desire for mastery” argument Why doesn't this argument also apply to genetic treatment? Deeper problem: “More generally, it has been argued, the intentions and attitudes of an agent reflect on the agent's character but not on the permissibility of his act.” Scientist example and “saving other to make some people worry” example © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Frances M. Kamm, “Is there a Problem with Enhancement?” Response to “treatment vs. enhancement” argument Sandel's attempt to distinguish treatment and enhancement is not successful. His objection to enhancement does not rule out maintaining natural gifts throughout a greatly extended life span. We need more argument to show that “it is our relation to nature than to persons that should be a primary source of concern with enhancement.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Frances M. Kamm, “Is there a Problem with Enhancement?” Response to “parent-child relationships” argument “To the extent to which Sandel allows training and appliances to be used to transform gifts, should he not also allow genetic transformation that does exactly the same thing?” Response to “social justice” argument Sandel “does not show that we should limit options to enhance ourselves or others as a way of ensuring a right to social assistance.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Frances M. Kamm, “Is there a Problem with Enhancement?” The “lack of imagination” argument (not from Sandel): “in seeking enhancements people will focus on too simple and basic a set of goods,” because “most people's conception of the varieties of goods is very limited.” Thus: “at least in those cases where enhancement—greater goods—is more likely to come about if chance rather than unimaginative choice is in control, the desire for enhancement will militate against control.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Peter Singer, “Parental Choice and Human Improvement” The idea of a genetic “supermarket” Parents aren't harmed, but is a genetic supermarket “bad for the kids”? “Bad for the kid” = “Going to produce a child with a very bad life” “Bad for the kid” = “Not the best thing for the next child of the couple” In these two senses, it is not “bad for the kids.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Peter Singer, “Parental Choice and Human Improvement” Possible negative social consequences of a genetic supermarket Loss of human diversity: Singer takes this to be the least important consequence. Effects of engineering children to have “position goods.” Position goods require that one be different with respect to others (e.g., being taller than average). “Genetic enhancement could lead to a collective action problem, in which the rational pursuit of individual self- interest makes us all worse off.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Peter Singer, “Parental Choice and Human Improvement” Possible negative social consequences of a genetic supermarket (cont'd) Effects on equality of opportunity Here Singer worries about the possibility that “a free market in genetic enhancement will widen the gap between the top and bottom strata of our society, undermine belief in equality of opportunity, and close the 'safety valve' of upward mobility.” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Peter Singer, “Parental Choice and Human Improvement” Addressing these problems Problem with losing diversity: Wait and see if this becomes a problem. If it does, “stop the social experiment.” Problems with positional goods and equality of opportunity Could ban all uses of genetic selection and genetic engineering that go beyond addressing obvious defects. (Three difficulties discussed.) If ban is not feasible, could use a lottery system. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 11: Cloning and Genetic Enhancement Peter Singer, “Parental Choice and Human Improvement” Problems with positional goods and equality of opportunity (cont'd) Singer suggests that the best strategy would be to get the state directly involved in promoting genetic enhancement in order to confer intrinsic goods. © Oxford University Press