Human Security Principle focusing on prevention GROUP 3 Fukasawa, Michiko / LEE, Chae won / CHOI, Seungyeon

2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami Prevention: the comparison of Okirai and Okawa Elementary School 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami ・Near the river ・Had a large mountain behind the school buildings ・During class → Prevention determined whether children could survive or not.

Case1: Okirai Elementary School ・located on lower place than the municipal road → Parents complained to the school → Built a large emergency staircase → All children and teachers survived.

Case2: Okawa Elementary School

14:16 Earthquake convulsed the whole city 15:00 Teachers called the roll of students Started to discuss where they should take refuge at 15:25 Municipality bulletin warned of Tsunami The discussion finished 15:37 The river flooded Students were carried away while evacuating

Lessons: ① Assuming “the worst” is effective ② The administration should listen to what people are anxious about

Hurricane Katrina Prevention: Superdome and FEMA Focusing on New Orleans, Main causes those led to failure Timeline Evaluation

Hurricane Katrina -One of the most dangerous hurricanes in American history Yet New Orleans was not ready New Orleans Poor city NO personal transportation (20%) Levees Can endure up to Category 3 → Katrina: Category 5 Worn-out 1st Cause

Timeline: August, 2005 Category 4→5 Category 4→3 8.27 Katrina: Category 3 Recommends Evacuation Category 4→5 8.28 Mandatory Evacuation Opens Superdome Category 4→3 8.29 Louisiana loses electricity Levees caved in 8.30 Noticed ppl in Convention Center Full Evacuation to Houston Timeline: August, 2005

FEMA(Federal Emergency Management Agency) Until 9/11 After 9/11 Result 2nd Cause Originally belonged to the White House Went under Homeland Security Department (by Congress) Lack of communication Low Efficiency Blame Game

Lack of Consensus within Local Government 3rd Cause Conflict between Mayor and Governor Passive evacuation enforcement Did not connect itself firmly to FEMA and central government

Evaluation Prevention: Less than 50% Authorities did not tried their best on evacuation plan 3/5 Lack of communications between authorities 1/5 Levees: terribly mismanaged 2/5 Shelter: Superdome was nice try, but was not enough 3/5 Prevention: Less than 50%

2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami Prevention: Buffer Zone Policy of Sri Lanka 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami

Timeline Earthquake Buffer Zone Revised Buffer Zone March 2005 26 December 2004 Buffer Zone March 2005 Buffer Zone Revised February 2006 100M landwards from the mean high water line in South coast 200M landwards from the mean high water line in East coast Vary from 35M to 125M standards from the 1997 Coastal Zone Management Plan

Tsunami Impact

Bigger confusion and uncertainty created Buffer Zone Policy Fishing communities forced to be displaced and livelihoods of the most vulnerable being threatened Reconstruction and relocation scheme delayed until policy revision Poorly assessed damages and arbitrary compensation Bigger confusion and uncertainty created

Prevention policy threatening human security Buffer Zone Policy Arbitrary policy without consultation with the victims and professionals Local and village level officers (Grama Sevakas) ill informed of the policy Lacking considerations on deep-rooted ethno-national tensions, intensifying security threats Prevention policy threatening human security

Conclusion Lessons for future preventive measures Prevention - ALWAYS IMPORTANT Assuming the worst case scenario Promoting cooperation among government sectors / between authority and people Understanding and considering vulnerability created by social, political, economic and cultural forces Not a simple work to go through

Thank you 