Electoral Systems and Representative Outcomes Lisa Young University of Calgary

Why so few women? Does the party “selectorate” discriminate? At national level, no evidence of this since mid-1980s BUT qualitative research suggests that minority women asked to run in hopeless ridings Does money matter? No compelling evidence that women have more trouble raising money either to contest a nomination or run a campaign However, persistent belief that raising money poses a barrier for women who might otherwise consider running Motivation for spending limits, limits on contributions to nomination campaigns at federal level

Why women don’t run Women more likely to run if asked Where a riding association has a search committee, there’s more likelihood that a woman will be nominated Few parties employ this practice Women may perceive barriers to entry Family/domestic responsibilities But note that Quebec, BC > PEI, where commuting is easy Persistent gender gap in political interest, information Evidence from US that women’s interest in politics increases when a competitive woman is running

Electoral System Effects Women’s representation has increased faster in PR than single member systems Matland figure This does not mean that PR systems guarantee more representative outcomes Cultural differences Political parties’ approaches to candidate selection

How PR Systems May Foster Representative Outcomes Candidate selection no longer “winner takes all” if district magnitude large enough Parties may worry about unbalanced lists Likely to vary by party ideology In some countries, facilitate legislated quotas Allow parties that choose affirmative action to implement it more easily Generally left-wing parties May have a contagion effect

The Role of Parties A comparative study found that the number of female activists in a party was a slightly stronger predictor of number of women elected than was the electoral system Party ideology will dictate party’s approach Creation of new institutions provides an opportunity to amend party practices

List Construction: Parties versus Voters MMP with closed lists lets parties determine which candidates most likely to be elected Parties can be “held responsible” for list construction Open lists and STV let voters decide Lets parties off the hook Which more likely to foster representative outcomes? Depends largely on voters May try to elect “one of their own” May discriminate against non-traditional candidates Under STV/Open List, how list is ordered may be important

This figure shows the mean change in a party’s vote share in each electoral district from the 1997 election to the 2000 election, broken down by gender. Although imperfect, using the change in the vote share offers something of a control for the party’s competitiveness in each riding. To further control for the party’s competitiveness, three categories are employed: ridings in which the party did not have an incumbent, ridings in which the party had an incumbent, and ridings in which the party won the seat in 1997, but the incumbent did not run again.[1] Positive numbers indicate that the party increased its vote share; negative numbers indicate that the party’s vote share dropped. In the figure, where the difference number is positive, it indicates that male candidates won more votes, on average, than similarly situated female candidates.

MMP: The New Zealand Experience Recall Elizabeth McLeay’s presentation

Microcosmic representation 1966-2002

Pathways to representation: Maori

Pathways to representation: women

Why the shift from list to electorates in 2002? Some evidence that Labour party women elected from list cultivating electorates 3 of 5 Labour women elected from list in 1999 were elected in constituencies in 2002 Change in partisan composition of list-elected seats Away from National toward NZ First, United Future